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Movements in a new America

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The voting booth is often touted as the way that Americans can change their society — the site where democracy plays out in its purest form. But we live in an era where electoral politics has been diluted, its power leeched into the hands of pollsters and lobbyists. So where does this leave democracy? If one vote per citizen is not enough to overcome the influence wielded by corporations and the wealthy elite, then where should we look to find the new face of political engagement?

When our democratic institutions fail us, when citizens lose their ability to speak and be heard, Americans organize. Political and civic associations form a kind of test kitchen for democracy. It is here that we serve up new and classic combinations of citizen participation. The debate within these groups over organizing tactics is not just a matter of touchy-feely outreach and political correctness. It is a struggle over the very nature of democracy.

In this special issue of InTheFray Magazine, we take a look at this process in action. How do today’s social movements organize themselves? In what ways are organizers dealing with the fragmentation of American society — its separation into bickering identity groups, its division into silos of single-issue organizations toiling in isolation? Has this generation of activists come up with innovative ways to bond communities and bridge their divides?

This month, we begin with a series of four articles. In “The new ‘crisis’ of democracy,” we speak with the legendary thinker and activist Noam Chomsky about the recent, encouraging signs of political protest around the world, and the barriers and backlash that continue to stand in the way of real change. In “The end of old-school organizing,” Victor Tan Chen looks at United for a Fair Economy, a Boston-based economic justice group that has staked its success upon reaching out to communities of color, winning over sympathetic wealthy elites, and bringing the white working class back to progressive politics — a tall order for even the most visionary of activists. In “Elisabeth Leonard, Raging Granny,” Henry Belanger profiles a veteran peace and justice activist whose life story shows us how much — and how little — the struggles against oppression have changed over the years. And in “World Trade Barricade,” Dustin Ross and Victor Tan Chen offer us a glimpse of last month’s protests in Cancún, where thousands of farmers and anarchists and environmentalists from around the globe converged to demonstrate against the World Trade Organization and its alleged bias in favor of "free-trade fundamentalism."

In November, we’ll follow up with two more updates to our Special Issue. The stories to come include:

  • A list of the Top 10 social justice organizations in the country — compiled by the editors with the help of activists across the country — and a chance for readers to choose their own favorite activists and groups.
  • Maureen Farrell’s profile of the Catholic Worker, a group that since the days of its legendary co-founder, Dorothy Day, has striven to “obliterate” the distinctions that separate the poor from everyone else.
  • Tamam Mango’s look at Palestinian Media Watch, a media advocacy group that is organizing individuals across geographic lines in a decentralized, democratic fashion.
  • Victor Tan Chen’s analysis of the global justice movement, which shut down Seattle in 1999, helped derail trade talks in Cancún last month, and is mobilizing for another huge protest next month in Miami.
  • An interview with renowned Indian environmentalist Vandana Shiva, author of Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply and founder of Navdanya, a movement for agricultural diversity and farmers' rights.

Ben Helphand
Projects Editor, InTheFray Magazine
Chicago

p.s. You’ll notice a new look and feel to the magazine. Our redesigned site offers a range of new features, including a regularly updated blog (the reincarnation of our old “Pulse” department), the ability to post comments directly after articles, personalized user identities, automated printing and emailing of our online content, and a better-integrated Readers' Forum. We ask for your patience in the coming weeks as we work out the remaining bugs on the new site. Please send any feedback to webmaster-at-inthefray-dot-org.

STORY INDEX

TOPICS > SOCIAL MOVEMENTS >

“The Other Superpower”
By Jonathan Schell. Published in The Nation. March 27, 2003.
URL: http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030414&s=schell

“The Second Superpower”
Explanation of the term “second superpower,” and its recent use by The New York Times. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Superpower

 

The other side of Lawrence

BEST OF INTERACT 2003

A Supreme Court victory may turn out to be the gay community's death knell.

I don’t remember where I was when the Bowers v. Hardwick decision was handed down in 1986. I had not come out yet, but I do recall seeing protests on the news from my family’s living room in Wilmington, North Carolina. It would take me a few years to realize the significance of the decision on every aspect of gay life. By upholding a Georgia statute that outlawed consensual sodomy, the Supreme Court denied gays and lesbians any constitutional right to privacy in even the most intimate matters. Put into historical context–in the midst of the Reagan era and the full force of anti-AIDS homophobia–the opinion was hardly surprising.

On the morning of June 26, I woke to the sound of my radio alarm and the voice of an NPR news announcer, who said that Bowers v. Hardwick was no longer the law of the land. The Supreme Court had reversed itself in a sweeping decision, Lawrence v. Texas, that stunned court watchers across the country.

The Court could have taken the easy way out. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called for striking down the offending law–a Texas anti-sodomy statute–because it violated the equal protection rights of homosexuals (as acknowledged in the Evans decision back in 1995). But Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion went much farther, reviving the court’s dying concern for personal privacy and handing queers a monumental legal and political victory.

I applaud the Court for having the courage to correct its own mistake. The Lawrence decision is worthy of celebration, especially by those who have fought for the last seventeen years to overturn Bowers. Yet what disquiets me is the lack of debate about what the decision means for the queer community, culturally speaking. To read most of the queer press, you would get the impression that the Lawrence decision will have no negative consequences at all and it is up, up, up from here.

One thing is for certain: The Lawrence decision firmly establishes our place in the firmament of protected classes and sets the stage for the scuttling of laws against gay adoption, military service, and perhaps even marriage. We can leave behind our sequins and sexual liberation, and say begone to our urban, childless existence. Soon we can be as clueless about art and activism as Joe Sixpack and Sally Housecoat.

The danger of backsliding is real. Lawrence may mean the acceleration of what has become the gay community’s steady, incontrovertible course since the 1980s: assimilation. That assimilation is the primary goal of gay liberation is, for the most part, unquestioned. Those who agitate against it–like the group Gay Shame in San Francisco–are painted as fringe wackos who only want to spoil our gay old time.  

