Features

 

Free at last

Saying goodbye to that nettlesome question: Is it the French Quarter, or the Freedom Quarter?

No one could have been more relieved than I was to see George W. Bush make nice with French President Jacques Chirac. The olive branch he extended during last week’s G-8 summit in Evian, France–though frail–appears to have improved relations. Hopefully it’ll make it easier to have a French last name and to respect my home state again.

When freedom became the name of battered toast and fried pieces of potato, I expected Louisiana to be above the anti-French movement. After all, French culture is more prevalent here than in just about any other state. This has been the case ever since 1682, when Frenchman Rene’-Robert Cavalier arrived in the Mississippi River valley and declared it the territory of France (naming it “Louisiane” in honor of Louis XIV). Louisiana was sold to the Americans in 1803, but the French influence on its way of life has persisted. In fact, in my hometown of New Orleans, the city’s Francophile ways have become the cornerstone of its most important industry, tourism: Every year, revelers from around the world are drawn to the city by its distinct blend of French culture served up with American attitude.

But when French President Chirac openly opposed the U.S.-led effort to invade Iraq last spring, all things French suddenly became suspect. Bottles of French wine bled into sewers; French flags burned. The backlash reached its peak in mid-March, when Republican lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives decided to stage their own culinary coup–purging the menus in their cafeterias of French-named foods and putting “freedom fries” and “freedom toast” in their place.

Given its close ties to France, I was optimistic that the same thing would not happen in Louisiana. A state that packaged and sold its French influence like its seafood would be more mindful of stirring the waters of French denunciation, I thought.

I was wrong. Rather than trying to soothe the tensions brewing on both sides of the Atlantic, Louisianans quickly went on the attack–against France. Politicians condemned the French in ringing tones, even as they continued to market their Mardi Gras events and old-fashioned French ways to tourists. The lowest blow came when Republican state representative A.G. Crowe drafted a resolution to strip Chirac of his invitation to attend the state’s bicentennial celebration of the Louisiana Purchase, which will be held in New Orleans this December (Bush and King Juan Carlos of Spain were also invited). “Through his unwillingness to support the United States and President Bush at this crucial time, Mr. Chirac has appeared to be ungrateful for the tremendous help and genuine friendship that the United States has given to France for many years, including during both World War I and World War II,” Crowe’s resolution read.

Even Louisiana’s governor, Mike Foster, came out in support of the resolution. The Republican repeatedly savaged France in public statements throughout the spring. “People are really fed up with France,” he said last March on his radio show. “We have good relationships with the French people. They must have slipped up and elected somebody who doesn’t like us.”

Slipped up? Chirac’s approval ratings in France exceeded 90 percent at the end of March, when the French leader was sharply criticizing the United States for invading Iraq. Does that mean the French do not like us? If that is true, then we Americans have a much bigger problem on our hands: Other countries that did not support the war must not like us, either.

Now I have my own opinions about the war, but I see no reason to single out France for condemnation. It is one of many countries that opposed the Iraq invasion. And regardless of whether I agree with the French government, I respect the right of others to make up their own minds. Isn’t such freedom of opinion at the heart of our First Amendment?

What our state’s politicians never realized as they were railing against France was that Louisianans were the ones who were going to suffer most from any transatlantic boycott. Louisianan culture is French culture. Should we stop speaking French on the bayou? Stop offering cafe’ au lait and beignets? Burn down New Orleans’ French Quarter–or just rename it the Freedom Quarter? Better yet, cancel Mardi Gras–that’ll really show France!

In a state struggling with high poverty rates and a stagnant economy, perhaps it would have made sense to stay in good standing with a country that employs 10,000 Louisianans and every year sends tens of thousands of tourists to our state–a country that before the war had been showing interest in investing in New Orleans. But some Louisianan politicians were too patriotic to carefully craft their sound bites on France.

Maybe now, though, things will get better. Maybe this recent meeting between Bush and Chirac will bring Louisiana’s politicians to their senses, so that they can concentrate on promoting our state’s economic development rather than crippling our international relationships. And now that some of the wartime emotions have subsided, maybe we Louisianans can start treating other people’s opinions with a little more understanding and respect.

After all, don’t people–even French people–have the freedom to think what they want? Or is freedom reserved for fried potatoes?”

 

The painted ladies of Queens

When modern art masters Matisse and Picasso visit Long Island City, it's their mistresses who take center stage.


From left to right: Henri Matisse, Self-Portrait, 1906. © 2003 Succession H. Matisse/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York; Pablo Picasso, Self-Portrait with Palette, 1906. © 2003 Estate of Pablo Picasso/Artists Rights Society (courtesy of the Museum of Modern Art)

On February 13, 2003, the celebrated Matisse/Picasso exhibition opened to sold-out audiences at the Museum of Modern Art’s temporary residence in Long Island City. I was one of the lucky ones to make it through the doors of this converted storage space on opening day, after purchasing my timed ticket on Ticketmaster weeks before. Crowds lined the streets waiting to take their place beside the art of two modern masters, Henri Matisse (1869-1954) and Pablo Picasso (1881-1973). While the new MoMA is just a few subway stops from midtown Manhattan, the industrial area of Long Island City and the warehouse made me anticipate a freshness about the exhibition. The 133 works on display–many of which have never before been shown to the public–show the well-documented rivalry and surprising collaboration between Matisse and Picasso. The arrangement of the art works reveals more about each of their maker’s preoccupations–Matisse’s experiments with color, for instance, and Picasso’s experiments with shapes and forms.

On a wall of the exhibition, the curators have printed a quote attributed to Picasso in old age:
You have got to be able to picture side by side everything Matisse and I were doing at that time. No one has ever looked at Matisse’s painting more carefully than I; and no one has looked at mine more carefully than he.

The curators place the viewer in the center of this dialogue, and we are given the unique opportunity to do exactly what Picasso wishes we could do. But the exhibition curators didn’t leave room for some questions I wanted to discuss with the artists. While analyzing how Matisse and Picasso used color, forms, and perspective, the curators never address how Matisse and Picasso challenged or failed to challenge traditional representations of women.

While each challenged artistic conventions in different ways, Matisse, despite his novel use of color and space, emerges as the traditionalist by consistently depicting women as passive creatures. Picasso experiments with his women, whereas Matisse’s women simply lie waiting to be looked at.

The MOMA’s mission statement says: “The Museum of Modern Art seeks to create a dialogue between the established and the experimental, the past and the present, in an environment that is responsive to the issues of modern and contemporary art.” While the paintings can speak for themselves, neither the audio guide (which features two of the exhibition’s curators, John Elderfield and Kirk Varnedoe, discussing the works) nor the exhibition catalog allow feminism to enter into this dialogue.


Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, 1907. © 2002 Estate of Pablo Picasso/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. (courtesy of the Museum of Modern Art)

Brothel broads vs. bathers

The pairing of Picasso’s “Demoiselles d’Avignon,” (1907) and Matisse’s “Bathers With A Turtle” (1908) most vividly illustrates the differences in how the artists depict women. In the exhibition catalog, the painter and art historian, John Golding, calls “Demoiselles” “one of those rare individual works of art that changed its very course.” Art historians have called “Bathers with a Turtle” Matisse’s response to “Demoiselles.” The “Demoiselles” shocks, and, juxtaposed with such boldness, Matisse’s “Bathers” is overshadowed.
  
“Demoiselles” breaks with traditional composition, perspective, and Western images of beauty. The painting depicts five standing nude women surrounded by drapery and geometric figures and pieces of fruit at the bottom center of the canvas. Rejecting three-point perspective that creates the illusion of painting as a window on the world, Picasso uses a combination of geometric forms and angular features to show women projecting from the canvas toward the viewer. Three of the five women, who are said to be prostitutes in a brothel in Avignon, Spain, stare directly at the viewer, while the other two look sideways. Two of the women’s faces resemble African masks.

In 1935, Picasso is quoted as saying: “Art is not the application of a canon of beauty but what the instinct and the brain can conceive beyond any canon.” In “Demoiselles,” Picasso rejects the Western canon of beauty–cherubic porcelain-skinned women with generous curves–and paints women with androgynous features. Picasso horrified his contemporaries, particularly Matisse, with this painting that mocks the traditional passive female nude. The demoiselles may be playing one of the most humiliating female roles– the prostitute–but they gaze directly at the viewer. They dare the viewer to objectify them.

“Bathers With A Turtle,” rivals “Demoiselles” in size, but despite the boldness of color, the painting seems lifeless next to it. While the demoiselles seem to jump off the canvas toward the viewer, Matisse flattens out the three-point perspective without trying to invert it like Picasso. Instead, the viewer enters the bathers’ world, watching the women stand timidly, peering at the turtle. Perhaps taking a cue from “Demoiselles,” Matisse does not objectify the women in a typical manner. The three women are engaged in examining the turtle and their nudity is a response to the act of bathing rather than for the enjoyment of the viewer. Like the women in “Demoiselles,” the women do not interact with one another and seem to occupy their own worlds within the painting.

Come hither

Each artist’s treatment of women follows from his generalized artistic methods. As Matisse seeks to find beauty through spatial and color relations, he uses women as one of his primary props. In painting after painting, women sit in his studio beside fruit, goldfish, and some of his other trademark motifs. In Matisse’s “Goldfish and Sculpture” of 1912, a reclining nude female lies at the right side of the picture and a large bowl of red goldfish are placed to the left of this woman. The entire painting is hazily depicted and in typical Matisse style, the colors stand out. In this picture, presumably a studio, one cannot make out the face of the model or sculpture but her breasts are visible as she lies with one arm resting against her head, possibly a provocative pose. Her body blends into a vase with flowers, which rests next to a fish. With my feminist eye, I am sometimes awed, sometimes horrified. There’s beauty in the way he arranges his objects and the colors he chooses even if they are nude women. But I am horrified when the female nude occupies a lower position than a compositional object, in this case, a goldfish.
  
Another Matisse painting, “The Studio, quai Saint-Michel” of 1916-17, features a reclining nude model lying on a red floral couch atop a red floral sheet in Matisse’s studio. Unlike many of his other images of nude models, Matisse depicts her facial features. It is difficult to discern whether the model is simply posing for the painter or is resting between poses. The artist’s chair is empty and the canvas shows a half-drawn painting. The studio, which is a depiction of Matisse’s actual studio at the time in Paris, overlooks water and buildings. Viewing this painting like “Goldfish and Sculpture,” and almost every still life displayed in this exhibit, I come up against the same conflicting responses: My eye jumps toward the bold and unique pairing of colors, and I grapple with Matisse’s unusual use of space. But the image of a woman, devoid of life, is intensely disconcerting. In the other paintings in the exhibition, Matisse depicts nude women in different scenes, colors and the perspective, but still places them in the same role–that of a powerless but sexual object.

Near the end of the exhibition, the curators juxtapose Matisse and Picasso’s depictions of odalisques, which are female slaves or concubines in a harem. Matisse was intrigued by the “Orient” and often incorporated Asian styles of ornamentation in his paintings. Nineteenth-century French artists who had visited the Arab world, such as Eugene Delacroix and Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres, helped to popularize these “exotic” women.

Despite the sharp contrasts between Picasso’s and Matisse’s representations of women, Picasso ultimately chooses the odalisque, one of the most overtly degrading historical images of women and calls it his primary inheritance from Matisse. Picasso told the English surrealist painter and modern art collector, Roland Penrose: “When Matisse died, he left me his odalisques as a legacy, and this is my idea of the Orient, though I have never been there.” Two months after Matisse’s death in 1954, Picasso began a 15 painting cycle on variations of Eugene Delacroix’s “Women of Algiers.” The three paintings displayed in this cycle: “Women of Algiers, After Delacroix, Canvas M,” “Women of Algiers, After Delacroix, Canvas N” and “Women of Algiers, After Delacroix, Canvas O.” In each of these canvases, Picasso breaks the odalisques into unusual forms, but remains true to traditional odalisque image by making the women’s bare breasts a prominent feature in the paintings.

The curators draw specific attention to the image of the odalisque as another major proof that Matisse and Picasso borrowed and learned from each other. The curators compare the use of the odalisque but never probe why Picasso specifically chose the odalisque, the female slave, as his “primary inheritance” from Matisse. Perhaps, this would reveal much more about what the artists sought to learn from one another. Was Picasso’s use of the odalisque simply an homage to Matisse? Or, was Picasso making a larger statement by choosing more traditional female imagery? “Demoiselles” challenged the idea of the female nude and in turn challenged art historical conventions. Could this use of traditional female imagery in the traditional sense signify that Picasso has chosen to backpedal away from the modern? Both Picasso and Matisse’s use of the female imagery speak beyond their ideas of women. They could help the viewer understand more about their broader ideas on painting, what conventions they challenged, and where they were content to reiterate certain long-held Western art practices. By failing to probe how each artist depicts women, the curators leave out a large part of the story.


Pablo Picasso, Girl Before a Mirror, 1932. © 2001 Estate of Pablo Picasso/Artists Rights Society (courtesy of the Museum of Modern Art)

Going beyond the stereotype

I keep gazing at a print of Picasso’s “Girl Before A Mirror” (1932) that hangs on my wall, trying to divine what it is saying. This woman seems to be grappling with her femininity as she reaches her hand into the mirror almost through the image of herself. In the region of her abdomen, Picasso paints circular figures that resemble a womb. The woman’s face resembles a mask split in half, half yellow, half purple. Her image in the mirror shows only half of a mask with red around the eyes. From the mirror image’s eyes hangs a small semi-circle of red, possibly a tear.

While the intensity of color here rivals Matisse’s showiest work, I am drawn to “Girl” by Picasso’s depth of perception. Rather than telling you about the girl’s experiences before a mirror, Picasso lets the viewer watch the girl connect to herself in the mirror. He writes an open-ended sentence. This painting rejects the idea of art as escapism and instead offers this picture as an invitation into the mind of the woman or perhaps even the idea of womanhood.

I also hang Matisse prints on my walls. While Picasso’s works make me seek to understand the objects, I become absorbed by Matisse’s use of color–his reds and yellows warm the entire room. I display his still lifes, though, not his nudes. Looking at Matisse’s works, I continually feel a range of positive emotions. His colors evoke a sense of calm and happiness.

But works by both Matisse and Picasso can simultaneously offend and inspire me. As Matisse and Picasso opened the doors to modern art, they brought with them an inheritance of disempowering female imagery. On my two trips to this exhibit, I found myself standing in an awkward place. To begin to understand what has happened in twentieth century art, I must study and understand these masters, but their depictions upset my vision of the world and a woman’s role in it.

While Matisse and Picasso put me in an uncomfortable position, the curators working in 2003 surprise me with their implicit acceptance of the idea of women as art subjects. Why didn’t they address this issue in their catalog or audio guide? The place of Matisse and Picasso in art history is secure, so why not start questioning some of the other forces at work in their paintings?

While exposing new ideas about Matisse and Picasso and their important contributions to each other’s art and the idea of the modern in art, the exhibit also showed that modern art does not by necessity incorporate modern feminist ideals. As the suffragette movement gained momentum in the early 1900s in the United States and similar feminist movements arose in Europe, these artists continue to use primitive images of sexualized women. Changes in iconography seem to happen much slower than political change. To this day, contemporary art struggles with the inherent conflict between women as art object and women as artist.