In the 1980s, AIDS and a conservative political climate created a schism in the queer community between the more radical approach of AIDS activists and the more sedate political activities of gay groups trying desperately to advance gay rights legislation in spite of AIDS. Queer Nation attempted to take the radical tactics of AIDS activists and use them to advance the visibility of queers and queer issues. But the nineties saw the decline of AIDS activism and Queer Nation and the rise of more mainstream and conservative gay groups, such as Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the Log Cabin Republicans, and the ascent of assimilation-related issues–for instance, military service and marriage–to the top of the gay political agenda.  

Once Bill Clinton mentioned us in a political speech during his first run for president, the process of de-revolution” was complete: The gay community had become a player in mainstream politics. Gay conservative writer Bruce Bawer got his place at the table and gays were just happy with any political crumbs that were tossed their way.

With assimilation as our goal, we became a victim of our own success. Each victory created a more comfortable, accepting atmosphere for all to come out, finally resulting in a mass exodus by the last group to leave the closet: political conservatives. By moving the community to the right, we experienced a further loss of activist fervor and less support for issues like environmentalism, feminism, racial equality, and labor. While coming out is still a revolutionary act, for many it is the only one they will ever commit.

An examination of exit poll data over the last decade further illustrates our political drift to the right. According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, a quarter of queer voters supported Republican congressional candidates in 1992; in 1998, that support had risen to one-third. The Log Cabin Republicans celebrated the fact that 25 percent of gay voters cast a ballot for George W. Bush in 2000, the highest percentage for a GOP presidential candidate ever. And the actual conservative numbers are probably much higher considering that most gay conservatives are less likely to feel comfortable admitting their homosexuality to exit pollsters.

Some would argue that the decrease in political fervor is only natural, now that we have gotten much of what we wanted, and there are few fights left to fight. But even if you think environmental, feminist, class, and racial issues are outside the purview of queer politics, internationally the queer rights movement is just beginning. After all, gays and lesbians in many countries are still subject to the death penalty for merely existing.

But if the queer community in the United States does recognize that a world exists outside our borders, you can’t tell it by our actions. Except for the admirable work of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC), which gets no attention in the mainstream gay press, little is being done to change the situation abroad.

Our community’s growing desire to assimilate affects not just our politics, but also our culture. Even as we gays and lesbians have influenced the culture of the larger society, mainstream American culture has had a diluting effect on us. Gay culture has been replaced with gay consumer culture.

Now that being gay will not lead to mainstream rejection per se, gay and lesbian artists can now be openly gay and pander to the mainstream–but at what price? In our consumer-oriented society, we abandon the queer aesthetic to increase sales. The music of Sylvester, Bronski Beat, and the in-your-face homosexuality of Pansy Division has given way to George Michael, Melissa Etheridge, and the almost apologetic homosexuality of Elton John. AIDS was once an important political issue for queer artists–embodied in the work of Keith Haring, Marlon Riggs, Tony Kushner, and Larry Kramer–but nowadays that and other kinds of politically infused queer art are on the decline. AIDS reinforced the role of gay men as cultural outsiders and was celebrated by gay men (and lesbians) in theater, visual arts, performance art, and literature. Imagine Keith Haring’s provocative work being used to sell Volkswagens back in 1985. Imagine Keith Haring allowing it.  

Today, politically charged art is the exception in the gay community rather than the rule. For every Laramie Project (a play about the murder of Matthew Shepard), you have ten plays where the story seems merely an excuse for male nudity. Nudity as a means of making a socio-political statement about gender has been replaced with naked boys for the sake of naked boys, a neoconservative celebration of sexual attraction within the context of good-old-fashioned, atavistic objectification: sex not as political statement but as consumer activity.  

Surveying the current queer political and artistic landscape is most disheartening because it is unlikely to change for the better. The last few decades have seen a growing anti-intellectualism in this country, resulting in an American society that does not like to be challenged or think critically, especially about itself. And this is one pernicious characteristic that the queer community has adopted. I have friends who refuse to question any decisions made by local queer leaders. This “we-must-support-the-troops” mentality is no prettier to gaze upon among gays than it is in the larger society. If objective, critical thinking is a crucial aspect of good art, then it is no small wonder that American culture, and by extension queer culture, is experiencing an artistic famine.

Perhaps queer culture is merely a transient state of being–a roadstop on the way from historically denied existence to complete mainstream cultural absorption. But there is no reason that members of an oppressed group cannot work to eradicate barriers to their full participation in the larger society while refusing to surrender their cultural identity. There is no reason that we in the gay community should exchange our hard-won political awareness for something we should have had all along: freedom.

STORY INDEX

ORGANIZATIONS >
  
  

  International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission
  An organization that lobbies around the world on behalf of gay rights.
  URL: http://www.iglhrc.org            
    
  National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
  Washington-based organization working for the civil rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people.
  URL: http://www.ngltf.org
  

 

Not on my watch

Can A Problem From Hell make stopping genocide a priority?

Can one writer single-handedly compel the world’s strongest nation to inject greater concern for human rights into its foreign policy? Thirty-three-year-old Samantha Power set out to do exactly that in her Pulitzer prize-winning book, A Problem From Hell, which chronicles the indifference of the world’s more powerful nations, particularly the United States, to genocide in the twentieth century.  

Power was a war correspondent in Bosnia in the mid-1990s and was frustrated at how little impact the horrific stories that she and her colleagues wrote about Serb atrocities had on U.S. policy-making. Her book both seeks to explain the reasons for this inaction and to indict the responsible policy-makers for their indifference. Through cases studies of many of these slaughters–the Turks’ 1915 decimation of the Armenians, the Holocaust, the Khmer Rouge’s wipeout of 30 percent of the Cambodian people, Saddam Hussein’s gassing of the Kurds, the Hutu murder of 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda, and Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo–Power demonstrates how the United States has consistently failed to respond to these massive human tragedies.  

By carefully documenting what policy-makers knew and when–even with the primitive technology available in 1915, The New York Times ran 145 stories about the killings of the Armenians–she removes the central rationalization for inaction. That the oft-heard post-Holocaust promise of never again” can co-exist alongside this record of non-intervention Power views as rank hypocrisy. Indeed, as she quotes writer David Rieff, “never again” might best be defined as, “Never again would Germans kill Jews in Europe in the 1940s.”

Less a work of original scholarship than a carefully researched and arrestingly written call to arms, Power’s book is clearly intended to jolt the world, and particularly U.S. policy-makers, into greater action in the future. And for a book that was dropped as too macabre by its original publisher, Random House, and one that was for a time refused by all the publishers in New York, it has made a remarkable splash. Former U.N. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke bought forty-five copies and distributed it widely, including one to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. After she published an article in The Atlantic in 2001 about governmental inaction in Rwanda, a memo summarizing the argument was given to President Bush, who wrote on it, “NOT ON MY WATCH.” If Power’s goal was to get prevention of genocide on the radar screen of the nation and the world’s most powerful people, the book is a rousing success.

Rhetoric and reality

How or whether these words translate to action, of course, is another matter. Judging from Power’s own description of the past, vague commitments to do the right thing are a dime a dozen, whereas a willingness to expend political capital, disrupt alliances, or risk soldiers is less likely than a Red Sox World Series championship. These past episodes of genocide did not suffer from a lack of idealistic academics, muckrakers in the press, or committed congressional staffers trying to raise the issue. These people are the tragic heroes of Power’s book, and their stories bear retelling.  

First among them was Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish legal academic, who invented the term genocide in 1945 to ensure that there was a single term that would distinctively capture the horrors perpetrated by Hitler against the Jews (including Lemkin’s family) and by the Turks against the Armenians. Lemkin spent much of his remaining years pushing the U.N. Genocide convention, first at the United Nations, where it passed in 1948, and then trying to get the domestic legislatures of the various countries to sign off. Lemkin worked himself to the bone–living off donations, haunting halls around the world where genocide was being debated–and died penniless in 1959.  

Others since have worked with equal fervor and disregard to their personal health, specifically Senate staffer Peter Galbraith’s unauthorized (and unprotected) trip to Iraq in 1991 that documented the Iraqis’ murderous repression of the Kurdish uprising. But despite the sympathy that Power evokes for Lemkin, Galbraith, and the various others who tried to bring genocide to the fore, the dominant message of her story is how these valiant efforts have been overwhelmed by the forces arrayed against them. There is a deep irony in Power carrying on their mission in large part by cataloging their failures.  

Specifically, two familiar and unchanging factors of the American political system consistently doomed their efforts: 1) a foreign policy that prioritizes national self-interest (generally defined as winning the Cold War for most of the period Power covers), and 2) a pluralist political system that is most responsive to organized and/or well-financed interests. Politicians, in turn, recognize that they do not have the domestic backing for interventions even if they are so inclined, and thus develop a variety of ways to downplay the horrors: by avoiding the use of the word “genocide” (Rwanda), by portraying the conflicts as ancient multi-sided ethnic struggles instead of as genocide (Bosnia), and by justifying state killings as a legitimate means of political repression against an insurgent group (Cambodia, Iraq).  

It is not that the American political system doesn’t work, Power ruefully concludes–it is that it works too well in representing American interests that are narrowly defined. As one reviewer pointed out, a foreign policy realist might wonder not why the United States does not generally intervene to prevent genocide, but rather why it ever would.  

Facing this climate, perhaps all that Power’s work could hope to do is stir the moral outrage that might bring about the political pressure to act against genocide. Indeed, Power recounts that National Security Adviser Anthony Lake told Human Rights Watch two weeks into the Rwandan genocide to “Make more noise!” Power’s book makes a lot of noise. But the noise comes at the price of some needed clarity, particularly in a newly constituted world where the wiping out of (selected) previously genocidal regimes is now claimed to be part of a more broadly defined set of national interests. The questions that Power avoids are ones that have become the paramount ones in this new world. What kind of human-rights violations are significant enough to override state sovereignty? Does it matter whether the intervention is unilateral or multilateral? Does it matter whether the genocide is in the past or on going? Power provides a devastating critique of the consequences of inaction, but does not specify the criteria for when it is appropriate to act.  

Indeed, some have even claimed that left-leaning critics’ cry about genocide in the 1990s–and the American-driven NATO bombings of Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999–paved the road for Bush to declare preemptive war against Iraq in the new century. Writing in the London Review of Books, Stephen Holmes argued that “the 1990s advocates of humanitarian intervention have…helped rescue from the ashes of Vietnam the ideal of America as a global policeman, undaunted by other countries’ borders, defending civilisation against the forces of ‘evil’. By denouncing the U.S. primarily for standing idly by when atrocity abroad occurs, they have helped repopularise the idea of America as a potentially benign imperial power.” Holmes notes that key Bush administration unilateralist hawks Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle were among those who supported the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo outside of the U.N. framework. In Holmes’ view, Power has “bequeathed a risky legacy” to the current administration through her endorsement of American-led, unilateral if necessary, intervention to protect human rights.  

We can’t place responsibility for the Iraq war on Power’s shoulders. No one has yet claimed that she is part of Bush’s Straussian “cabal,” and there is nothing in A Problem From Hell that suggests she would not have supported it. In large part, this is because at the time the book was written, after a century of American shirking of responsibility, the danger of too much intervention was not even a possibility.  

But there is another reason as well. Because Power’s primary goal was to motivate complacent policy-makers and a dormant public to greater concern for the victims of genocide, the book does not spend any time exploring the underlying issue of when it is or is not appropriate to intervene. Rather than try to reason us into some kind of consensus about when intervention is morally required, she begins by presenting us the death of nine-year-old girl in Sarajevo at the hands of a Serbian shell and then dares the reader to rationalize permitting genocide.  

This is by no means an uncontestable point. Even the leading just-war theorist on the left, Michael Walzer, sees genocide occurring within a state as a sufficient justification for war, but not one that imposes a duty on other powers to intervene. But to enter into this philosophical dialogue would detract from the book’s moral clarity that is its greatest strength. In other words, by choosing to take the crucial question of whether it is appropriate to intervene and positing it as a given, Power simultaneously gives her work a kind of punch it would not otherwise have had and leaves herself unable to deal with the changed problems posed in the new century.