The Guerilla Girls, an anonymous group of female artists who protest the marginalization of women in the art world, organized themselves after the MoMA’s 1984 exhibition, “An International Survey of Painting and Sculpture” had only 13 female artists out of 169 contemporary artists exhibited. Since then, the women have crashed major art exhibitions wearing gorilla masks to highlight how female artists are ignored in the mainstream art world. Their provocative posters put art in the wider perspective: “Do women have to be naked to get into the Metropolitan Museum of Art?” one of their posters asks. “Less than five percent of artists in the Modern Arts section are women, but 85 percent of the nudes are female.” These posters and protests serve an important purpose. The highest forms of art that stand in the Metropolitan Museum of Art should be celebrated, and also questioned. By questioning the patriarchal ideals around which Western art developed, women can begin to find a space from which they stand as art viewers and creators.

The Guerilla Girls’ protests kept flashing through my head as I left the exhibit. Maybe we need to shake up the modern art world and remind it that women are not just objects. We can appreciate the beauty of forms and color, but there is also beauty in remembering that women paint, stand, and argue.

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Written by: Maureen Farrell, Inthefray.com Special Features Editor

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Matisse/Picasso
Reunion des Musees Nationaux and the Museum of Modern Art | Tate Publishing | 2002
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Art in Theory: 1900-1990
Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, editors | Blackwell Publishers | Oxford | 1999
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Driving us into the ground

The debate over the true cost of cars.

Let’s go, let’s go, let’s go!” chant the thousands of bicyclers in San Francisco’s Justin Herman Plaza. Gathered for the monthly Critical Mass ride, this gleeful mob will pour into city streets after work, stopping traffic, angering motorists, and generally having a good time. Since Critical Mass’ founding a decade ago, the group has emerged in hundreds of cities, from Warsaw to Taipei.

Though some are just along for the ride, many cyclists have anti-car sentiments they wish to make known. “End Petrotyranny,” reads the hand-written sign pinned to the back of one rider. “The war and our car use is completely connected,” he says as he waits for the March ride to begin.

“The auto is bad technology–gasoline, pollution, isolation, war,” rattles off Critical Mass co-founder Chris Carlsson as he taps on the drums and cowbell that festoon his bike. A wire sprouting from his black hat dangles a dollar bill that jumps to his rhythm.

Then, true to the group’s anarchist principles, the riders lumber off spontaneously with no predetermined route or leader. It’s time to take back the streets from those hurtling steel boxes, if only for an evening.

Critical Mass and its like-minded brethern are the public face of the anti-car movement, doing whatever it takes to discourage, annoy, and guilt-trip drivers off the road. For them, the car is the root of most evil, poisoning the environment and chewing up communities. The two- and three-car garage, the parking lot, and the elevated highway have usurped front porches, dense shops, and vibrant downtown hubs. Whether cars are wee Minis or hulking Hummers, they are “big, greedy, and aggressive,” in the words of Charles Komanoff, an activist who works with www.cars-suck.org and the Bridge Tolls Advocacy Project. “They make everything the same, and they crowd out everything else.”

Though contemporary anti-car protest has its roots in 1960s activism, today rebellion foments in policy institutes, environmentalist organizations, fringe political groups, and academia. In the form of Arianna Huffington’s anti-SUV ads and the What Would Jesus Drive? campaign, it even threatens to go mainstream. For the most part, today’s activists have spurned old-school revolutionary rhetoric. They are confronting the beast on its own terms: Armed with economic analysis and appeals to free markets, they hope to slay the dragon of American auto-dependence and usher in an era of clean mass transit and dense, vibrant urbanity.

The theoretical backbone behind opposition to automobiles is the search for the “true cost” of driving. To reverse the transformation cars have imposed on our cities and communities, the argument goes, drivers should pay for the havoc cars wreak. If transportation were priced fairly, anti-car activists claim, people would choose places to live that favor dense, urban areas and relegate the car to occasional family trips and Sunday drives. Although anti-car papers debate the “true cost” of driving–a figure proving to be rather slippery–some critics claim that the anti-car argument is riddled with economic errors and that the debate goes much deeper to basic issues of freedom and coercion.


Anti-car activity?

Surrogate feet

One of the most inescapable papers on the true cost of driving is “Going Rate: What it Really Costs to Drive,” a 1992 paper from the World Resources Institute. “Motorists today do not directly pay anything close to the full costs of their driving decisions,” writes co-author James MacKenzie. The current transportation system, he says, favors cars by providing direct and indirect subsidies to drivers. MacKenzie posits that this produces a distorted, inefficient market and encourages people to drive excessively.
  
A host of reports from organizations such as the World Resources Institute and the Sierra Club claim to show that automobiles are massively subsidized by both the government and those who bear the costs of pollution, noise, and accidents. The amount of the subsidy varies from $300 billion per year, calculated in the “Going Rate” report, to a staggering $2.1 trillion, as reported by the Sierra Club.

Anti-automobile economists claim that although drivers do pay for their vehicle operating costs and some percentage of road construction and maintenance, they don’t pay for many other costs: roadway land value; municipal services such as highway police that cater to drivers; air, water, and noise pollution; accident costs; resource consumption; land-use impacts; military expenditures in the Middle East to protect oil supplies; and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. For example, according to the Federal Highway Administration, federal, state, and local disbursements for highways were $129 billion in 2000, while user-fee receipts from fuel and vehicle taxes and tolls totaled only $77 billion. The rest of that $52 billion came from general fund appropriations, property taxes, and “other taxes and fees.” These appropriations comprise a direct subsidy, analysts like MacKenzie say.

Congestion is another large external cost–one not created by a producer or consumer. With free access to the roads at all times, drivers do not have to pay more to drive during commutes, when demand for driving is highest. The result of this “market failure” is traffic jams that wastes the time of drivers, time that MacKenzie estimates to be worth at least $100 billion a year.

In essence, writes Alvin Spivak, author of the anti-car tract The Elephant in the Bedroom, our policy toward the car is like the Soviet policy toward bread: The price is kept so artificially low that over-consumption is bound to occur. According to Spivak, Soviet economics in former President Mikhail Gorbachev’s time made rolls so cheap they were often used as surrogate soccer balls. In the United States, cars have become surrogate feet, Spivak argues–and our use of them has mushroomed out of control because using them seems almost free.

Unable to compete against this giveaway, mass transit, once privatized and profitable, is unable to pay its own way. The government has had to take over and, despite intervention, those hapless souls in America who cannot afford a car are ill served by limping bus and rail systems.

Anti-car papers claim that the solution to these two broken systems–the overused auto and ineffectual mass transit–is to restore the free market to transportation. Whether through an increased gas tax that would push the cost per gallon to anywhere from $2.86 to $16.11 (the range is due to different reports’ findings), congestion pricing, or increased user fees, once people start paying for their use of the roads and the damage they cause to the environment, a whole new pattern of transportation use will emerge.

In Europe, where drivers pay up to three times the amount Americans pay for a gallon of gas, it has not been difficult to implement high gas taxes. Gas taxes are not earmarked for highway and road expenses in Europe, and politicians are more willing to raise the tax to increase general revenue. But in the United States, where gas tax revenue must go toward road projects–though increasingly it is being used for mass transit projects, too–raising the price of driving is a tough sell. Some would argue that the gas tax is a third rail that politicians will never touch for fear of angering a public that considers low gas prices a birthright.

But even if it were politically feasible, some say proponents of an increased gas tax are not necessarily using sound economic analysis, despite their claims of “fair pricing.” In the exhaustive report, “The Annualized Social Cost of Motor Vehicle Use in the U.S.,” University of California at Davis economist Mark Delucchi writes that “there is not a single external cost, with the possible exception of CO2 emissions from vehicles, that in principle is properly addressed by a gas tax.” He argues that the majority of external costs imposed by drivers are not a function of how much gas they use. For example, Delucchi says a gas tax would not be a fair way to compensate for noise pollution because gas consumption is not necessarily related to the amount of noise a car produces. A Harley-Davidson motorcycle or a broken muffler will out-noise a Toyota Camry any day, regardless of gas consumption.


Cutting through downtown.

Driving wherever? Priceless

But even if we could accurately determine all the costs driving imposes on society, would that necessarily mean that driving cars is nothing but one big cost? No, critics argue. As any economist can tell you, cost is just one factor. To properly estimate the worth of something, one must weigh its cost against its benefits–something most anti-car analysts have been accused of failing to do.
  
“I think they are trying to affect a cultural revolution,” says Roy Cordato, an economist with the John Locke Foundation, explaining why those who argue against cars don’t factor in the benefits they bring. Cordato calls the reports he has read, including MacKenzie’s piece and tracts from the Sierra Club, “intellectually dishonest…hyperbolic at best, and just outright deceitful.” The anti-automobile leaders are so wrapped up in imposing their vision of society on the public, he says, that they ignore contradictory data and sound economic analysis.

Cordato is a self-described libertarian who loves living on an acre-and-a-half while still being able to drive just thirty minutes to his office in downtown Raleigh, North Carolina. Originally from upstate New York, he speaks with northeastern impatience when the subject turns to anti-car arguments. The costs they are trying to measure, Cordato asserts, are not measurable, and the benefits that are supposed to accrue from a full-cost pricing plan are unknowable. “So-called analyses of the full cost of driving,” he says, “can come to any conclusion the analyst desires.”

The problem, argues Cordato, is that anti-car analysts misunderstand or misuse the economic concept of cost, which refers to opportunity costs–the amount of satisfaction foregone by undertaking a certain activity. For example, if someone must choose between going to the beach or the ballgame and chooses the ballgame, the cost of that decision is the value placed on going to the beach. This value is plainly subjective.

To know the costs of driving, then, “the analysts would have to know the subjectively determined preferences of all the individuals whose lives would be affected” by any changes to the current situation. Because this is impossible, says Cordato, any so-called “full-cost analysis” of driving should not be the basis for a policy that would cause the drastic lifestyle changes advocated by anti-car arguments.

Cordato uses the example of an asthmatic to illustrate his point. We cannot say with certainty that someone with asthma is “better off” in a society where a high gas tax, which theoretically will reduce airborne particulate matter, improves her medical condition. Perhaps the asthmatic values the flexibility and freedom she associates with automobiles more than easier breathing. How are we to know this unless we ask her? And how are we to know, in general, what every individual in society prefers?

Further, if advocates of the full-cost pricing scheme are trying to correct for “market failure”–the linchpin concept in their case against the car–why do they advocate more governmental intervention in the form of taxes, other pricing schemes, or mass transit, Cordato asks. “The transportation system is a mess because there is a lack of markets,” he says. This absence of markets produces a supply of roads that does not reflect demand and generates costs such as noise and pollution that users do not pay. But since we have a completely socialized road system–a centralized authority determines where and when roads are built and does not charge users the market value of using the system–we cannot blame the free market for the system’s failure. “The markets have not failed,” Cordato says. “It is the government, which has a monopoly on the road system, which has failed.”


Highway revolt.

Route 66, Inc.?

Cordato agrees that there is an automobile problem. Roads are under- and overused, and cars cause damages for which victims are not compensated. He points to the interstate highway system as an example: “So much of it is just a waste of concrete. You’ve got miles and miles of super-highway that is empty most of the time.” His solution is to take planning out of the hands of the inept government, privatize the roads and have operators charge people to drive on them, which is abhorrent to anti-car activists. Privatization would take politics out of transit choices and leave them up to the consumer, not the lobbyists. Costly, unprofitable enterprises like unused highways, subways, and light rail likely would go bankrupt. Private bus companies would flourish–not a bright prospect for those who want to lessen or even eradicate car use.
  
For Cordato, central planners and the government can never respond to demand as well as the market, in which millions of individuals make specific economic decisions in incredibly varied situations. When a central authority tries to determine what all these individuals need, then allocate resources and charge fees accordingly, he warns others to be on the lookout for bread-roll soccer balls.

Even if planners could determine what needed to go where and when, special interests would tear their designs apart. Libertarians fear that when you couple these tendencies with the coercive power of the government–eminent domain in the field of town and transportation planning–you have disaster: Just look at the highways that roll through uninhabited ranch lands or have decimated the urban fabric, ripping through neighborhoods in the face of local opposition.

But if roads were privatized, Cordato argues, people would get what they demand. Privatization also would go further in solving the problem of external costs that concern anti-car activists. Whereas now it is virtually impossible to sue the government for pollution caused by the use of its roadways, private companies would not enjoy the government’s luxury of “sovereign immunity” and would have to take issues of harm into account when they plan the construction and operation of roads. If too many people are able to sue a company for the pollution and noise that accompanies the superhighway planned for their backyard, the company probably won’t build it.

What the issue comes down to for libertarians is individual freedom as opposed to the coercive nature of centralized planning. We simply can’t know if society will be “better off” with reduced car use unless we claim to know what is good for all individuals and force that “good” upon them. Only the free market can give individuals what they want without forcing them to comply with the vision of a few far-away planners, argue those who oppose regulating car use.

“Freedom is the one value that allows other values to flourish,” Cordato says. This, he reiterates, is the nut of the debate, something either dismissed or not discussed in anti-car literature. “I want people to get what they want,” he says, with the usual caveat of not allowing the coercion of others. But the anti-car activists, he claims, don’t seem to want that.

Americans have a history of revolting against what Jane Jacobs, in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, called the centralized city planning of “high-minded social thinkers.” This April, residents of San Francisco, home of the first American highway revolt in 1959, tore down some of the elevated highway built across busy Market Street. The lesson seems clear: Far-away authorities and social engineers have no business determining local issues. Are anti-car advocates following the central planning footsteps of the highway builders of yore? If so, the revolutionary visions of the movement could simply lead to more rebellion. In our culture of freedom and choice, utopia may have to be won one driver at a time.

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Driving Forces: The Automobile, its Enemies, and the Politics of Mobility
By James Dunn | Brookings Institution Press | 1998
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URL: http://www.carbusters.org
Prague, Czech Republic

Cars Suck
URL: http://www.cars-suck.org
New York

Critical Mass
URL: http://www.critical-mass.org
Worldwide
Note: There is no official Critical Mass web site; this is just one of many sites devoted to the ride

Federal Highway Administration
URL: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov
Washington, D.C.

John Locke Foundation
URL: http://www.johnlocke.org
Raleigh, North Carolina

Victoria Transport Policy Institute
URL: http://www.vtpi.org
Victoria, British Columbia
A wealth of information on transportation issues, including a huge annotated bibliography on transportation at URL: http://www.vtpi.org/bib.xls

University of California Transportation Center
URL: http://www.uctc.net
Berkeley, California
Download or order scholarly articles on transportation issues, often at no charge.

World Resources Institute
URL: http://www.wri.org
Washington, D.C.
Published the influential report “The Going Rate: What It Really Costs to Drive.”

TOPICS > COST OF DRIVING >

“America’s Autos on Welfare”
URL: http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/articles/subsidies.asp
Sierra Club | 1996
A summary of the economic analyses of the cost of driving.

“The Annualized Social Cost of Motor Vehicle Use in the U.S., 1990-1991”
URL: http://www.uctc.net/papers/311.pdf
By Mark Delucchi | Institute of Transportation Studies | 1997
The above link is to an overview of Delucchi’s extensive report. For additional sections, see URL: http://www.uctc.net/papers/papersnumber.html#300

“The Central Planning Of Lifestyles: Automobility and The Illusion of Full Cost Pricing”
URL: http://www.cei.org/gencon/025,01606.cfm
By Roy Cordato | The Competitive Enterprise Institute | 1997
Criticizes arguments made by economic analyses that purport to show that autos receive subsidies.