The dithering and the messianic

In a more recent piece in The New Republic, Power takes a more analytical approach, and begins to diagram her view of what a foreign policy committed to human rights might look like. She tries to steer a middle course between the dithering, power-averse, “We can all get along” Clinton foreign policy of the 1990s, and the messianic, power-loving, “You’re with us or against us” Bush foreign policy of the past two years. Clinton’s strategy she derides as impotent and naïve about the ways of the world; Bush is overly cocksure and he unnecessarily alienates countries that should be allies. She favors the stated Clinton policy of acting “multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must” over the Bush administration’s implied policy of acting unilaterally when we can and multilaterally when we must.  

But more than the United States’ unilateralism, what bothers Powers is what she neatly labels its “a la cartism”–the mishmash of foreign policies that indicates to the rest of the world that the United States is only interested in human rights when it is otherwise convenient. To bomb Kosovo but to ignore Chechnya, and to gripe about the lack of democracy in Palestine but not in Pakistan, invites cynicism from the rest of the world when America claims to be acting on the basis of human rights in Iraq. (Not to mention the fact that, as Power points out, U.S. aid to Iraq doubled the year after Hussein gassed the Kurds.)  

Power would prefer the United States to come clean and acknowledge all of the black marks on its past record. Going forward, she argues that preventing genocide is only one part of a larger set of goals concerning human rights. For that reason, she suggests that human rights should be a stated consideration in all foreign policy decisions, including those that on the surface have little to do with human rights. Each treaty, photo-op and oil contract should be considered in light of its human rights implications.  

Knowing that it is naïve to argue for troop deployments too often, Power wants the United States use its entire toolbox of options (sanctions, moral censure, diplomatic pressure) to avert human rights abuses. Power argues that such a policy would be morally consistent, and would make the United States more attractive to the allies it needs in its war on terrorism. The battle to convince our allies over Iraq, Power avers, was less a battle over the nature of the Iraqi regime than it was one over the character of the U.S. regime. A foreign policy that consistently makes human rights central would not only be right, it would protect national interests by projecting an image of America that would be harder for terrorists to demonize and easier for allies to embrace.  

Power’s vision is difficult to evaluate responsibly, in large part because it rests upon a set of propositions about how others would react to a hypothetical foreign policy. But at least it is a vision–a way of drawing lines is at least somewhat realistically grounded in the ways of the world, but still idealistic in its aims. More context-specific than abstract concepts like just war theory, but more consistent and principled than a case-by-case approach, Power has articulated the kind of middle-range paradigm that is sorely needed to help us think about foreign policy in the post-September 11 world.  

As liberal intellectual George Packer has pointed out, the terms of the public debate over Iraq pushed liberals into an uncomfortable ambivalence: While they saw preemption as a dangerous precedent, thought war should still be a last resort, and distrusted the Bush administration’s motives, they were left defending a status quo that resulted in severe repression and was opposed by the majority of the Iraqi people. Power’s paradigm recasts the debate in a way that allows liberals to recapture their defining idealism by committing to a broader vision of protecting human rights, without being drawn into the dangers of preemptive war.

In the long run, creating this kind of middle-range paradigm may prove an even more powerful way of meeting Power’s ultimate objective of injecting concern for human rights into American foreign policy. The role played by Wolfowitz, William Kristol, and others, who have been outlining the case for war with Iraq since at least the mid-1990s, is only the most recent example of how idea-people can radically remake the world. As the Democratic presidential candidates mumble vaguely about the importance of strength, brag about past service, or join the reflexive anti-war left, it is striking how comparatively unprepared they are to articulate a vision for how to responsibly deploy American power in a world filled with terrorists and human rights abusers.  

To be sure, there can never be too few voices making noise about genocide. Even now, as the wars in Liberia and the Congo hang precipitously on the edge of the radar of the Western world, Power’s voice rings daily in my ears, reminding me that civil war is not an excuse for inaction if genocide is going on, and that history will judge us badly if we turn away. But it is also true that noise is not the only way to make change, and that the attacks of September 11 have made this a critical branching moment for the future of U.S. foreign policy, one that is just waiting for an intelligent paradigm to counter Bush’s simplistic preemption doctrine. We can only hope that Power, or someone with similar knowledge and commitment to human rights, will step in to fill the void.”

 

Por los ojos

BEST OF IMAGE 2003

Down a road in Central America, eyeing each other.

Click here to enter the visual essay.

There are storytellers who speak from the third person like gods with the omniscience of distance. The images in Por los ojos” are not of this type. They are face-to-face and first person. By way of a gaze we enter into the story of Nicas, Guanacos, Chapines, Catrachos, and Mexicanos encountered along the road.”

 

Driving us into the ground

The debate over the true cost of cars.

Let’s go, let’s go, let’s go!” chant the thousands of bicyclers in San Francisco’s Justin Herman Plaza. Gathered for the monthly Critical Mass ride, this gleeful mob will pour into city streets after work, stopping traffic, angering motorists, and generally having a good time. Since Critical Mass’ founding a decade ago, the group has emerged in hundreds of cities, from Warsaw to Taipei.

Though some are just along for the ride, many cyclists have anti-car sentiments they wish to make known. “End Petrotyranny,” reads the hand-written sign pinned to the back of one rider. “The war and our car use is completely connected,” he says as he waits for the March ride to begin.

“The auto is bad technology–gasoline, pollution, isolation, war,” rattles off Critical Mass co-founder Chris Carlsson as he taps on the drums and cowbell that festoon his bike. A wire sprouting from his black hat dangles a dollar bill that jumps to his rhythm.

Then, true to the group’s anarchist principles, the riders lumber off spontaneously with no predetermined route or leader. It’s time to take back the streets from those hurtling steel boxes, if only for an evening.

Critical Mass and its like-minded brethern are the public face of the anti-car movement, doing whatever it takes to discourage, annoy, and guilt-trip drivers off the road. For them, the car is the root of most evil, poisoning the environment and chewing up communities. The two- and three-car garage, the parking lot, and the elevated highway have usurped front porches, dense shops, and vibrant downtown hubs. Whether cars are wee Minis or hulking Hummers, they are “big, greedy, and aggressive,” in the words of Charles Komanoff, an activist who works with www.cars-suck.org and the Bridge Tolls Advocacy Project. “They make everything the same, and they crowd out everything else.”

Though contemporary anti-car protest has its roots in 1960s activism, today rebellion foments in policy institutes, environmentalist organizations, fringe political groups, and academia. In the form of Arianna Huffington’s anti-SUV ads and the What Would Jesus Drive? campaign, it even threatens to go mainstream. For the most part, today’s activists have spurned old-school revolutionary rhetoric. They are confronting the beast on its own terms: Armed with economic analysis and appeals to free markets, they hope to slay the dragon of American auto-dependence and usher in an era of clean mass transit and dense, vibrant urbanity.

The theoretical backbone behind opposition to automobiles is the search for the “true cost” of driving. To reverse the transformation cars have imposed on our cities and communities, the argument goes, drivers should pay for the havoc cars wreak. If transportation were priced fairly, anti-car activists claim, people would choose places to live that favor dense, urban areas and relegate the car to occasional family trips and Sunday drives. Although anti-car papers debate the “true cost” of driving–a figure proving to be rather slippery–some critics claim that the anti-car argument is riddled with economic errors and that the debate goes much deeper to basic issues of freedom and coercion.


Anti-car activity?

Surrogate feet

One of the most inescapable papers on the true cost of driving is “Going Rate: What it Really Costs to Drive,” a 1992 paper from the World Resources Institute. “Motorists today do not directly pay anything close to the full costs of their driving decisions,” writes co-author James MacKenzie. The current transportation system, he says, favors cars by providing direct and indirect subsidies to drivers. MacKenzie posits that this produces a distorted, inefficient market and encourages people to drive excessively.
  
A host of reports from organizations such as the World Resources Institute and the Sierra Club claim to show that automobiles are massively subsidized by both the government and those who bear the costs of pollution, noise, and accidents. The amount of the subsidy varies from $300 billion per year, calculated in the “Going Rate” report, to a staggering $2.1 trillion, as reported by the Sierra Club.

Anti-automobile economists claim that although drivers do pay for their vehicle operating costs and some percentage of road construction and maintenance, they don’t pay for many other costs: roadway land value; municipal services such as highway police that cater to drivers; air, water, and noise pollution; accident costs; resource consumption; land-use impacts; military expenditures in the Middle East to protect oil supplies; and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. For example, according to the Federal Highway Administration, federal, state, and local disbursements for highways were $129 billion in 2000, while user-fee receipts from fuel and vehicle taxes and tolls totaled only $77 billion. The rest of that $52 billion came from general fund appropriations, property taxes, and “other taxes and fees.” These appropriations comprise a direct subsidy, analysts like MacKenzie say.

Congestion is another large external cost–one not created by a producer or consumer. With free access to the roads at all times, drivers do not have to pay more to drive during commutes, when demand for driving is highest. The result of this “market failure” is traffic jams that wastes the time of drivers, time that MacKenzie estimates to be worth at least $100 billion a year.

In essence, writes Alvin Spivak, author of the anti-car tract The Elephant in the Bedroom, our policy toward the car is like the Soviet policy toward bread: The price is kept so artificially low that over-consumption is bound to occur. According to Spivak, Soviet economics in former President Mikhail Gorbachev’s time made rolls so cheap they were often used as surrogate soccer balls. In the United States, cars have become surrogate feet, Spivak argues–and our use of them has mushroomed out of control because using them seems almost free.

Unable to compete against this giveaway, mass transit, once privatized and profitable, is unable to pay its own way. The government has had to take over and, despite intervention, those hapless souls in America who cannot afford a car are ill served by limping bus and rail systems.

Anti-car papers claim that the solution to these two broken systems–the overused auto and ineffectual mass transit–is to restore the free market to transportation. Whether through an increased gas tax that would push the cost per gallon to anywhere from $2.86 to $16.11 (the range is due to different reports’ findings), congestion pricing, or increased user fees, once people start paying for their use of the roads and the damage they cause to the environment, a whole new pattern of transportation use will emerge.

In Europe, where drivers pay up to three times the amount Americans pay for a gallon of gas, it has not been difficult to implement high gas taxes. Gas taxes are not earmarked for highway and road expenses in Europe, and politicians are more willing to raise the tax to increase general revenue. But in the United States, where gas tax revenue must go toward road projects–though increasingly it is being used for mass transit projects, too–raising the price of driving is a tough sell. Some would argue that the gas tax is a third rail that politicians will never touch for fear of angering a public that considers low gas prices a birthright.

But even if it were politically feasible, some say proponents of an increased gas tax are not necessarily using sound economic analysis, despite their claims of “fair pricing.” In the exhaustive report, “The Annualized Social Cost of Motor Vehicle Use in the U.S.,” University of California at Davis economist Mark Delucchi writes that “there is not a single external cost, with the possible exception of CO2 emissions from vehicles, that in principle is properly addressed by a gas tax.” He argues that the majority of external costs imposed by drivers are not a function of how much gas they use. For example, Delucchi says a gas tax would not be a fair way to compensate for noise pollution because gas consumption is not necessarily related to the amount of noise a car produces. A Harley-Davidson motorcycle or a broken muffler will out-noise a Toyota Camry any day, regardless of gas consumption.


Cutting through downtown.

Driving wherever? Priceless

But even if we could accurately determine all the costs driving imposes on society, would that necessarily mean that driving cars is nothing but one big cost? No, critics argue. As any economist can tell you, cost is just one factor. To properly estimate the worth of something, one must weigh its cost against its benefits–something most anti-car analysts have been accused of failing to do.
  
“I think they are trying to affect a cultural revolution,” says Roy Cordato, an economist with the John Locke Foundation, explaining why those who argue against cars don’t factor in the benefits they bring. Cordato calls the reports he has read, including MacKenzie’s piece and tracts from the Sierra Club, “intellectually dishonest…hyperbolic at best, and just outright deceitful.” The anti-automobile leaders are so wrapped up in imposing their vision of society on the public, he says, that they ignore contradictory data and sound economic analysis.

Cordato is a self-described libertarian who loves living on an acre-and-a-half while still being able to drive just thirty minutes to his office in downtown Raleigh, North Carolina. Originally from upstate New York, he speaks with northeastern impatience when the subject turns to anti-car arguments. The costs they are trying to measure, Cordato asserts, are not measurable, and the benefits that are supposed to accrue from a full-cost pricing plan are unknowable. “So-called analyses of the full cost of driving,” he says, “can come to any conclusion the analyst desires.”