The Elephant in the Bedroom
URL: http://www.flora.org/afo/elephant-cont.html
By Alvin Spivak and Stanley Hart | Samizdat Press | 1992
Book that purports to show that autos are receiving giant subsidies. The entire book is online

“Saving Energy in U.S. Transportation”
URL: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1994/9432_n.html
United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment | July 1994
Full PDF of the article on the cost of driving and other transportation issues. The Office of Technology Assessment is now defunct.

TOPICS > LIBERTARIANISM >

Brief introduction to libertarianism
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/
Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy
A scholarly and more objective introduction than those found below.
URL: http:// www.libertariansim.org
URL: http://www.self-gov.org/libertarianism.html.
Good bibliography, including books and articles on left and right libertarianism as well as some critical publications.

 

Old Glory in new times

The patriotism that made America great now endangers it.

The war was only a week old, and a friend was already complaining about the protestors. Not the anti-war ones. The people on the other side of the street–the ones protesting the idea of protest. Men and women decked in red, white, and blue, angry and solemn and proud, waving their flags like weapons. Perhaps they didn’t reflect the majority of Americans who supported this war, but they were the faces he saw whenever he turned on the TV. The most patriotic of patriots.

My friend was against the war when it started, largely because he felt it would bring about more terrorism. But he did not march in any of the demonstrations. He isn’t an activist. He’s the son of Korean immigrants, who worked the counters of a convenience store for years so that their two children could go to college. My friend was born in the United States, and has never stepped foot outside of it.
  
And yet something turned him off about the pro-war protestors. They represented the America that has shunned him, he told me. Shunned him? He has a good job, a college education, a comfortable lifestyle. America has been good to him, he is the first to admit. But he watched the people wave their flags and say, I am an American. This is America.” And they were almost all white. And the things they were saying reminded him of the co-workers and acquaintances and strangers who have uttered ignorant, even racist, things in his presence–about African Americans or Arab Americans when they think he’s on their side, about “Orientals” when they forget. He does not feel a part of their America. And yet he is just like them: an American by birth.
  
Nothing brings out patriotism more than war. A public that was initially skeptical of war in Iraq rallied in support of it, once American soldiers were fighting, and dying, abroad. Significant dissent emerged, but it fought a holding action against the tide of patriotism that swept up everyone–journalists, union workers, soccer moms, and Wall Street bankers alike. Now that the fighting seems to be ending, and coalition forces have apparently succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime, that sense of pride has only swelled. Even some longtime critics of the war have changed their tune. They watch TV images of Iraqis celebrating as U.S. soldiers tear down statues of the deposed tyrant, and they, too, love America and the freedom it has brought the world.
  
Is this surge in patriotism a good thing? Of course it is, friends tell me. I receive patriotic emails expressing support for America and its soldiers; as always, the flags are there, fluttering in a gentle HTML breeze. They may lack solemnity, but in the symbol itself they express the same sentiment as those gracing the steps of marble monuments, those draped over soldiers’ coffins: Liberty was won with the blood of Americans. Your freedom to speak, to criticize, to live as a minority amid a majority–was bought with that blood.
  
But patriotism has a darker side, one that has become quite clear in the last few weeks of war. Now might be the time to consider whether we Americans or Britons really should consider ourselves patriots, or whether defending our ideals and supporting our soldiers can be undertaken in the name of a higher cause.
  
It’s true that patriotism–love and devotion for one’s nation–gives people a shared identity. In the United States, for instance, settlers from all over Europe gradually came to see themselves as a single, distinct group of people. Though their nation was built, at first, on the exclusion and genocide of indigenous tribes and black slaves, today even many Native Americans and African Americans proudly declare their American-ness.

Patriotism may be necessary to build a nation, but sometimes it grows too quickly, becoming cancerous. The example always mentioned is Nazi Germany. Suffering amid a massive economic depression, hungry for their former glory, the German people turned to a charismatic leader who promised prosperity, power, and revenge–first against the Jews, and then against all of the nation’s “enemies.” Adolf Hitler brought his country to ruin, but he could not have emerged without the obsessive patriotism of ordinary Germans, whose love of country reached such a feverish pitch that they began to value German ways over all other ways, German life over all other life.

The United States has not reached that level of love-turned-hate, but it has come close. Today, things are looking grim once again. Patriotism of a rather pernicious kind is enshrined in the U.S. PATRIOT Act, legislation that has stripped away many of the protections that U.S. citizens once had from the power of big government. It also appears in the protect-America-at-all-costs policy of detaining foreign prisoners of war in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba–without charge, without trial, and far from any eyes who could judge whether they’re being treated fairly. At the root of these policies are two disturbing beliefs. One is that love of America demands giving up the very thing that America is supposed to be about–liberty. The other is that people elsewhere in the world do not deserve the rights or respect that Americans do. It’s the same sentiment that in the past allowed Americans in the majority to enslave African Americans, drive indigenous people from their lands, persecute union workers or put Japanese Americans in camps: They are not “American,” and so they are not worthy of the same treatment as we are.

Since the war in Iraq began, the uglier face of patriotism has been popping up on a daily basis. Consider the recent behavior of our fearless public watchdog, the mainstream news media. Throughout this war, public reaction–or just fear of public reaction–has prompted many news outlets to silence their own dissenting voices. This is obvious in American news channels like CNN, FOX, and MSNBC, where the coverage has been dramatically more partisan than what you find on the BBC–or even CNN International. Those who have tried to buck the trend have been punished outright: At MSNBC, liberal talk show host Phil Donahue was canned after news executives complained in an internal memo that his show could become “a home for the liberal anti-war agenda at the same time that our competitors are waving the flag at every opportunity.”

Supporters of patriotism say that Americans must suffer the rollback of civil liberties and the censorship of dissenting voices now so that they can enjoy their freedom once the fighting is over. But it is not clear what freedom we will have left to enjoy, if the present course of government action continues.
  
More importantly, it’s not clear that Americans will make themselves any safer by alienating the rest of the world with a belligerent self-love. I should be clear here: There were many good reasons for the United States and Britain to overthrow a murderous tyrant like Saddam Hussein. The problem with the present war is that the United States entered it in violation of international law, with the public support of only a single Arab government, and without the backing of the United Nations. This kind of arrogance has radicalized Muslims around the world, who see the war as a war against Islam, and will likely cause more grief for the United States in the years to come. Meanwhile, America continues to lose the real “war against terrorism”–the battle over the hearts and minds of people in other countries, especially Muslim countries.

To win that war, we will need more than tanks and cruise missiles. We will need a sustained effort to change how other people in the world see the United States. The first step is for people here to understand why people in Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Indonesia think the way they do about America. Sadly, many otherwise decent and patriotic Americans cannot put themselves in the shoes of people who are enraged by the U.S. government’s policies. They insist that their country is the world’s savior, because only it has the will to fight tyranny abroad (as the case of Iraq proves). But elsewhere in the world, many people see George W. Bush as a greater threat to peace than Saddam Hussein.
  
Some people look at this resentment abroad and conclude that foreigners are simply jealous of American power. Even if this has some truth to it, many Americans don’t realize how many good reasons people in other countries have to be suspicious of the U.S. government. We seem to be the only people in the world who do not appreciate the fact that the U.S. government’s rhetoric of “liberation” too often masks cold self-interest. Just look at the history of U.S. interventions in Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, South Vietnam, East Timor, and Laos, or the support that the U.S. government has given to authoritarian and brutal regimes in the Middle East (Saddam’s included, up until his invasion of Kuwait).
  
Americans are rightfully proud when their soldiers step in to end atrocities in war-ravaged places like Bosnia, but we don’t realize that the United States is the only one fighting wars these days because it is the only one allowed to do so (the U.S. government has explicitly stated that it will allow no country to rival it militarily). Likewise, many Americans talk about how their military defends the rights of people elsewhere in the world, but we don’t appreciate the animosity our armies and military bases create in places like South Korean and Saudi Arabia, where many people despise the presence of foreign soldiers on their land.
  
What makes people in other countries so upset is the assumption behind these policies: America knows what is best for the rest of the world. Some say that this assumption is at the heart of all patriotism. “Patriotism assumes that our globe is divided into little spots, each one surrounded by an iron gate,” said Emma Goldman. “Those who had the fortune of being born on some particular spot, consider themselves better, nobler, grander, more intelligent than the living beings inhabiting any other spot. It is, therefore, the duty of everyone living on that chosen spot to fight, kill, and die in the attempt to impose his superiority upon all others.”
  
Some liberals argue that, properly understood, patriotism encourages dissent. In their view, patriotism is not about doing whatever the government tells you to do, but using your free speech to uphold the ideals of liberty and equality that America was founded upon. Clearly many anti-war protestors believe in this approach. It is surely better than patriotism-as-unquestioning-loyalty, but it is still flawed, Robert Jensen tells us. “Why are human characteristics being labeled as American,” he asks, “if there is nothing distinctly American about them? … At its worst, patriotism can lead easily to support for barbarism. At its best, it is self-indulgent and arrogant in its assumptions about the uniqueness of U.S. culture.”
  
Patriotism has served the United States well in making it a global power, and clearly it was necessary in the beginnings of the republic, to create unity out of a hodgepodge of former British subjects. But nowadays patriotism is past its prime. The United States is no longer a small republic on the shores of the Atlantic; it is the most multinational of nations. It is linked to the rest of the world economically (by the flow of import and export goods) and culturally (by the flow of immigrants, students, and workers). Today, to an ever-increasing extent, whatever helps the rest of the world helps the United States.
  
For this reason, world leaders like the Dalai Lama have called for an end to our old notions of nation vs. nation, “us” vs. “them.” In the past, when countries were independent of one another, “there was a relevance to violence and war,” the Dalai Lama writes. But today, “one-sided victory is no longer relevant. We must work to resolve conflicts in a spirit of reconciliation and always keep in mind the interests of others. We cannot destroy our neighbors! We cannot ignore their interests! Doing so would ultimately cause us to suffer.”
  
Perhaps it is time, then, to move beyond patriotism. Without losing our love for the people, places, and ideals of our unique country, we can begin to see ourselves as citizens of something larger than this. In places around the world, people are already making this journey: as Italians, Spaniards, and Germans increasingly see themselves as part of a unified Europe; as the number of individuals with multiple citizenships multiplies; as more people realize that in a world where everyone’s fates are tied together, love and loyalties can be shared.
  
Becoming a “citizen of the world” does not lessen the sacrifice of the men and women who have fought on behalf of the American flag, to defend American liberties. It extends the blessings of that liberty to new lands; it honors America’s heroes by honoring all of humanity, without prejudice or pettiness. And it preserves the nation, by preserving the world. “We must say goodbye to patriotism,” Jensen writes, “because the world cannot survive indefinitely the patriotism of Americans.”
  
My friend was tortured by his dislike of the pro-war protestors, because he truly wanted to do what was best for his country, the only country he has known. But there are many ways to serve one’s country, and in the end, what might save America is something other than patriotism–something more than patriotism.

Oddly enough, acting in ways that aren’t seen as patriotic may be the best way to help America out of its current international crisis. After all, part of the reason that terrorists are so willing to kill civilians is that they see them as representatives of their hated governments. Dissent reminds the rest of the world that not all Americans agree with the U.S. government’s foreign policy. It says that dislike of America should be directed at specific government policies, not at Americans themselves. It also improves the way that the American people are perceived elsewhere in the world, providing evidence that, yes, Americans are capable of critical thought and concern for the lives of people in other countries.
  
Ultimately, dissent may lead to something even more valuable: a new vision of American power. As the world’s only remaining superpower, America has the privilege to be a leader upon the global stage. Good leaders are not blinded by self-love, nor driven by self-interest. They identify with the group they lead. They see any loss on the part of the group as a loss to their own self. They lead with courage and strength, but also understanding and humility.
  
America’s future–and its future security–is tied to its ability to be that kind of leader. It will have to do a better job of showing other countries that it seeks what is best for the world, even at its own expense. It will need a new kind of patriotism–yes, a love for the people, land, and ideals of America, but an equally deep love and respect for other countries, too. Those who love America and want what is best for it will accept the great task, and the great responsibility, laid before it. Until Americans can accept criticism of their country’s actions abroad, until they can value the lives of Iraqis and Afghans as much as they do Americans, then there will be little hope of a more peaceful and just world.

Victor Tan Chen is In The Fray's editor in chief and the author of Cut Loose: Jobless and Hopeless in an Unfair Economy. Site: victortanchen.com | Facebook | Twitter: @victortanchen

 

Mother-guilt’

The unscientific progress of a psychiatric resident.

I awakened to death one morning in my life as an intern. I awoke and found myself standing next to my call bed in the hospital: an A code was called over the intercom and I reacted like reflex.  Where was it? I ran to the room and two residents had already arrived. The intern was giving chest compressions to a dying patient. The man was so brittle with his illness that his ribs broke with the first compression. I took over for the tiring intern, and as I pushed rhythmically, the patient passively vomited blood from his ruptured esophagus. The blood spilled from his mouth, onto the pillow, bed sheets, and floor. I noticed these details as though in a dream: what was real was my counting of the compressions, keeping the rhythm. Soon he was pronounced dead by the senior resident. I stopped pushing the broken chest, took off my gloves, and saw it was time to start rounds on the living patients. He was not one of mine, and in the rush of events, I did not catch his name. I put on my white coat over my scrubs to go and face the living.

Little did I understand, when I first received this physician’s costume, how it would usher me down to the underworld, onto a stage where sickness and death are main actors in the play. What I found within me during the descent was my mother-guilt. With the white coat comes an influence that presses you to provide good care to your patients. I call it mother-guilt,” for it is innate like one’s “mother-wit,” or common sense. It feels inherited, passed on through many generations, like the remembrance of my father in the features of my face.

I became a physician one day in May when, with all my classmates, I recited an ancient Greek oath by Hippocrates “to first do no harm” to my patients. On that sunny day, I did not feel the weight of the mother-guilt that grew heavier when in June I put on the long white coat at Yale-New Haven Hospital. The mother-guilt fears the harm done to patients in your care, even if not done by your hand. The death or decline of my patients began to feel my fault until proven otherwise–no American justice system at work here, but something akin to an ancient indictment for a crime long-forgotten.

My fellow interns have confessed to me this guilt in corners of hallways, when a patient under their care suffers complications. Sometimes it hits you first thing in the morning when you walk onto the floors. The nurse tells you that the patient was transferred to the intensive care unit overnight.  I have to remind myself that it was not due to my care, but because their body is failing them. I have to reason with myself, try talking away the guilt, but it lingers, whispers from hallway corners that you don’t know what you are doing, and are to blame.

The making of a medicine man

The pressure of guilt makes me as aggressive about my patients’ welfare as I’d be if my conscience, my livelihood were in the balance. In such a manner, the professional caregiver is driven to care. The days begin to merge and blur as I work the eighth hour, which becomes the fourteenth hour, which becomes the twenty-sixth hour, which becomes the thirty-fourth. Solace is found in the restroom for a few minutes, or writing patient notes, speaking with a fellow worn intern, or in an empty cafeteria. The distinction between this ancient guilt and the care of my patients–a haze of sleepless work, immersion in the infinity of details, the endless checking of doses and vital signs, and the constant moving of hands over the body–this distinction blurs into a near identification of their body with mine.

From one perspective, this approach is good medicine, for I am not only intellectually processing that the intravenous potassium I order for Mr. Baxter will burn his veins if given too quickly; I also feel my veins burning, and tell the nurse to administer the potassium slowly. Perhaps that is an empathy provoked by guilt and fear, but not sustained by it. It must be sustained by a greater motivation, otherwise short is my stay in medicine.