The problem, argues Cordato, is that anti-car analysts misunderstand or misuse the economic concept of cost, which refers to opportunity costs–the amount of satisfaction foregone by undertaking a certain activity. For example, if someone must choose between going to the beach or the ballgame and chooses the ballgame, the cost of that decision is the value placed on going to the beach. This value is plainly subjective.

To know the costs of driving, then, “the analysts would have to know the subjectively determined preferences of all the individuals whose lives would be affected” by any changes to the current situation. Because this is impossible, says Cordato, any so-called “full-cost analysis” of driving should not be the basis for a policy that would cause the drastic lifestyle changes advocated by anti-car arguments.

Cordato uses the example of an asthmatic to illustrate his point. We cannot say with certainty that someone with asthma is “better off” in a society where a high gas tax, which theoretically will reduce airborne particulate matter, improves her medical condition. Perhaps the asthmatic values the flexibility and freedom she associates with automobiles more than easier breathing. How are we to know this unless we ask her? And how are we to know, in general, what every individual in society prefers?

Further, if advocates of the full-cost pricing scheme are trying to correct for “market failure”–the linchpin concept in their case against the car–why do they advocate more governmental intervention in the form of taxes, other pricing schemes, or mass transit, Cordato asks. “The transportation system is a mess because there is a lack of markets,” he says. This absence of markets produces a supply of roads that does not reflect demand and generates costs such as noise and pollution that users do not pay. But since we have a completely socialized road system–a centralized authority determines where and when roads are built and does not charge users the market value of using the system–we cannot blame the free market for the system’s failure. “The markets have not failed,” Cordato says. “It is the government, which has a monopoly on the road system, which has failed.”


Highway revolt.

Route 66, Inc.?

Cordato agrees that there is an automobile problem. Roads are under- and overused, and cars cause damages for which victims are not compensated. He points to the interstate highway system as an example: “So much of it is just a waste of concrete. You’ve got miles and miles of super-highway that is empty most of the time.” His solution is to take planning out of the hands of the inept government, privatize the roads and have operators charge people to drive on them, which is abhorrent to anti-car activists. Privatization would take politics out of transit choices and leave them up to the consumer, not the lobbyists. Costly, unprofitable enterprises like unused highways, subways, and light rail likely would go bankrupt. Private bus companies would flourish–not a bright prospect for those who want to lessen or even eradicate car use.
  
For Cordato, central planners and the government can never respond to demand as well as the market, in which millions of individuals make specific economic decisions in incredibly varied situations. When a central authority tries to determine what all these individuals need, then allocate resources and charge fees accordingly, he warns others to be on the lookout for bread-roll soccer balls.

Even if planners could determine what needed to go where and when, special interests would tear their designs apart. Libertarians fear that when you couple these tendencies with the coercive power of the government–eminent domain in the field of town and transportation planning–you have disaster: Just look at the highways that roll through uninhabited ranch lands or have decimated the urban fabric, ripping through neighborhoods in the face of local opposition.

But if roads were privatized, Cordato argues, people would get what they demand. Privatization also would go further in solving the problem of external costs that concern anti-car activists. Whereas now it is virtually impossible to sue the government for pollution caused by the use of its roadways, private companies would not enjoy the government’s luxury of “sovereign immunity” and would have to take issues of harm into account when they plan the construction and operation of roads. If too many people are able to sue a company for the pollution and noise that accompanies the superhighway planned for their backyard, the company probably won’t build it.

What the issue comes down to for libertarians is individual freedom as opposed to the coercive nature of centralized planning. We simply can’t know if society will be “better off” with reduced car use unless we claim to know what is good for all individuals and force that “good” upon them. Only the free market can give individuals what they want without forcing them to comply with the vision of a few far-away planners, argue those who oppose regulating car use.

“Freedom is the one value that allows other values to flourish,” Cordato says. This, he reiterates, is the nut of the debate, something either dismissed or not discussed in anti-car literature. “I want people to get what they want,” he says, with the usual caveat of not allowing the coercion of others. But the anti-car activists, he claims, don’t seem to want that.

Americans have a history of revolting against what Jane Jacobs, in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, called the centralized city planning of “high-minded social thinkers.” This April, residents of San Francisco, home of the first American highway revolt in 1959, tore down some of the elevated highway built across busy Market Street. The lesson seems clear: Far-away authorities and social engineers have no business determining local issues. Are anti-car advocates following the central planning footsteps of the highway builders of yore? If so, the revolutionary visions of the movement could simply lead to more rebellion. In our culture of freedom and choice, utopia may have to be won one driver at a time.

Story Index
                    
MARKETPLACE >

A portion of each sale goes to Inthefray.com

Driving Forces: The Automobile, its Enemies, and the Politics of Mobility
By James Dunn | Brookings Institution Press | 1998
Amazon.com

ORGANIZATIONS >

Bridge Toll Advocacy Project
URL: http://www.bridgetolls.org
New York

Car Busters
URL: http://www.carbusters.org
Prague, Czech Republic

Cars Suck
URL: http://www.cars-suck.org
New York

Critical Mass
URL: http://www.critical-mass.org
Worldwide
Note: There is no official Critical Mass web site; this is just one of many sites devoted to the ride

Federal Highway Administration
URL: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov
Washington, D.C.

John Locke Foundation
URL: http://www.johnlocke.org
Raleigh, North Carolina

Victoria Transport Policy Institute
URL: http://www.vtpi.org
Victoria, British Columbia
A wealth of information on transportation issues, including a huge annotated bibliography on transportation at URL: http://www.vtpi.org/bib.xls

University of California Transportation Center
URL: http://www.uctc.net
Berkeley, California
Download or order scholarly articles on transportation issues, often at no charge.

World Resources Institute
URL: http://www.wri.org
Washington, D.C.
Published the influential report “The Going Rate: What It Really Costs to Drive.”

TOPICS > COST OF DRIVING >

“America’s Autos on Welfare”
URL: http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/articles/subsidies.asp
Sierra Club | 1996
A summary of the economic analyses of the cost of driving.

“The Annualized Social Cost of Motor Vehicle Use in the U.S., 1990-1991”
URL: http://www.uctc.net/papers/311.pdf
By Mark Delucchi | Institute of Transportation Studies | 1997
The above link is to an overview of Delucchi’s extensive report. For additional sections, see URL: http://www.uctc.net/papers/papersnumber.html#300

“The Central Planning Of Lifestyles: Automobility and The Illusion of Full Cost Pricing”
URL: http://www.cei.org/gencon/025,01606.cfm
By Roy Cordato | The Competitive Enterprise Institute | 1997
Criticizes arguments made by economic analyses that purport to show that autos receive subsidies.

The Elephant in the Bedroom
URL: http://www.flora.org/afo/elephant-cont.html
By Alvin Spivak and Stanley Hart | Samizdat Press | 1992
Book that purports to show that autos are receiving giant subsidies. The entire book is online

“Saving Energy in U.S. Transportation”
URL: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1994/9432_n.html
United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment | July 1994
Full PDF of the article on the cost of driving and other transportation issues. The Office of Technology Assessment is now defunct.

TOPICS > LIBERTARIANISM >

Brief introduction to libertarianism
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/
Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy
A scholarly and more objective introduction than those found below.
URL: http:// www.libertariansim.org
URL: http://www.self-gov.org/libertarianism.html.
Good bibliography, including books and articles on left and right libertarianism as well as some critical publications.

 

Mother-guilt’

The unscientific progress of a psychiatric resident.

I awakened to death one morning in my life as an intern. I awoke and found myself standing next to my call bed in the hospital: an A code was called over the intercom and I reacted like reflex.  Where was it? I ran to the room and two residents had already arrived. The intern was giving chest compressions to a dying patient. The man was so brittle with his illness that his ribs broke with the first compression. I took over for the tiring intern, and as I pushed rhythmically, the patient passively vomited blood from his ruptured esophagus. The blood spilled from his mouth, onto the pillow, bed sheets, and floor. I noticed these details as though in a dream: what was real was my counting of the compressions, keeping the rhythm. Soon he was pronounced dead by the senior resident. I stopped pushing the broken chest, took off my gloves, and saw it was time to start rounds on the living patients. He was not one of mine, and in the rush of events, I did not catch his name. I put on my white coat over my scrubs to go and face the living.

Little did I understand, when I first received this physician’s costume, how it would usher me down to the underworld, onto a stage where sickness and death are main actors in the play. What I found within me during the descent was my mother-guilt. With the white coat comes an influence that presses you to provide good care to your patients. I call it mother-guilt,” for it is innate like one’s “mother-wit,” or common sense. It feels inherited, passed on through many generations, like the remembrance of my father in the features of my face.

I became a physician one day in May when, with all my classmates, I recited an ancient Greek oath by Hippocrates “to first do no harm” to my patients. On that sunny day, I did not feel the weight of the mother-guilt that grew heavier when in June I put on the long white coat at Yale-New Haven Hospital. The mother-guilt fears the harm done to patients in your care, even if not done by your hand. The death or decline of my patients began to feel my fault until proven otherwise–no American justice system at work here, but something akin to an ancient indictment for a crime long-forgotten.

My fellow interns have confessed to me this guilt in corners of hallways, when a patient under their care suffers complications. Sometimes it hits you first thing in the morning when you walk onto the floors. The nurse tells you that the patient was transferred to the intensive care unit overnight.  I have to remind myself that it was not due to my care, but because their body is failing them. I have to reason with myself, try talking away the guilt, but it lingers, whispers from hallway corners that you don’t know what you are doing, and are to blame.

The making of a medicine man

The pressure of guilt makes me as aggressive about my patients’ welfare as I’d be if my conscience, my livelihood were in the balance. In such a manner, the professional caregiver is driven to care. The days begin to merge and blur as I work the eighth hour, which becomes the fourteenth hour, which becomes the twenty-sixth hour, which becomes the thirty-fourth. Solace is found in the restroom for a few minutes, or writing patient notes, speaking with a fellow worn intern, or in an empty cafeteria. The distinction between this ancient guilt and the care of my patients–a haze of sleepless work, immersion in the infinity of details, the endless checking of doses and vital signs, and the constant moving of hands over the body–this distinction blurs into a near identification of their body with mine.

From one perspective, this approach is good medicine, for I am not only intellectually processing that the intravenous potassium I order for Mr. Baxter will burn his veins if given too quickly; I also feel my veins burning, and tell the nurse to administer the potassium slowly. Perhaps that is an empathy provoked by guilt and fear, but not sustained by it. It must be sustained by a greater motivation, otherwise short is my stay in medicine.

Certainly I am not alone in this guilt-induced empathy. I’ve had colleagues come to me in nausea, almost in tears, at the decline of their patients, or due to some small oversight.  They do not know how to contain their feelings; meanwhile the needs of other patients call to them.  Once during morning rounds, a patient passed by on a stretcher. A fellow resident clutched her throat. “I feel like my body mimics what my patients have,” she said. “You better not go into oncology,” I replied.

This guilt-empathy, like a fear of perdition, motivates you to get things done for the drug users, the alcoholics, the obstinate, the gluttonous, and the lascivious whose desires have brought on hepatitis, HIV, poorly managed diabetes, morbid obesity, and other consequences of bodily neglect.  That does not matter when they are your patients. You stay the extra hour, draw the blood, and check the chest X-ray before you sign their care over to another resident and leave the floors, satiating the flames that keep you in the hospital.

A story from within and release

Catherine was a heroine addict, prostitute, and a regular on the HIV wards. Rumor was, she’d told a fellow patient that she would milk this admission for all the time that she could. As the weeks passed, she lay in bed in a dark room save for when she would go outside for a smoke. I noticed her growing thinner in the early morning light when I examined her each day. We searched for the cause of her diffuse pains but found none.  Her T-cell count was low enough that something could be brewing, but during her second week we became convinced that she was using her hospital stay to evade the police. Then one morning I looked into her mouth and saw thick white yeast coating her throat. “It hurts to swallow so much I want to jump out of the window,” she whispered to me. In addition to the yeast infection, endoscopic examination diagnosed a herpes flare extending down her throat. We gave her medicated lollipops to suck on as she shambled along the hallway. The next time I took blood from her veins, my attitude was not of doubt or double- guessing. My intent was to get her better, her past be damned.