Certainly I am not alone in this guilt-induced empathy. I’ve had colleagues come to me in nausea, almost in tears, at the decline of their patients, or due to some small oversight.  They do not know how to contain their feelings; meanwhile the needs of other patients call to them.  Once during morning rounds, a patient passed by on a stretcher. A fellow resident clutched her throat. “I feel like my body mimics what my patients have,” she said. “You better not go into oncology,” I replied.

This guilt-empathy, like a fear of perdition, motivates you to get things done for the drug users, the alcoholics, the obstinate, the gluttonous, and the lascivious whose desires have brought on hepatitis, HIV, poorly managed diabetes, morbid obesity, and other consequences of bodily neglect.  That does not matter when they are your patients. You stay the extra hour, draw the blood, and check the chest X-ray before you sign their care over to another resident and leave the floors, satiating the flames that keep you in the hospital.

A story from within and release

Catherine was a heroine addict, prostitute, and a regular on the HIV wards. Rumor was, she’d told a fellow patient that she would milk this admission for all the time that she could. As the weeks passed, she lay in bed in a dark room save for when she would go outside for a smoke. I noticed her growing thinner in the early morning light when I examined her each day. We searched for the cause of her diffuse pains but found none.  Her T-cell count was low enough that something could be brewing, but during her second week we became convinced that she was using her hospital stay to evade the police. Then one morning I looked into her mouth and saw thick white yeast coating her throat. “It hurts to swallow so much I want to jump out of the window,” she whispered to me. In addition to the yeast infection, endoscopic examination diagnosed a herpes flare extending down her throat. We gave her medicated lollipops to suck on as she shambled along the hallway. The next time I took blood from her veins, my attitude was not of doubt or double- guessing. My intent was to get her better, her past be damned.

I emerge from the hospital and squint at the setting sun, and it seems foreign, this sunlight, for I have become accustomed to fluorescence. The last I saw the sun, it was rising on a Thursday, and now Friday is coming to an end. I walk out to my car, and on some days I am at peace. On others, I am swallowing all the small terrors and frustrations of the past ten or fourteen or thirty hours.  I want to sleep, but I also want to release the distillation of black bile collected under my rib cage; otherwise it comes up my throat and tastes metallic, like acid. I have smelled the iodine and the vomit, the shit and the latex gloves, the scent of the sick and the putrescence of infection. I feel deprived of the regeneration found in sitting at Rudy’s, my hole-in-a-wall second home, with a glass of Guinness and much talk around me.

Headed north, I pass East Rock, that traprock rise overlooking the city, and I spy its red heights, green crown, and the memorial tower. I breathe: my ribcage expands, loosening its anxious hold on the black bile in me. The seagulls circle near the sublime East Rock, and in that circling comes a gratefulness and freedom from this mother-guilt for a while–a rest, a simplicity in returning to a quiet home.”

 

Breaking the celluloid ceiling

Asian Americans embrace the bad-boy characters of Better Luck Tomorrow.

Emails about it have been popping up in my inbox more often than Viagra ads. Asian American magazines have been treating it like long-awaited salvation. It’s the coolest thing since tapioca pearl milk tea (and better for us too), hotter than a lowered Honda.

All of this hype presages the release of a movie called Better Luck Tomorrow, scheduled to hit theaters in major cities April 11. BLT for short, it promises to present Asian Americans the way we’ve yearned to be portrayed for all our sheltered lives: as ass-kicking hoodlums who instill fear into the hearts of white people.

The movie centers on a group of Asian American high school students, academic overachievers who resent the boredom of their tract-home suburb in Los Angeles. For excitement and rebellion, they turn to a life of gun-wielding violence, Las Vegas hookers, and on-campus larceny. The film follows the teens from party to party, through romantic liaisons, as they win one academic decathlon championship after another. The group’s violent escapades escalate until the teens finally find themselves in over their heads.

Since its premiere on the festival circuit last year, BLT has wowed audiences from Asian American festivals all the way to Sundance, winning praise and generating controversy along the way. One such episode has virtually become the film’s calling card. During the question and answer period following the third Sundance screening, a white man with a misguided sense of political correctness expressed outrage at the amoral portrayal of the Asian American people. This prompted film critic Roger Ebert to stand on his seat and shout, “What I find very offensive and condescending about your statement is nobody would say to a bunch of white filmmakers, ‘How could you do this to your people?'” A few days later, MTV Films signed BLT, making it the first film with an Asian American cast and director to be picked up for distribution at Sundance by a major studio. For many Asian Americans, BLT marks the first time they will see themselves on the big screen in an honest light or in major movie multiplexes alongside Hollywood blockbusters. If successful, the film could open the door to more realistic portrayals of Asian Americans all over the mainstream media.

Since the birth of cinema, Asian Americans–actors and audiences alike–have sought roles and characters that stretched beyond the stereotypical: the dragon lady seductress performing ancient sexual secrets with her pinky, the oriental Buddha-shaped man dispensing fortune cookie advice, the flying martial-arts hero who knocks out twenty ninjas in a single roundhouse kick. But even in 2003, roles beyond these old stereotypes hardly exist.

Says actor Russell Wong, promoting his new TV show Black Sash (he’s a martial arts guru) on the WB website: “I’ve always been pretty dedicated to practicing martial arts. Growing up, Bruce Lee was a big source of inspiration for me. As an Asian actor you either do martial arts or you just won’t get cast in anything.” BLT writer-director Justin Lin realized the only way to realize his dream of an Asian American movie with authentic characters was to make it himself. It gave him the freedom to create Asian American characters in his vision, not having to kowtow to studio heads, who most likely would have shied away from a movie with an all-Asian American cast. In BLT, humor and anger and other contradictory emotions collide, just as they do in life (and good movies). Take this scene between  two of the main characters, students Ben Manibag and Virgil Hu, competing in their club’s candy bar drive:

In a high school hallway, a chart on the wall reads: CANDY BAR DRIVE WINNERS: CINDY LAWTON – 58 BARS, JOSH DIAMOND – 87 BARS, BEN MANIBAG – 547 BARS, AND THE WINNER OF THE PORTABLE CD PLAYER: VIRGIL HU – 575 BARS.

Virgil, proudly holding the CD player over his head, screams in joy.

In the locker area, Virgil opens his locker full of candy bars. Candy bars flood out of Virgil’s locker. Ben cracks up.

Virgil closes his locker and they walk off.

BEN
Can I borrow your CD player?

VIRGIL
Fuck off.

Ben snatches it from Virgil and runs off. Virgil chases him.

Ben makes a turn and the CD player flies out of his hand and smashes on the ground.

Virgil takes a look at the CD player.

BEN
Sorry, Virg.

VIRGIL
Fuckin’ dick.

BEN
Stop crying. It’s a piece of shit CD player anyway.

VIRGIL
Fuck you.

Ben pulls a wad of cash out of his pocket and tosses it at Virgil.BEN
Now you can buy a better one.

Going beyond the stereotype

Sure, the portrayals of Asian Americans in BLT can be grim and violent. But what the guy at Sundance failed to understand (besides that life actually is often grim and violent) is that Asian Americans have been longing for complex portrayals like the ones in BLT, not necessarily “positive” ones. Portraying Asian Americans as the goody-two-shoes “model minority” denies us our humanity. Furthermore, this same mentality leads to the flip side–inexplicably evil and/or degrading Asian characters. In its shameful history, Hollywood has long forbidden Asian Americans to be anything but two-dimensional props.

One of the first Asian American stars was Los Angeles-born Anna May Wong. Despite her great talent, she subsisted on supporting roles, like the Mongolian slave in The Thief of Bagdad, or else was typecast as the exotic foreigner. Fed up with the constraints of Hollywood, Wong left for Europe in 1928 to pursue more meaningful roles. “I was tired of the parts I had to play,” she said at the time. “Why is it that on the screen the Chinese are nearly always the villain of the piece, and so cruel a villain–murderous, treacherous, a snake in the grass? We are not like that.”

Still, Wong kept track of American roles throughout the 1930s. When movie adaptation plans were made for The Good Earth, Pearl S. Buck’s novel about a farmer in rural China, Wong hoped to land the leading role of the farmer’s wife. Instead, all of the lead roles went to white actors who played the parts of Asians in yellowface. Luise Rainer, who got the part of the farmer’s wife, O-Lan, won an Academy Award for Best Actress.

Other highlights of Asian American cinema:

1961–Mickey Rooney, complete with prosthetic eyepieces and big buckteeth, plays a huffy Japanese landlord in Breakfast at Tiffany’s. This obscenely racist yellowface bit of “acting,” which continues to this day on shows like MadTV stings for Asians like Amos and Andy does for blacks.

1984–American teen comedy Sixteen Candles features horny foreign exchange student Long Duk Dong. Sole purpose in film: to be the butt of White Man’s jokes. He might as well have been named Long Jap Chink.

1990s–Roles improve, but some Asian American filmgoers have nagging feeling that characters must go extra mile to prove “I am an American!” by pitting themselves against their crazy old-world parents and their antiquated customs (Joy Luck Club). Or, in other cases, the Asian American woman must be saved from the clutches of evil Asian men by a sanctimonious white man (Joy Luck Club.)

2000–Movies from Asia make inroads into American theaters. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is even nominated for Best Picture. These are cool movies in their own right, but should not be confused with Asian American movies that deal with American issues. Incidentally, Crouching Tiger star Zhang Ziyi’s next role is a mail-order bride summoned by a trailer park loser played by Adam Sandler.

Now we as Asian Americans might pretend these movies didn’t affect us growing up in the United States. We might like to pretend movies and television are just fanciful fictions with no bearing on how we conduct our lives, how we see ourselves, or how non-Asians see us. On the contrary–we Americans take most of our cultural cues from the world of entertainment. And, for Asian Americans, decades of Asian caricatures and stereotypes have taken their toll.

Professor Darrell Hamamoto at the University of California–Davis conducted an experiment in his Asian American studies class. Essentially, he asked his students, “When you think of a sexual fantasy, what is the race of the person you fantasize about?” Invariably, the fantasy was not Asian, most certainly not an Asian American male. Years of demeaning roles had invaded our subconscious. Although the question was sexual in nature, the self-hatred could have applied to myriad human desires.

Which brings us to 2003 and Better Luck Tomorrow. In a widely circulated Internet letter, BLT actor Parry Shen lamented the cycle of Asian American typecasting in the twentieth century. “The world is exposed to the cliche9d images of Asians that currently occupy the screen, these images subconsciously encapsulate for them what Asian people are. The martial-artists practitioners. The nerdy students. The exotic sexual prizes. The guy that delivers the food to your door. And it becomes a self-fueling process because audiences continue to pay admission to see them. Unfortunately, these are the only roles that are available for Asian actors to portray.”

Eighty years after Anna May Wong first appeared on screen, things could be changing. Acting and directing opportunities could increase for Asian Americans after BLT, provided it does well at the box office. If it does, it will be due in no small part to the grassroots advertising, organizing, and excitement created by Asian Americans. It’s not hard to see why strong support has been building for BLT. For in this movie, a greater truth will have been revealed: We, as Asian Americans, are all too ready to see ourselves on the big screen, to revel in fictional characters in all their depravity, humor, sexuality, anger, and faults. In other words, as full human beings.”

 

Bollywood ending? Not yet.

BEST OF IDENTIFY 2003 (tie). What digital video could mean in the world's largest democracy.


The faded grandeur of a burned-out neighborhood cinema hall is no match for newer Delhi multiplexes.

It was the end of March, Delhi was heating up after a brief winter, and revolution was in the air. Even the festival program knew it: There is a revolution in the air,” it said. “A great democratic vista of the people’s work is opening up.” Digital video, that most subversive of tape formats, had finally come to India, heralded by the apostles of independent film. And the 2001 Digital Talkies International Film Festival was to be its showcase, its forum, its Mecca. The assembled moviegoers were critical, but ready to escape the tyranny of Bollywood epics, to see new stories told by new authors, to give up, at least temporarily, the dreamy quality of celluloid for the grainy and gritty drama of digital video.

For Delhi’s up-and-coming generation of filmmakers, digital was more than just another film format. Digital, in a word, meant democracy. Consumer digital video cameras cost tens of thousands of dollars less than 16mm or 35mm film cameras, use cheap tapes as opposed to costly film stock, and create footage that can be edited on a home computer and easily distributed on DVD or over the Internet. Though criticized by some for its granular, unbeautiful look, digital video was clearly a cost-effective way of shooting, ideal for strapped filmmakers breaking away from Bollywood.

And break away they did. By most measures, Asia’s first-ever digital film festival was a huge success. The sponsorship was generous, the jury internationally acclaimed, and the screenings full. Digital Talkies, the festival organizer, saw two of their own features win awards. The company was ready to pursue distribution full tilt: in theaters, on TV, and via broadband Internet. The shackles that kept Indian film from experimentation, from innovation–from anything not involving an extravagant dance number shifting from Egypt to the Alps with every refrain–were finally being unlocked, and it seemed there was no looking back.

Yet something went wrong. Two years later, digital video’s promised democratization of the Indian film industry has yet to happen. Some filmmakers say the blame lies with Digital Talkies. After the smashing success of its 2001 festival, the company lined up even more films for the following year. But the 2002 festival was postponed to March 2003. Then, abruptly, it was canceled. And the new generation that Digital Talkies had helped inspire–filmmakers who truly believed that digital was the “next generation” of entertainment–suddenly discovered their work no longer had a venue.

Indie filmmakers embrace DV, commercial concerns hold back–the tale is a familiar one. In the United States, critically acclaimed films like Dancer in the Dark, last summer’s The Fast Runner, and this winter’s Personal Velocity (awarded best cinematography at Sundance) have racked up decent profits in art-house box offices. But despite the messianic attempts of George Lucas, who shot and distributed his latest Star Wars film digitally, Hollywood has been slow to bank its celluloid infrastructure on the promise of a digital future. Theaters have been reluctant to invest, scared off by the $100,000-plus price tags of digital projectors. And even digital-friendly chains like Madstone, which planned to open digital theaters nationwide, have ended up sticking with more traditional products in order to stay afloat.

Hollywood, of course, is no Bollywood. India is the world’s largest film producer, releasing over 800 features a year. It boasts a strong industry infrastructure, three billion tickets sold annually, and a proliferation of multiplexes in urban centers. India is also diverse, with 70 percent of the population living in rural or remote areas and over 18 recognized languages. There is no end of new stories to be told. Whether these stories make their way to film, however, is a different matter. The struggle over digital video in India has become a struggle over who gets to tell the stories.

So far, the revolution has stalled. While Hollywood looks for ways to cash in on the U.S. indie craze, the appetite for art-house films in India remains restricted to urban areas and a certain cultural elite. Independent film in India has been around since Satyajit Ray made his famous Apu trilogy in the 1950s, and “parallel cinema” is still supported by the government. But filmmakers in India have yet to convince mainstream audiences, especially the majority living outside the big cities, to try something other than masala, the tried-and-true Mumbai mix of action, family tragedy, and song and dance.

Masala is the mush you’ll find in the 200 features that Bollywood puts out every year. Each costs an average of Ru 50,000,000 ($1 million), lasts around three hours, and allows little room for anything that smacks of originality. Those who can afford Ru 150 ($3) see these films in plush multiplexes that rival any suburban movie theater in America. Alongside imported Hollywood hits, films like Kabhi Khusi, Kabhi Gam (Sometimes Happiness, Sometimes Sadness) show the same big stars rearranged in different poses. The stadium seats recline, the surround sound embraces, cell phones interrupt, and at intermission, you can even eat nachos.

Yet all is not well in Bollywood these days. The sure-fire formula has fared poorly in recent years. Last year, 90 percent of big releases were box office flops.

So in the summer of 2000, when two twenty-something scions of commercial empires, Pia Singh and Hari Bhartiya, started chatting during a course at New York University, there seemed at least as many reasons to float a digital production and distribution company in India as in America, where similar startups were magnets for venture capital. The two returned to India, teamed up with director Shekhar Kapur (The Four Feathers), and recruited a luminous board of advisors, including Mira Nair, director of the crossover success Monsoon Wedding. By March 2001, with the backing of the goliath India Tobacco Company, they had organized the first Digital Talkies International Film Festival.


Two girls take time out from begging near a multiplex in South Delhi.

‘He’s a policeman. How can he be homosexual?’

Yamini Tiaari, Digital Talkies’ head of production, is still in her twenties, a hipster who trades the traditional Hindi “accha,” the equivalent of “okay,” for a breezy “coolio, coolio.” Ensconced in her office in the back of a yet-to-be resurrected cinema hall in Old Delhi, Tiaari describes the 2001 festival as history in the making. “It was brilliant, a huge huge success. Even the 10 a.m. screenings were full.”

Tiaari’s exuberance is not unwarranted. Of the roughly 175 films submitted to the 2001 festival, 40 percent were Indian. Before plans for the follow-up 2002 festival were scrapped, organizers had already collected 150 entries from India alone, 75 percent created with the Digital Talkies competition in mind.

Yet as early as that first festival, there were signs that digital video might not fare so well in India. Two features–both produced by Digital Talkies and intended afterward for domestic distribution–did not receive the censor’s sanction to be shown.

India’s Central Board of Film Certification tightly controls which domestic films are distributed for public viewing. The board’s definition of obscenity tends to disallow novel and/or realistic portrayals of romantic relationships, while lascivious dance sequences and even rape are easily approved. The latest round of films to be rejected included Anand Patwardhan’s War and Peace, which criticizes India’s nuclear weapons program. Most filmmakers don’t bother fighting the censors; Patwardhan’s willingness to wage a costly court battle against the board is an exception.

When the board nixed their features at the last minute, Digital Talkies was in a bind. Divya Drishti, about a quack fortune teller’s involvement in a suburban community’s sexual intrigues, and Urf Professor, a profane flick about a Mumbai hit man, were quickly moved to the British Council’s auditorium, thus temporarily evading Indian law. Though they saved their star projects from getting no play at all, Digital Talkies had to make do with inferior projection and limited seating of 150. Any hopes of future distribution in India were firmly squashed.

Festival organizer Siddarth Kumar was outraged. In his eyes, Indian films were singled out unfairly for censoring while foreign films escaped. “I showed pornography at 9 a.m. that came from Czechoslovakia,” he says. Then there was the board’s hypersensitivity to the portrayal of a gay police officer in Divya Drishti. Fellow organizer Ankur Tewari describes their objection: “He holds a very responsible position in Indian society. He’s a policeman. How can he be homosexual?”

Digital Talkies’ unforeseen brush with censorship wasn’t the only blow to the fledgling company. Though the 2001 festival created a great deal of enthusiasm, it broke even and didn’t yield the profit-making deals the organizers had hoped for. Still, the second annual festival was planned for March 2002. But by the time that date drew nigh, access to broadband Internet (which would have allowed digital films to be beamed to theaters and even viewers at home) was still spotty throughout the country, and India-Pakistan border tensions were discouraging sponsors. Frustrated entrants were postponed for one month, then two, then an entire year for a festival which has yet to materialize. Essentially, Digital Talkies pulled the plug. Critics accuse them of canceling the entire movement in the process.

“‘Go out there and make your film, we’ll help you in every way we can’–that was the premise that Ankur and I tried to market,” says Kumar, who is now running his own production company with Tewari. In the festival program, Digital Talkies promised as much–to “help independent filmmakers tell their stories, and to ensure a pathway for those stories to an audience.” But, today, the company’s stance has changed. “We are not in a position to aid digital filmmakers at this time,” goes the official line. Digital Talkies says it is focusing on producing ads for television on film and Digibeta (a video format used on television), creating an MTV sitcom, and developing a fleet of traditional cinema halls. From Kumar’s perspective, the move is a betrayal. “Instead of a movement for independent filmmakers, DV has become a cheap way for people to produce the same shit they have been producing all their life,” he says. “There’s very little activity left now because the support that Digital Talkies promised was dropped when they realized that there were no immediate returns to be made.”

“Business is business,” says Vijaya Singh, Pia Singh’s twenty-nine-year-old cousin, a former banker who now oversees Digital Talkies’ production house and festival. “We really believe in the concept [of digital video], but maybe we’re a little too early. We had to get from this idealistic platform onto the reality bandwagon.” Those who “don’t see the virtue of morphing” with the times, Singh says, “exhibit a childlike behavioral pattern.” She offers this advice for future filmmakers: “Do what you want to do but don’t be foolish. There is no point wasting money, effort, and aspirations.”

Kumar describes his old group at Digital Talkies as “dukandars,” Hindi for “someone who keeps a shop.” “That’s anathema for an independent filmmaker, he cannot associate himself with someone who is a shopkeeper,” he says. Yet Kumar is no impractical idealist. He wouldn’t mind being a dukandar himself, so long as he can devote himself to independent rather than mainstream pursuits–sort of like an Indian Harvey Weinstein.

In spite of all that’s happened, Kumar still sees profit in DV. “You could have done the festival a second year with other sponsors for half the cost because now you had expertise. You might have made some money if you took that content and represented it and made deals abroad to sell it, especially in Europe.” He points to the Karachi International Film Festival as an example of what can be accomplished with fewer resources and greater determination. “It’s not that there is less censorship in Pakistan, it’s just that those people have proved themselves to be a more committed bunch than us. They started [their] festival in 2001, nine months after ours, and they managed to do it a second time. That’s key in a festival.”

Other filmmakers have fewer regrets. Sidarth Srinivasnan, director of the banned film Divya Drishti, doesn’t put much stock in digital video changing the playing field. “Whatever revolutionary change is going to happen,” he says, “is going to come from the commercial arena.” Though DV helped him break into the industry with his first feature, Srinivasnan questions the benefit of setting the masses loose with the technology. “If thousands of people who harbored dreams of making movies were able to make them on DV, you’d have loads of shit,” he says. “The thing with 35mm is, it automatically distinguishes the boys from the men.”


Lining up for a Bollywood blockbuster outside a classic cinema hall.

Telling a different story

Though chastened, the prophets of digital video have not yet given up on India. Twenty-seven-year-old grassroots activist Venkatesh Veeraraghavan is one of the true believers. The founder of a cooperative of like-minded digital producers, he is campaigning to expand audio-visual curriculum offerings in schools and is working on an experimental film from footage shot in a North Delhi slum.

Veeraraghavan can often be found in front of his Macintosh computer, “the finest of species,” in an understatedly cool South Delhi studio that doubles as his living quarters. Black-and-white track-lit portraits of Gandhi, Snoop Doggy Dog, and Courtney Love look on as his hands orchestrate the techno score he has created to accompany shots of poor and beautiful children celebrating Diwali, the Indian festival of lights.

The frames are mesmerizing, granting access to domestic scenes that as yet have no place on the screens of Indian theaters: a six-year-old cleaning a spoon with sand, two eight-year-old girls smiling uncertainly at the intrusion of a camera, a bold boy twisting the lens 180 degrees so he can watch himself grimacing into the viewfinder. Veeraraghavan’s children belong to a laboring community from Uttar Pradesh that relocated to Delhi for work. His camera follows them closely, jerking frequently, at one point letting loose in an ebullient spin. Pinks and greens stand out, giving the shots a painted quality. As the sun goes down and the children light candles and sparklers, the limitations of natural light evoke memory, emulating the home footage of a childhood birthday party.

Veeraraghavan doesn’t own the Sony Digital 8 he uses to shoot the children. He borrows a friend’s camera on the weekends, then spends the rest of the week editing the film on his Mac. It took two months for his subjects to get used to a stranger, but it helped that he had no dollies, no lights, no crew to get in the way–just a camera the size of a shoebox.

While Verraraghavan toils away on his experimental film, other digital filmmakers have settled for now on less ambitious uses for their high technology. The more market-minded duo of Kumar and Tewari are using digital video to shoot documentary footage that they hope to sell in Europe. Their production company, Framework, is banking on hopes that Indian culture will become the latest exotic fashion in countries like Sweden, where Tewari believes “Asia is the flavor of the next three seasons.” Even Digital Talkies insists it hasn’t left the digital-video market just yet. Vijaya Singh talks about making space on the schedule for a “Digital Film Month” at one of their local theaters, with donated or sponsored equipment.

The sad truth is, even if there were digital theaters in India, there wouldn’t be enough digital content to show. Yet developing that content seems impossible without access to audiences. Resolving this chicken-and-egg scenario may take several years. But India has several things working in its favor: a growing film audience, a relatively light (and thus easily replaced) investment in standard projectors and other traditional technology, a well-established and skilled filmmaking industry, a large information technology sector, and the potential for establishing broadband networks that could bring digital video into every Indian home.

What happens next may depend on the fate of Let’s Talk. By director Ram Madhvani, it’s the first Indian movie to be shot on DV, transferred to film, and distributed to domestic audiences. The novel story, with only two rooms and two characters, portrays a young woman struggling to inform her husband that he is not the father of her baby. Let’s Talk was released in December to a limited number of cinemas. Will it win over audiences used to panoramic song-and-dance numbers? Bollywood will be watching.

Story Index

CONTRIBUTORS >

The writer
Nicole Leistikow, Inthefray.com News Editor

ORGANIZATIONS >

Catalyst Fusion Lab
Delhi-based cooperative of digital filmmakers.
URL: http://www.catalystfusionlab.org

Digital Talkies
URL: http://www.digitaltalkies.com

Karachi International Film Festival
URL: http://www.karafilmfest.com/home.htm

Madstone Theaters
Site of the upscale, art-house U.S. theater chain.
URL: http://www.madstonetheaters.com

National Film Development Corporation
The Mumbai-based Indian government agency that subsidizes and supports independent film.
URL: http://www.nfdcindia.com

PEOPLE >

Satyajit Ray biography
A short bio of Ray, arguably India’s best-known independent filmmaker.
URL: http://www.upperstall.com/people/satyajitray.html

TOPICS > BOLLYWOOD >

“Bollywood”
Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia
URL: http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bollywood

TOPICS > DIGITAL VIDEO >

Digital Cinema Magazine
Los Angeles-based magazine of the digital video industry.
URL: http://www.uemedia.com/CPC/digitalcinemamag

Dogme95
A Danish collective of film directors who typically shoot on consumer DV cameras.
URL: http://www.dogme95.dk

“India’s First DV Film Deserves Kudos”
By Deepa Gumaste | Rediff Movies | November 2002
URL: http://www.rediff.com/entertai/2002/nov/26mami.htm

Let’s Talk
Official site of Ram Madhvani’s latest digital film.
URL: http://www.letstalkmovie.com

“Methods: Film or Video”
Unhollywood Guide to Movie Making
URL: http://unhollywood.com/film-vid.htm

 

From sparks to full blaze

Reporting Civil Rights traces the evolution of a movement and its coverage.

John Herbers was expecting something different when he turned to the Florida Highway patrolmen observing a civil rights protest. Protection, perhaps, from the white locals who were threatening to beat him up. They told me I had to get out of town, put me in a police car, and drove me away,” said Herbers, who was covering Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 1964 visit for the New York Times. “They weren’t there to help me do my job, and that was the same in community after community.”

Herbers and other journalists on assignment in the South often found themselves plunged into an unfamiliar country where the rule of law no longer seemed to apply. Neither news reporting nor social protest would be the same after this intersection of media and movement, which is chronicled in the new two-volume anthology Reporting Civil Rights: American Journalism 1941-1973.

The first volume, culled mostly from small black papers close to the early flashpoints, documents a slowly festering anger ignored by the mainstream press. But by the 1960s, explosive events like race riots, the Montgomery bus boycott, and King’s Selma march had grabbed national attention. The writers who covered the movement present a wide array of viewpoints–from the immediacy of daily reports from Little Rock, Selma, and Birmingham to essays and magazine pieces by famous names like John Hersey, James Baldwin, Robert Penn Warren, Joan Didion, and even a remarkably sober piece on integration in Louisville by Hunter S. Thompson.

In the first years of the movement, getting the media’s attention was a struggle in itself. Discrimination and racism were dismissed as local problems by major news outlets. Sit-ins were considered pranks; no one knew about lynchings unless someone called the wire. Many Southern papers differentiated between blacks and whites in print. White women, for instance, were given the “Mrs.” Courtesy title, and black women were not.

Change came slowly. In the essay “Mrs. Means Married Woman,” Hodding Carter explains his decision to change his small Greenville, Mississippi, paper’s policy after a black reader’s entreaty in 1951. “Behind her request was the persistent, long-unanswered demand that we–not just we of Mississippi, or of the South, but the Western white people who are an amalgam of so many anciently blended bloods–recognize that what the darker peoples of the world require and must get from us is a recognition of their right to human dignity and self-respect,” Carter wrote. “I do not think that the incident was really small or that the decision that came from it was inconsequential.”

It took conflict and organized protest to bring the issues to mainstream America’s attention. “The movement was all about press,” says Stanford University professor Clayborne Carson, an editor of the anthology. “Southern blacks knew the only way they could call attention to the problem was to get the word out to the whole country.” The nonviolent protests in Birmingham and the riots that accompanied civil rights marches across the South riveted the nation. Civil rights activists organized to get press attention, from the early lunch counter sit-ins to the massive marches that brought national television into the struggle.

For journalists who witnessed the tumultuous events, reporting on civil rights reached beyond the story. If reporters took authority figures at their word in the years immediately after World War II, the civil rights movement forced a radical reassessment of their relationship to authority. “If McCarthy said he had a list, well, then, he had a list,” remembers anthology co-editor Bill Kovach, chairman of the Committee of Concerned Journalists. “As reporters began to see people being jailed, beaten, murdered under the cover of law and authority, that changed the fundamental opinion of what law and government was all about.””

A former resident of a Muslim neighborhood in Suksar Village visits his destroyed home. He now lives in a refugee camp. Navaz Kotwal

Genocide Is Not a Spectator Sport

Exploring the roots of ethnic violence in Gujarat.

I force myself to write a small fraction of all that I heard and saw, because it is important that we all know. Or maybe also because I need to share my own burdens. What can you say about a woman eight months pregnant who begged to be spared. Her assailants instead slit open her stomach, pulled out her foetus and slaughtered it before her eyes. What can you say about a family of nineteen being killed by flooding their house with water and then electrocuting them with high-tension electricity? —Harsh Mander, director of ActionAid India

Former resident stands in front of his destroyed home
A former resident of a Muslim neighborhood in Suksar Village visits his destroyed home. He now lives in a refugee camp. Navaz Kotwal

At 7:43 a.m. on February 27, 2002, the Sabarmati Express was attacked while stopped at Godhra station in the Indian state of Gujarat. While precise events remain unclear, the mix of Hindu devotee passengers returning from Ayodhya, the contested site of a sixteenth-century mosque destroyed by Hindu nationalists, with the Muslim population living around Godhra, was lethal. Two cars were drenched with petrol while a Muslim mob threw stones, acid bulbs, and burning rags at the train. Fifty-eight passengers were roasted alive. Twenty-six were women and sixteen were children.

Many have described what followed as a meticulously executed pogrom against the Muslim community. Within hours of the Godhra outrage, shops were looted, houses were burnt, and whole cities came to a standstill. Officials numbered the dead at 800, while independent reports put the figure at well over 2,000. Women were stripped and raped, parents were murdered in front of their children. Hundreds of mosques were destroyed and homes ransacked. Some 100,000 Muslims became refugees in their own country.

A year later, the question remains: What happened in Gujarat? Was it “simply” communal riots? Or was it systematic genocide of a minority population on par with the atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo? How did this state — Gandhi’s laboratory for nonviolence, source of the wealthiest diaspora of enterprising expatriates — become a petri dish of hate and fear? And why did the vast majority of India’s billion residents remain silent as Gujarat was soaked in Muslim blood? Simple answers remain frustratingly elusive, but it’s clear that the trail of clues leads through the rise of Hindu nationalism, its large-scale acceptance by the average citizen, and the increasing political apathy of the middle class.

The final count of the dead, dismembered, and homeless is only half the story. Initially, the media depicted rioting on both sides. But soon reports trickled in that these were methodical attacks organized by radical Hindu nationalists. Many were members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which heads both the Gujarat state government and the coalition that controls the national parliament. Trucks would arrive full of slogan-shouting young men clad in khaki shorts and saffron sashes and armed with explosives, daggers, and tridents. Their leaders communicated on mobile phones with an unknown “command center,” checking targets against voter rolls and printouts listing Muslim-owned properties. Muslims’ homes and businesses were identified, looted, filled with gas cylinders, and set on fire. Women and children were singled out for the most perverse forms of torture. Mosques and other religious shrines were razed with bulldozers or burned to the ground.

The violence raged well into March and spread to almost all parts of the state. Over 10,000 Hindus were also made homeless either by retaliatory attacks or from being mistaken as Muslim. Twenty-six cities were placed under curfew. Yet Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi kept issuing “all is well” statements while the State Reserve Police sat idle, waiting for orders. There is evidence of police guiding people straight into the hands of rioting mobs. Police sources admit that former parliamentarian Ehsan Jaffrey made frantic calls to the police control room hours before being brutally killed, along with his family, when a mob entered his home. Four constables stood as silent witnesses to the incident. The rest reached the scene two hours after the attack, and the fire brigade only three hours later. The police commissioner cited obstructions along the way as an excuse for the delay.

Those that escaped the murderous mobs faced yet more misery. At the height of violence, the government estimated 98,000 Muslims had been driven from their homes, yet refugee camps received little government support. The humanitarian aid agencies that proliferated during the 2001 earthquake were suddenly scarce. The camps, now officially closed, were run exclusively by bands of Muslim volunteers and a few NGO workers. At present, some estimate that 10,000 Muslims remain without regular shelter. Many are still unable to return to school, access public utilities, or supply themselves with enough food. Pamphlets calling for an economic boycott of Muslims have exacerbated the difficulties of finding work or rebuilding businesses. And to call out for one’s parents as “abba” or “ammi” in Urdu on the streets of Gujarat remains unwise.

 Burnt-our car in Suksar Village
More devastation in Suksar Village. Navaz Kotwal

The Rise of Nationalism

The BJP-led national government’s response was stunning in its denial. It took many weeks for the national party to respond. And when it finally did, members called upon India’s Muslim population — at 150 million, the largest Muslim minority in the world — to earn the “goodwill” of the majority community. Moderate prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee shocked observers when he said, “Wherever Muslims are, they do not want to live peacefully.” In Gujarat, the tragedy gave Hindu nationalist fervor an unprecedented boost. Once a low-key bureaucrat, Chief Minister Narendra Modi took full advantage, campaigning for his second term on a platform of Hindutva, or hardline Hindu nationalism. He won December’s election in a landslide.

The Hindu right focused on an immediate cycle of cause and effect: Muslims killed Hindus in Godhra, and the Hindus retaliated. Some even extended the timeline to prior riots, the ongoing controversy over building a Hindu temple on the former site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, or even the Muslim invasions in 1100 CE. Opposition parties, the national press, and liberal intellectuals were labeled “pseudo-secularists” and “anti-nationals.”

The recent rise of Hindutva, in Gujarat and in India at large, is important to understanding how such a tragedy could have happened. A philosophy of Hindu revivalism, Hindutva seeks to make India a Hindu, rather than a secular, state. Its defining tenets can be traced to a seventy-seven page pamphlet called We or Our Nationhood Defined. Written in 1939 by Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, who once headed the RSS (the fundamentalist ideological arm of the BJP), it states, “The non-Hindu people in Hindustan must cease to be foreigners or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment — not even citizen’s rights.” The subtext of the Hindutva war cry is a call for Hindus to assert their religious, economic, and political rights in the face of hundreds of years of subjugation — by the Mughal empire, the British, and then the so-called “pseudo-secularists” of the Congress party. Specious associations of Muslims with the creation of Pakistan, the Sikh nationalist movement, and missionary Christianity feed into the pernicious view that Hinduism is a religion under siege.

For the BJP and its political siblings, the RSS and the VHP (Global Hindu Convention), the killings were a celebration of their very existence. Founded on a Hindu supremacist platform advocating strong anti-Muslim and antiminority sentiment, and tracing its roots to Gandhi’s assassins, the movement has been brewing hatred for decades. Their ideologues echo Golwalkar: “The future of India is set. Hindutva is here to stay. It is up to the Muslims whether they will be included in the new nationalistic spirit of Bharat. It is up to the government and the Muslim leadership whether they wish to increase Hindu furor or work with the Hindu leadership to show that Muslims and the government will consider Hindu sentiments.”

To comprehend the spread of Hindutva, one must first grasp the leadership vacuum that has long been brewing. India claims to be the world’s largest multiparty democracy, yet a corrupt and self-interested political elite shuffle between the ruling party and the opposition in the Indian parliament. Because permission to govern is won based on volume of electoral votes and gerrymandered districts rather than the strength of public opinion, politicians have an easier time targeting specific populations for electoral gains. Voters are made empty promises, bribed with blankets at wintertime, or forced at gunpoint to vote for politicians they hardly know. And then they are conveniently forgotten. Once in power, ministers and members of parliament trade favors to amass wealth, often for generations to come. The BJP government is propped up by a ragtag alliance of political parties called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). On the opposition benches sit the Congress and the Janata Party, which ruled India for many decades on supposedly secular political agendas until the BJP’s ascension in the mid-1990s.

Within a week of the first riots, the opposition went on a strike to adjourn the parliament, called for a formal censure of the state government, and demanded commissions of inquiry into the massacres. These same instruments of political action — strikes, boycotts, and public inquiry — were implemented during the freedom struggle against the British. But repeated application of these devices in every political conflict has, in Professor Pratap Mehta’s words, “downgraded the currency of protest.” He writes, “What ought to appear like an extraordinary event in the course of our legislative proceedings becomes simply another familiar gesture.”

Women shopping in Ayodhya
Women shop for devotional trinkets in Ayodhya, a place of both Hindu and Muslim worship until 1992. Nicole Leistikow

India Buys In

To lump a billion people, practicing many religions and speaking even more languages, into a predictable and responsible political organism was a challenge on the part of the nation builders — first the British, then the Nehru-led socialists. They began to accentuate every imaginable attribute that could divide people — caste, religion, region, language, income. The government offered customized carrots to each identity-based vote bank: state boundaries drawn to serve linguistic majorities, caste-based quotas in jobs, food packets to the hungry.

The people acquiesced to the command-and-control socialist political system, rewarding politicians with landslide vote margins and a license to misrule. More importantly, the people relinquished the work of social adaptation to the sarkari babus — government bureaucrats, politicians, religious heads, and criminals. Political ideology, religious practice, and cultural norms came to be determined from somewhere above. Freedom was lost again. Thus the way was paved for Hindu nationalists to raise their divisive allegations: the opposition parties want only to appease minorities, to sell out the country, to leave Hinduism vulnerable to Muslim militants and — worse — Pakistan.

India’s deregulation of key industries in the 1990s led to a jump in middle-class affluence, which in turn led to increased consumption. However, the majority of citizens remain poor, with a per capita income of $496 per year. Caught in this transition between postcolonial socialism and a still nascent capitalism were millions of disenfranchised villagers, unemployed urban youth, and bored government officials. Their frustrations and fears were a treasure trove of emotions that could easily be harnessed by political ideology. When provoked by the threat of annihilation of identity, empowered by swords and tridents, and seduced by a feeling of nationalist dogma, this hidden ambivalence spilled over — as numbed apathy at the very least, and bloodcurdling anger at the very worst.

Beneath the veneer of silence and detachment from the blood and gore of Gujarat lies an eerie rationalization of nationalist revival. On Internet bulletin boards, in letters to the editor, or over cups of tea, educated young men (and some women) rationalized the massacres with talk of cause-effect relationships, clash of civilizations, or Newtonian physics — sentiments that resonate with the BJP’s agenda of anti-Muslim propaganda and Hindu revival. In activist Manish Jain’s words, “Their mental make-up and actions are governed by a strange mix of blind hypocritical patriotism, competitive rivalry, consumerist greed, and de-contextualized bits of information.” Who then, he asks, is the struggle between? “Not between ‘Us’ and ‘Them,’ but between ‘us’ and ‘us.'”

For those that believe in the blissful dream of a Hindu state, writer Arundhati Roy has some hard questions. “Once the Muslims have been ‘shown their place,’ will milk and Coca-Cola flow across the land? Once the Ram temple is built, will there be a shirt on every back and a roti in every belly? Will people be beheaded, dismembered, and urinated upon? Will fetuses be ripped from their mothers’ wombs and slaughtered?”

People on street near roadblock
Life goes on around a roadblock controlling access to the site of the former Babri Masjid. Nicole Leistikow

India Opts Out

Many people were shocked and numbed by what was happening in Gujarat. Writers and activists wrote passionately about the unbelievable cruelty and violence. But little happened. Now, a year later, political and social “experts” have moved in to dissect the phenomenon. A witch hunt has begun. They want to find out who started this fire or demolished that building. They continue to accuse BJP political party leaders like Prime Minister Vajpayee and Narendra Modi, some spineless opposition leaders, corrupt bureaucrats, and prominent intellectuals who voice themselves vociferously on both sides of intolerance.

The preferred dosage of intervention is one of technical policy fixes — dismiss the state government, seek a formal apology from the prime minister, call in the Indian army battalions, and impose a stricter code of conduct for press reportage, which in some cases circulated untrue and propagandistic explanations of the carnage. These are real issues, but shouldn’t be Band-Aids placed mindlessly over deep-seated, hidden value conflicts. One of the biggest adaptive challenges lies in the inability of the society at large to consider, in Jain’s words, “the broader processes and systems that shape and harden communal identities and pit neighbors and friends against one another.”

Attempting to pinpoint these identity-forming factors shifts the onus of leadership away from central authority figures, unravels the paradoxes of the competing interests of invisible groups, and probes deep into the contradictions in values so rampant in Indian society. The BJP has marched into power through democratic electoral processes after decades of being a fringe element. Who has given the BJP and the Hindu nationalists the authority to indulge in the brainwashing of millions? It is middle-class India, which forges ahead in its relentless quest for progress, seeking education, jobs, and material accomplishments and believing that political advocacy and influencing public opinion is inconsequential. Yet many hidden contradictions boil within the walls of their own houses — marital rape, child labor, unbridled opportunism, unsustainable environmental practices, and a sense of racial inferiority handed down from the ages.

Many middle-class Indians feel that the deaths in Gujarat are the sad but unavoidable collateral damage of the battle to regain the soul of a nation long suppressed. Ghettoization of Indian society into socially distant bubbles protects those with money from the suffering of the “invisible others”: poor people, minorities, and villagers. How would the middle classes behave if a plane carrying India’s richest man, Azim Premzi, Oscar-nominated actor and director Amir Khan, and cricket star Mohammed Azharuddin — Muslims all — was hijacked by a mob of Hindu fanatics? Their reaction would certainly not be as muted as it was for the Muslim shopkeepers, clerks, and laborers who were killed in Gujarat.

How did we come to be this way? Somewhere down the road, our society failed to perceive the dissonance between the harsh realities facing us and the illusions that our authorities made us believe in: that nationalist identity could somehow promote economic growth; that a nation could somehow leapfrog into global superpowerdom when millions of its children still do not go to school; that somehow all our pains could be linked to the presence of a few pockets of Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians. The pressure cooker of self-examination in which we held ourselves during the struggle against the British has become an open frying pan, steaming out fumes of self-aggrandizement and false nationalism. It took hundreds of years of struggle with others and within ourselves to bring together many ethnicities and create a system of political self-expression. We labeled it “secularism” and “democracy.” Now, secularism connotes the appeasement of minorities, and democracy is the synonym for stuffing ballot boxes with false votes every five years or so.

God, that word which denotes an explicable, multidimensional entity, has been reduced to a menacing idol of Ram with a bow and arrow, reeking of an inferiority complex. We, the people of India, who were supposed to have kept our tryst with destiny, have left destiny to the experts. Someone from above will arbitrate not just the spare change in our wallets, the hymns of our prayers, but also the very content of our character.

UPDATE, 3/8/13: Edited and moved story from our old site to the current one.

 

Crying wolf

Television journalist decries bias in media coverage after 9/11.

I was standing with microphone in hand, staring into a camera on a brisk evening in Modesto, California awaiting my cue for a live-shot, when in my earpiece I heard the anchor read bits of a story that began with five Arab men” and “FBI.” Twenty seconds later, the anchor stated that the nationalities of these men were unconfirmed, their whereabouts within the United States were uncertain, the names attached could be false, and that they werecnot wanted in connection to any terrorist activities. I assumed that I must have missed out on other elements of the story and went back to focusing on my piece. When I watched the same story in its entirety during the late newscast that night (the most-watched 10 p.m. newscast in the country), I was a bit shocked to find that there was no more information.
  
Though it has been almost a year and a half since the attacks on the United States, hyper-patriotic tendencies still flutter through flag-waving newsrooms. On December 29, 2002, the FBI released an incredibly ambiguous plea for public assistance as it sought the whereabouts of five men for whom it had neither certain names, dates of birth, or countries of origin. The government alleged that these five men–whose pictures they had obtained through an illegal passport trafficker–were in the United States. Not only did the media cooperate by trumpeting such scant facts on the government’s behalf (and sometimes mangling them along the way), it also fell silent in sharing responsibility for the dissemination of an errant message.

As a media person in the “age of terror,” I knew the arguments. It was television performing its obligations to public safety, right? We the media, were helping get the bad guys off the streets, right? We had the ability to post pictures of wanted men on the screen, to awake a citizenry that otherwise might not be “vigilant” enough in these times of extra caution.

Driving to the newsroom the next day, I kept hearing the same story on the largest news radio station in the San Francisco Bay Area, again, with little to no facts. Without pictures, I couldn’t fathom the utility of carrying a radio broadcast stating that there were “five Arab men … suspects …” at large, countries of origin/birth dates/names unconfirmed.

When I compared the wire copy on which the previous night’s script had been based with the source (the FBI’s press release, along with a phone call to the FBI press office in Washington, D.C.), I was dismayed. The FBI had made sure to specify that these individuals were not “suspects,” nor was there any mention of their nations of origin, while the media carrying the message had so casually inserted “Arab” and “suspect” into its copy. All it would have taken was a phone call or a click of the mouse.

Racial bias in the media

The wire story took a costly liberty. The need for speed led the wire copy I saw to read, “FBI searching for 5 illegal Arab immigrants.” Similar or identical headlines ran in the Anchorage Daily News, the Houston Chronicle, and the Bergen Record. As the story spread, the language intensified, culminating with this from Fox News: “FBI Searching for Five Suspected Arab Terrorists.”
  
They report, I decide? Isn’t that the Fox slogan? More generally, was the media being “fair and balanced”? It wasn’t just about one television network or one small paper in Alaska. The blame lies with all of us in the media. We were caught up in what I can only surmise was a patriotic zeal that allowed us to justify the injection of inaccurate and potentially dangerous adjectives, and further, to veil a lack of facts.

I began asking everyone I could find about the rationale of putting loaded information out there without a single confirmed fact behind it, other than the five mug shots. What if we had to run just the pictures of the FBI’s ten most wanted domestic suspects–without any information on their whereabouts, any evidence of criminal activity, no confidence in their names, ages, or places of origin. Would we? Most responded with a resounding “No.” Why then, had everyone been so quick to broadcast this information?

I wrote to the wire service, FOX News, and the local news radio station in San Francisco asking how they could glean such a different news story from the FBI press release. Only a gentleman from the radio station wrote back, saying “[The reporter] did not write this story from an FBI news release. It came from AP.” I didn’t know whether to be comforted or alarmed.

Within two days, news reports surfaced from Lahore, Pakistan, that one of the five men was a jeweler, who recognized himself while reading an article with the FBI pictures. Though he admitted to having used fabricated travel documents before, he claimed never to have been in the United States. Meanwhile, the FBI, the American media, and public continued to search for him on U.S. soil. Eleven days after the initial press release, the FBI withdrew the pictures from their site and announced their decision not to publish fourteen more pictures of men wanted for questioning. The primary reason for their about face, besides the egg on that face, was that the credibility of the informant–the same one who turned over the original five–was less than they had initially suspected, They had, in essence, been lied to.

It wasn’t just the FBI that had fallen for a lie. The town clarions had blown loudly and proudly only days before, running pictures just below the fold, or in the first block of newscasts. As always, the retractions/corrections pages in the aftermath haven’t taken responsibility for poor judgment or made any admission of guilt. Instead, consumers are treated to news stories on the layers of complexity in vetting information at an agency as large and powerful as the FBI. There aren’t diminishing marginal return studies that can pinpoint when the joke got old and when the townspeople stopped running to check on the boy who cried wolf, but we might as well start counting.

STORY INDEX

CONTRIBUTORS >

Written by
Hari Sreenivasan, Inthefray.com Contributor

TOPICS > FBI SEARCH >

FBI press release
URL: http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/122902press.htm
The original December 29, 2002 press release

“FBI searching for 5 illegal Arab immigrants”
URL: http://www.adn.com/24hour/front/story/695165p-5148190c.html
By John Solomon | Associated Press | Anchorage Daily News | December 30, 2002

“FBI Searching for Five Suspected Arab Terrorists”
URL: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,74118,00.html
Fox News | December 30, 2002

 

At the heart of the darkness

What the U.S. could learn from Chile's September 11.

The soldiers set fire to the grounds three times, hoping to obliterate every trace of their crimes. The trees, though, they could not entirely kill. Some left seeds. In the years that followed, the trees reappeared, sprouting around the charred craters of their old selves.

And so the memory of Chile’s greatest cruelty lingers. Not in ruined buildings or unearthed bodies, or abandoned implements of torture and execution, but in a curious hole at the heart of a tree. Even those who suffered and died here never knew where they were taken. But decades later, the earth still brandishes the scars, as if it refuses to be forgotten, because what was done here was too hateful to forget.

Thirty years ago, this was Villa Grimaldi, an elegant estate built by an Italian family on the outskirts of Santiago. After the bloody September 11, 1973 coup that overthrew an elected government and put General Augusto Pinochet in power, Villa Grimaldi was taken over and transformed into a detention center, where the enemies of the new regime were shipped, in secret, and silenced. Between 1974 and 1978, about 4,000 people were tortured there. At least eighteen were killed, and another 200 disappeared, likely executed as well. Those responsible for the atrocities at Villa Grimaldi were blinded by hatred for their political opponents. Their work became something more than rooting out information, or intimidating people into submission. It became the realization of a sadist’s fantasy: “la destrucci n de la persona.” The enemy must be made to suffer until he is broken, until she is destroyed. And so the torturers showed no mercy. They poured scalding water over prisoner’s bodies, and dunked them in vats of dirty water, urine, or feces. They hung prisoners up by ropes and thrust sticks into their anuses or burnt their genitalia with lighters. Women prisoners were routinely raped by packs of men, even by packs of dogs.

Today, survivors of Villa Grimaldi return regularly to their former prison. They are working to turn the place where many of them were beaten, maimed, and raped into a peace park and museum. Over the years since the camp closed down, in 1978, they have collected evidence of the torture and execution that occurred at Villa Grimaldi–painstakingly, because there are many in Chile even today who argue that the atrocities never happened.

Some of the government’s torturers have confessed. Pinochet has not. He still insists that he did not know of the activities of the DINA, his government’s secret police, which ran Villa Grimaldi and other torture and detention centers throughout the country, and was allegedly responsible for the killings and disappearances of at least 3,000 people, including hundreds of foreigners. His supporters admit that some “mistakes” were made, at Villa Grimaldi and elsewhere, but that the objective–freeing the country of the socialist rule of Chilean President Salvador Allende–required extreme measures. The ends, they insist, justified the means. As the spokeswoman for the Pinochet Foundation put it to me: “We had to clean house.”

I visited the Villa Grimaldi peace park last  August. When I returned to the United States, government officials had already started making the case for war in Iraq. From time to time, they brought up the human rights abuses perpetrated by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. It was another dictator, but the same crimes. In Chile, Pinochet’s soldiers rounded up the country’s undesirables–leftists, intellectuals, union members, students, their families–and trucked them to camps like Villa Grimaldi, where many vanished. In Iraq, Saddam waged a campaign of genocide against Kurdish civilians in 1988, gassing or executing tens of thousands; three years later, he crushed a revolt in southern Iraq, arresting, torturing, and “disappearing” thousands of Shi’a Muslims.

Villa Grimaldi’s torturers liked to tie couples to bunk beds of wire mesh, so that one partner could watch the other writhe in pain; Saddam occasionally brought in a prisoner’s wife or mother and had her raped in front of her loved one’s eyes. The Chileans experimented with the use of poison gas and injections of rabies on their victims; the Iraqis pierced hands with electric drills, ripped out fingernails, gouged eyes, cut out tongues. Other techniques were regularly used in both countries: hanging prisoners by their arms for hours, beating them with sticks or cables, ramming objects up their anuses, applying voltage to their genitalia.

Even when they weren’t being tortured, prisoners would be kept awake by the screams of other victims. In Iraq, some prisoners were forced to sleep facedown, their hands tied behind their backs; in Villa Grimaldi they were housed in closet-sized cells so cramped they could not sit down. Their eyes were taped over and black hoods placed over their heads. Only in the torture room would the hood be taken off, so that the torturer could read the prisoner’s face for signs of a premature death.

“If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning,” President George W. Bush said last month of Iraqi human rights violations. He could easily have been speaking about the atrocities committed in Chile under Pinochet’s dictatorship. And yet, there is a key difference. This time, the United States stands ready–eager, in fact–to do something to root out the evil.

Before we sign up for another crusade in the Middle East, however, we must consider some troubling facts. First, the truth is that liberating the Iraqi people is merely a sideshow, if even that much; the chief purpose of this war, the Bush administration has repeatedly said, is to remove a threat to U.S. national security. Second, even if the chief goal of this war were humanitarian intervention, it is not clear that the United States would have grounds to invade Iraq at this time, given that Saddam’s known acts of genocide occurred more than a decade ago. Third, the United States at the present moment has a shallow reservoir of credibility upon which to wage a war–even a war with as noble an aim as bringing the Butcher of Baghdad to justice.

I raise these concerns as someone with ambivalent feelings about military intervention in Iraq. When I left the Villa Grimaldi peace park last summer, I remember thinking how I wished the United States or some other country had made an effort back then to liberate Villa Grimaldi and Chile’s other detention centers before so many suffered and died. But since then I have come to recognize that–as much as I wish it to be otherwise–there are never easy solutions to the human catastrophes in places like Iraq or Chile. Sending in the Marines may seem like the quickest and best way to free a country’s people from violent repression, and yet it should never be forgotten that war by its very nature causes suffering–the most intense suffering human beings can know.

I still think that the case can be made for the use of armed force in Iraq. But this will require a different kind of leadership than we have seen so far, in America or Europe or the Middle East. It will require leaders who are willing to take the long and difficult path to attain legitimacy for their actions–a legitimacy backed not just by bold moral arguments, but also by the decisive weight of world opinion. Fortunately, recent developments in the area of human rights law (among them, the 1998 attempt to extradite Pinochet for crimes against humanity) have established a common language and common institutions for thinking and acting upon these concerns. Slowly but surely, we have been moving toward a world where the rule of states–whether Iraq or the United States–goes only so far, and where heads of state are held accountable for their actions, at home and abroad. What the United States does in the next few weeks, however, will make all the difference: Will the institutions that can legitimately deal with these crimes against humanity grow stronger, or
will they be torn apart by a superpower that thinks it can go it alone in the world?

Regardless of whether human rights is a genuine concern of the Bush administration, it clearly is not the driving motivation for the present Iraq policy. The administration’s argument-in-a-nutshell is that (a) Saddam is a menace to the world, and specifically the United States, and (b) he must be disarmed via invasion, because inspections aren’t working. That premise, as I have argued previously in this space, is a tough sell–or, at least tough to sell to anyone who properly respects the might of the world’s sole superpower. If by chance Iraq gives a slap to America’s cheek, America would swiftly return the cradle of civilization to its pre-civilization state. What kind of threat, then, does Iraq actually pose? (It seems that the only real threat to the United States nowadays is al-Qaeda, a shadowy network of terrorists who can’t be so easily bombed into oblivion.) And while we are discussing the merits of retaliation, we should also consider that a doctrine of self-defense that allows pre-emptive strikes–that is, the use of armed force not in response to any direct attempt to harm the United States–could also have been used to justify the bombing of U.S. naval vessels at Pearl Harbor (which apparently presented a menace far too close to imperial Japan’s own shores). In other words, striking first is rather hard to justify as moral behavior, as any schoolchild who’s gotten into a fight can tell you.

This notion of threat aside, let’s consider more carefully the administration’s use of humanitarian arguments in favor of war. Virtually every one of Bush’s speeches makes note of the rapacious evil of “the world’s most brutal dictator.” If the atrocities are true (and groups like Amnesty International–clearly no fans of Bush–have carefully documented them), why shouldn’t the United States liberate Iraq from its tyrant? The world rightly lamented its failure to stop the ongoing genocide in Rwanda; it reacted much too slowly to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Why not act now in Iraq, when the political winds are blowing at the president’s back, and the opportunity might never come again?

Oddly, human rights advocacy groups have been less than enthusiastic about the prospect of a humanitarian war. London-based Amnesty International worries that military action in Iraq will worsen the famine there, uproot “massive” numbers of people from their homes, and ultimately lead to a “human rights and humanitarian catastrophe,” in Iraq as well as neighboring countries. While it supported military action to stop Serbian massacres in Bosnia, Washington-based Human Rights Watch says the situation of ongoing genocide that existed in that country does not exist today in Iraq. As the organization said recently in a statement: “We have advocated military intervention in limited circumstances when the people of a country are facing genocide or comparable mass slaughter. Horrific as Saddam Hussein’s human rights record is, it does not today appear to meet this high threshold–in contrast, for example, with his behavior during the 1988 Anfal genocide against the Iraqi Kurds,” when Iraqi troops rounded up more than 100,000 Kurds in northern Iraq and executed them.

The problem, too, is that raining bombs upon Baghdad will also leave the liberators with blood on their hands. The “precision” bombs that the United States and its allies are using in Iraq will likely kill tens of thousands of civilians, not to mention tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers. Furthermore, it is quite possible that in Iraq, a country riven by age-old ethnic and religious differences and held together by the iron hand of its tyrant, the leader who replaces Saddam Hussein will be, or will have to be, just as brutal. With such concerns in mind, many human rights activists say they cannot advocate war in Iraq–even a just war that would presumably end the torturing and killing taking place in Iraq’s own Villas Grimaldi.

We could call the reluctance of human rights advocates to wage war in Iraq a sign of hypocrisy. Many hawks do. But we should remember, too, that there are many good reasons to be skeptical about the U.S. government’s present-day zeal for human rights. Take Iraq. Even after Saddam’s gas attacks and mass executions of Kurds were documented in the late 1980s, Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. said nothing, and continued to provide Iraq with credits to buy American grain and manufactured goods. In Chile, the Central Intelligence Agency aggressively supported the coup that brought Pinochet to power–even providing tear gas and submachine guns to a group of coup plotters who ended up killing Army Commander Rene Schneider, an Allende supporter, in a botched kidnapping attempt. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger happened to oversee this and other covert operations in Chile around the time of the coup, and he was well-informed about Pinochet’s bloody crackdown on dissidents. In June 1976, when Villa Grimaldi was running at full throttle, Kissinger encouraged the dictator behind closed doors: “We are sympathetic to what you are trying to do here,” he told Pinochet.

This brings me to my final point: the United States’ lack of credibility to wage a humanitarian war. Some may argue that the United States had no choice but to support dictators like Pinochet, fighting as it was then a global war against communism. But that also is a simplification of reality. The United States may have had to defend its national interests abroad, but human rights clearly could have played a much more prominent role in the decision-making of its leaders. Had U.S. presidents shown any moral backbone, values of democracy and liberty could have shaped foreign policy for the better not only in Iraq or Chile, but also in countries like Nicaragua (where the United States trained and funded a mercenary army that terrorized the civilian population) and Cambodia (where the United States conducted a secret bombing campaign that killed hundreds of thousands of innocents).

Instead, there were clear and tragic excesses. Even if the policies undertaken in these countries were not intended to cause harm to civilians, America’s utter disregard for the life-and-death consequences of its actions has stoked hatred and resentment of the United States around the world. For this reason, former South African president Nelson Mandela could say to a United Nations forum last month–to applause–“if there is a country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the world, it is the United States of America.”

The United States can salvage its reputation, but only if it makes human rights a higher priority in its foreign policy. Iraq will be the test. If the Bush administration believes its rhetoric about Saddam’s evil, then it must pursue a legitimate campaign to oust him from power and bring him to justice. But the United States cannot hope to win that legitimacy through unilateral action. It cannot hope to win it flanked by the usual suspects–the leaders of countries like Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, who are inexplicably defying the will of their own people in order to stand with Washington. (It should be noted that roughly half the world is not in favor of military action in Iraq “under any circumstances,” according to a Gallup International poll; throughout Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa, support for a war waged unilaterally by the United States and its allies against Iraq is in the teens or single digits.) To win legitimacy for its proposed military action, the United States must make a point of convincing ordinary people as well as elite decision-makers–in China, France, Germany, and Russia, but, more importantly, in Arab and Muslim countries. The outcome of this lobbying is not trivial. Having the weight of world opinion on the side of intervention will mean the difference between universal justice and vigilante justice. But so far, the United States hasn’t made much of a case for war to the people who really matter, and its superpowered arrogance has angered and offended the very allies it needs in its “war on terror.”

Fortunately, the example of Chile provides some hope that the world–when approached respectfully–can be convinced to side against tyranny. When Pinochet finally stepped down as head of state in 1990, he escaped any legal retribution for the crimes he had commited in Chile, thanks to various amnesty laws that he had made a point of enacting during the dictatorship. But in 1998, when Pinochet was visiting London, a Spanish judge asked for his extradition. Judge Baltazar Garzon insisted that the eighty-three-year-old ex-dictator be tried for crimes committed during his rule–namely, the genocide, terrorism, and torture of Spaniards in Chile and Chileans who now lived in Spain. Rallying to the Spanish judge’s cause, prosecutors argued before Britain’s House of Lords that international law should in this case supersede state law, and that there was no immunity for crimes against immunity. The court ruled in their favor.

What does the case of Pinochet say about the possibilities for bringing Saddam to justice? While Pinochet eventually went free, the fact that principles of international human rights finally had their day in court–and were found to have a legitimacy above and beyond the law of a single nation–has breathed life into other movements for justice. These same principles have lately found a home in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, where Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic is at last being judged for his role in Balkan genocide. In spite of the objections of Yugoslav authorities, Milosevic was handed over to the U.N. war crimes tribunal in June 2001, and he very well may face punishment for orchestrating the slaughter of Bosnians, Croatians, and Kosovars.

Saddam will not likely see a courtroom anytime soon–unless, of course, the United States attacks, or he flees the country in advance of an invasion. But thanks to the last decade of progress in international human rights law, the stage is set for that much-anticipated denouement. The tales of Saddam’s atrocities are enough to inspire humanitarians around the world to action, if the U.S. government would drop its doom-and-gloom scenarios and focus on the moral case for intervention. The United States has the international legal framework it needs to try Saddam, if the U.S. government would think to use it. What is needed now is an American leader patient enough to move the world down the path of justice for Iraq–to a just war if need be, and to the just peace that should be.

If Iraq is lucky, it will one day know the peace that Chile has finally won–decades after the killings, years after the downfall of its murderous dictator. It is a peace that Chile attained not through war, but through patience, perseverance, and, yes, forgiveness. You can see it in Villa Grimaldi, the very heart of the darkness. The work that survivors of the camp do today to bring past atrocities to light is not motivated by vengeance against Pinochet or the soldiers who worked under him, says Luis Santibanez, the architect who designed the peace park. “We are fighting for them, too. We want to make sure that nothing like this ever happens again, to anyone, regardless of their beliefs,” he says.

Ultimately, there is hope in the story of Villa Grimaldi, Santibanez says. Even under the most brutal conditions, there were those who found the strength to resist: the men and women who hid the names of other prisoners in slips of paper on their bodies, keeping their memories alive; the cellmates who wetted the lips of friends dying from electrocution with their saliva-moistened fingers; the lone man who, though crippled and able only to crawl, remained defiant to the end, shouting “Hope!” to other prisoners as they walked into the torture chambers.

As he walks among the somber monuments of his park, Santibanez reminds his visitors of the beauty this place of torture once possessed. Villa Grimaldi was a shrine to Old World beauty–a sanctuary of lush gardens adorned by statues, fountains, flowers. “In architecture school we were taught that beautiful things happen in beautiful places,” Santibanez says, his voice almost wistful. “But this place is a contradiction of that.””

Victor Tan Chen is In The Fray's editor in chief and the author of Cut Loose: Jobless and Hopeless in an Unfair Economy. Site: victortanchen.com | Facebook | Twitter: @victortanchen

 

A is for ambivalent

BEST OF IMAGINE 2003 (tie). The rise, fall, and pending resurrection of an Asian American magazine.

I remember reaching for the first issue of aMagazine when I saw it on a drugstore newsstand more than a decade ago. Here, I thought to myself, was a magazine unlike the others that I was reading–Sports Illustrated and Newsweek, at the time. Here was a magazine that purported to speak to and for Asian Americans. Here was a magazine that, well, was supposed to be for people like me.

In the years that followed, I became an on-again, off-again reader, never subscribing but also never failing to flip through its pages when I spied copies on newsstands. I don’t recall ever being thoroughly impressed by it. To me, at least, the magazine smacked of shallow materialism and appeared too preoccupied with pop culture; I thought it was nothing more than a glossy lifestyle publication stuffed with puff profiles of Asian American celebrities. But I always appreciated its existence and visibility. At the very least, aMagazine put a new Asian American face on newsstands throughout the country six times a year, not an unremarkable accomplishment when major news magazines rarely featured Asian Americans on their covers.

So it was with ambivalence that I greeted the news of the magazine’s demise last year. aMagazine had merged with Click2Asia, a website geared toward young, Internet-savvy Asian Americans flush with cash, and when the site shut down last February, it brought down the magazine as well. aMagazine issued its own public farewell. In a terse but heartfelt statement, the staff thanked its contributors, advertisers, and subscribers. I wasn’t sure whether to feel glee or gloom.

In spite of (or because of) my initial impressions of aMagazine, I spent a few days at the New York Public Library reading back issues. At first these sessions confirmed my suspicions about the publication’s editorial direction. Most of the articles left a saccharine aftertaste, but I came to realize that, as far as Asian Americana goes, aMagazine was the best thing out there.

Not just another pretty face

aMagazine arose out of a Harvard campus publication for Asian Americans in the late 1980s. Editor Jeff Yang would become a central figure at aMagazine as co-founder, editor, and publisher. The magazine’s original aim was to fill a void not addressed by either the mainstream press (which appeared not to care about issues pertaining to Asian Americans) or the various ethnic presses (which did not cater to an English-speaking audience).

In true plucky upstart fashion, the founders set up shop in a Brooklyn basement in 1989. A trail of offices maps its ascent: Chinatown, then Soho, then Midtown. Cheap paper and a crude layout gave way to glossy elegance, then a profusion of colors and graphics. The semiannual became a quarterly, and by early 1995, aMagazine had gone bimonthly. By 1999, it enjoyed a circulation of about 180,000 and advertising sales of around $1.1 million. By any reasonable standard, the publication could be considered a success.

A quick review of the archives shows that aMagazine emulated Vanity Fair‘s formula: reel readers in with a celebrity on the cover, then run news-driven or investigative articles within. aMagazine certainly wasn’t going to sell copies by showcasing Paul Igasaki, the vice chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or Norman Mineta, the Bush administration’s transportation secretary. (To be fair, it’s not like my mug shot could ever induce anyone to cough up $3.50 either.) So sultry actress Tamlyn Tomita, heartthrob chef Ming Tsai, and tennis standout Michael Chang would have to do the hawking. Of course, whenever the stateside celebrity supply threatened to run out, the overseas reinforcements could always be shipped in: Chinese actress Gong Li or Hong Kong leading man Chow Yun-Fat.

Yang, to his credit, understood the compromise. In 1996, he acknowledged the difficulty of achieving a balance between covering social issues that were important to Asian Americans and wooing advertisers. Furthermore, he recognized the opportunity his magazine had to shine a spotlight on people of political or cultural significance who otherwise may have gone unnoticed by the national press. “There aren’t enough positive, or at least interesting Asian American role models out there,” he told the New York Times. “We want to pull the shroud off of people who have achieved, not just people who have made lots of money but who are lifelong activists or artists.”

To this end, aMagazine brought exposure to such people as emerging playwright Naomi Iizuka, novelist Lois Ann Yamanaka, and politician John C. Liu, the first Asian American elected to the City Council in New York. It also opened its pages to Karen Narasaki, the executive director of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, and Christine Chen, the eventual director of the Organization of Chinese Americans, who wrote about Congressional legislation mandating an English-only rule in classrooms and the national effort to increase voter participation among Asian Pacific Americans, respectively.

Always a bad sign: an awards show

Still, that precarious balance seemed to shift away from thoughtful articles about politics and culture as the magazine increasingly emphasized lifestyle. In its later years, aMagazine ran articles on food, travel, and health on a regular basis. An advice columnist and horoscopes popped up, and fashion and style dominated the publication more and more. The magazine soon resembled a catalogue; one issue touted cashmere pillows, linen pajamas, and flannel slippers. And nothing could encapsulate aMagazine‘s preoccupation with glamour and celebrity more than the Ammy Awards, an annual gala event started in 2000 to celebrate Asian America’s presence in Hollywood. The awards allowed the magazine’s readers to nominate candidates for such categories as “Best Hollywood Picture” and “Best Performance by an Asian/Asian American Female Actor in a Cinematic Production;” winners were selected by a panel composed of Asian Americans in the entertainment industry.

Yet, amid all this bling-bling and celebrity worship, I found some inspiring, truly insightful journalism. These articles investigated important issues and painted a richer, more engaging portrait of Asian America. One such article was written by Phil Tajitsu Nash, founding executive director of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium. His clear-sighted profile in the February/March 1996 issue of Dinesh D’Souza, the conservative pundit who first gained notoriety with 1987’s Illiberal Education, highlighted the peculiar role of Asian Americans in society. “Being neither black nor white in a society with a bipolar view of race, he personifies the dilemma facing all Asian Americans,” wrote Nash. “They, like South Africa’s infamous ‘colored’ class, must submit to and support a racially unjust status quo as the price of conditional acceptance as ‘model minorities.'”

In addition, writer Terry Hong offered an intriguing exposition of the ideas of Frank Chin, the controversial literary figure and co-editor of Aiiieeeee!: An Anthology of Asian American Writers, in the February/March 1995 issue. Chin claimed that literature written by mainstream Asian American authors such as Maxine Hong Kingston, Amy Tan, and David Henry Hwang are rooted in myth. “These false books are great literary flaws that only work in the Western language, that only appeal to those who believe in the Western stereotype of the Chinese,” Chin told Hong. “It’s white racist text. I mean it .  . . . Their version of Chinese America wants to be white, to think white, to marry whites, and therefore become culturally and racially extinct.” What is so remarkable about Hong’s piece is that it allows Chin to undermine the very sort of figure that aMagazine lived to venerate.

Karl Taro Greenfeld, now editor of Time Asia, wrote an article that also deserves mention. In the August/September 1995 edition, he profiled the emergence of Asian American actresses in the adult video industry. In particular, he examined the lives of porn stars Asia Carrera and Annabel Chong. I was surprised to see that aMagazine didn’t flinch from covering such a salacious topic. (Could you imagine Carrera or Chong sashaying across the red carpet to accept her Ammy Award?) It was a glimpse into the shadows of the Asian American community that presented a more wide-ranging view of Asian American identity.

Another distinguished article, published in February/March 2000, investigated the plight of Wen Ho Lee, the Taiwanese-American nuclear scientist at Los Alamos who was jailed after being accused of passing along state secrets to China. Hindsight reveals that aMagazine‘s piece ran just as Lee’s fortunes began to subtly shift, though few knew it at the time. To bring attention to this civil rights case when it did showed editorial courage and a keen sense of timing.

Out of the ashes?

I couldn’t help but detect the distinct odor of irony when I noticed that both the last issue of aMagazine and the February 18, 2002 issue of Newsweek displayed ice skater Michelle Kwan on their covers. Then I recalled that baseball superstar Ichiro Suzuki had not only recently appeared on the front of aMagazine, but also on several issues of Sports Illustrated. If figures such as Kwan and Ichiro graced the covers of prominent mainstream magazines, did Asian Americans need aMagazine anymore?

After reviewing the history of aMagazine, the answer is yes. Many intriguing political, social, and cultural issues were mined–and still could be. Call me greedy, but it’s not enough just to put Asian American faces on magazine covers. Ask yourself if Newsweek or Time would ever explore controversies in Asian American literature or probe the difficulties associated with possessing an Asian American identity in the political or intellectual arenas? Or just glance at Newsweek‘s puff profile of Kwan last year: “Look for a 21-year-old L.A. babe who’s an A-list celebrity, whose boyfriend is an NHL defenseman and who abruptly canned both her longtime choreographer and her coach last year–in short, a Kwan ready to kick ice.” The piece was thorough, but nary a word about the infamous–infamous, at least, in the Asian American community–headline on MSNBC’s website after the California-born Kwan lost the gold medal to Tara Lipinski at Nagano in 1998: “American beats out Kwan.” Now, I don’t think this issue should have dominated the Newsweek piece, but I would have liked to hear Kwan’s thoughts about it (or see if she would have been willing to talk about it at all). Shedding light on the gaffe could have prevented the same error in the Seattle Times, which ran this secondary headline after Kwan lost at Salt Lake City to Sarah Hughes: “American outshines Kwan.” Whoopsy daisy.

Well, aMagazine might be on its way back. A holding company called GC3 and Associates currently owns Click2Asia and aMagazine, according to Pierre Wuu, associate partner of GC3 and CEO of Click2Asia. GC3 recently relaunched Click2Asia as an online dating site for Asians and is reviewing plans to revive aMagazine.

Unlike its first launch, however, aMagazine will have to take a look in the rearview mirror. Publications such as Yolk, which reads like a dumbed-down version of Maxim, and Giant Robot, which covers Asian pop culture cool, have gained formidable followings. An upstart magazine called Hyphen, based in San Francisco, will release its first issue this March. In contrast to Yolk and Giant Robot, Hyphen will adopt a more generalist approach, mixing serious investigative reporting with light cultural fare. More like aMagazine, in other words.

If aMagazine indeed relaunches, if Hyphen overcomes the inevitable obstacles of starting up, and if Yolk and Giant Robot continue to roll along, the competition will be exciting. The editors of each will all have to keep close tabs on the others. They may also have to vie for the same advertising dollars, and they will certainly be vying for content. The struggle may not be pretty, but collectively, the magazines would cover the Asian American community broadly and allow Asian American writers to make themselves heard on issues long ignored by America’s mainstream media.

Let the battle begin.

STORY INDEX

CONTRIBUTORS >

The writer
William S. Lin, Inthefray.com Contributor

The artist
Marvin Allegro, Inthefray.com Contributor

MARKETPLACE >
A portion of each sale goes to Inthefray.com

Aiiieeeee!: An Anthology of Asian American Writers
Edited by Frank Chin, et al | New American Library | 1974 Amazon.com

Illiberal Education
Dinesh D’Souza | Free Press | 1987 Amazon.com

ORGANIZATIONS >

National Asian American Telecommunications Association
URL: http://www.naatanet.org/
Official website

PEOPLE >

Carerra, Asia
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Carrera,+Asia

Chen, Christine
Announcement and profile
URL: http://www.ocanatl.org/news/pr05222001.html
Organization of Chinese Americans

Chong, Annabel
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Chong,+Annabel

Chow, Yun-Fat
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Chow,+Yun-Fat

Gong, Li
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Gong,+Li

Iizuka, Naomi
Profile and catalogue
URL: http://www.newdramatists.org/naomi_iizuka.htm
New Dramatists

Lee, Wen Ho
Official website
URL: http://www.wenholee.org

Liu, John C.
Official website
URL: http://www.liunewyork.com

Naraski, Karen
Profile
URL: http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/pnarabio.html
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium

Yamanaka, Lois Ann
Profile
URL: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0880669.html

PUBLICATIONS >

aMagazine
URL: http://www.aonline.com

Vanity Fair
URL: http://www.vanityfair.com

Yolk
URL: http://www.yolk.com

Giant Robot
URL: http://www.giantrobot.com

Hyphen
URL: http://hyphenmagazine.com

Click2Asia
URL: http://www.click2asia.com