I emerge from the hospital and squint at the setting sun, and it seems foreign, this sunlight, for I have become accustomed to fluorescence. The last I saw the sun, it was rising on a Thursday, and now Friday is coming to an end. I walk out to my car, and on some days I am at peace. On others, I am swallowing all the small terrors and frustrations of the past ten or fourteen or thirty hours.  I want to sleep, but I also want to release the distillation of black bile collected under my rib cage; otherwise it comes up my throat and tastes metallic, like acid. I have smelled the iodine and the vomit, the shit and the latex gloves, the scent of the sick and the putrescence of infection. I feel deprived of the regeneration found in sitting at Rudy’s, my hole-in-a-wall second home, with a glass of Guinness and much talk around me.

Headed north, I pass East Rock, that traprock rise overlooking the city, and I spy its red heights, green crown, and the memorial tower. I breathe: my ribcage expands, loosening its anxious hold on the black bile in me. The seagulls circle near the sublime East Rock, and in that circling comes a gratefulness and freedom from this mother-guilt for a while–a rest, a simplicity in returning to a quiet home.”

 

Breaking the celluloid ceiling

Asian Americans embrace the bad-boy characters of Better Luck Tomorrow.

Emails about it have been popping up in my inbox more often than Viagra ads. Asian American magazines have been treating it like long-awaited salvation. It’s the coolest thing since tapioca pearl milk tea (and better for us too), hotter than a lowered Honda.

All of this hype presages the release of a movie called Better Luck Tomorrow, scheduled to hit theaters in major cities April 11. BLT for short, it promises to present Asian Americans the way we’ve yearned to be portrayed for all our sheltered lives: as ass-kicking hoodlums who instill fear into the hearts of white people.

The movie centers on a group of Asian American high school students, academic overachievers who resent the boredom of their tract-home suburb in Los Angeles. For excitement and rebellion, they turn to a life of gun-wielding violence, Las Vegas hookers, and on-campus larceny. The film follows the teens from party to party, through romantic liaisons, as they win one academic decathlon championship after another. The group’s violent escapades escalate until the teens finally find themselves in over their heads.

Since its premiere on the festival circuit last year, BLT has wowed audiences from Asian American festivals all the way to Sundance, winning praise and generating controversy along the way. One such episode has virtually become the film’s calling card. During the question and answer period following the third Sundance screening, a white man with a misguided sense of political correctness expressed outrage at the amoral portrayal of the Asian American people. This prompted film critic Roger Ebert to stand on his seat and shout, “What I find very offensive and condescending about your statement is nobody would say to a bunch of white filmmakers, ‘How could you do this to your people?'” A few days later, MTV Films signed BLT, making it the first film with an Asian American cast and director to be picked up for distribution at Sundance by a major studio. For many Asian Americans, BLT marks the first time they will see themselves on the big screen in an honest light or in major movie multiplexes alongside Hollywood blockbusters. If successful, the film could open the door to more realistic portrayals of Asian Americans all over the mainstream media.

Since the birth of cinema, Asian Americans–actors and audiences alike–have sought roles and characters that stretched beyond the stereotypical: the dragon lady seductress performing ancient sexual secrets with her pinky, the oriental Buddha-shaped man dispensing fortune cookie advice, the flying martial-arts hero who knocks out twenty ninjas in a single roundhouse kick. But even in 2003, roles beyond these old stereotypes hardly exist.

Says actor Russell Wong, promoting his new TV show Black Sash (he’s a martial arts guru) on the WB website: “I’ve always been pretty dedicated to practicing martial arts. Growing up, Bruce Lee was a big source of inspiration for me. As an Asian actor you either do martial arts or you just won’t get cast in anything.” BLT writer-director Justin Lin realized the only way to realize his dream of an Asian American movie with authentic characters was to make it himself. It gave him the freedom to create Asian American characters in his vision, not having to kowtow to studio heads, who most likely would have shied away from a movie with an all-Asian American cast. In BLT, humor and anger and other contradictory emotions collide, just as they do in life (and good movies). Take this scene between  two of the main characters, students Ben Manibag and Virgil Hu, competing in their club’s candy bar drive:

In a high school hallway, a chart on the wall reads: CANDY BAR DRIVE WINNERS: CINDY LAWTON – 58 BARS, JOSH DIAMOND – 87 BARS, BEN MANIBAG – 547 BARS, AND THE WINNER OF THE PORTABLE CD PLAYER: VIRGIL HU – 575 BARS.

Virgil, proudly holding the CD player over his head, screams in joy.

In the locker area, Virgil opens his locker full of candy bars. Candy bars flood out of Virgil’s locker. Ben cracks up.

Virgil closes his locker and they walk off.

BEN
Can I borrow your CD player?

VIRGIL
Fuck off.

Ben snatches it from Virgil and runs off. Virgil chases him.

Ben makes a turn and the CD player flies out of his hand and smashes on the ground.

Virgil takes a look at the CD player.

BEN
Sorry, Virg.

VIRGIL
Fuckin’ dick.

BEN
Stop crying. It’s a piece of shit CD player anyway.

VIRGIL
Fuck you.

Ben pulls a wad of cash out of his pocket and tosses it at Virgil.BEN
Now you can buy a better one.

Going beyond the stereotype

Sure, the portrayals of Asian Americans in BLT can be grim and violent. But what the guy at Sundance failed to understand (besides that life actually is often grim and violent) is that Asian Americans have been longing for complex portrayals like the ones in BLT, not necessarily “positive” ones. Portraying Asian Americans as the goody-two-shoes “model minority” denies us our humanity. Furthermore, this same mentality leads to the flip side–inexplicably evil and/or degrading Asian characters. In its shameful history, Hollywood has long forbidden Asian Americans to be anything but two-dimensional props.

One of the first Asian American stars was Los Angeles-born Anna May Wong. Despite her great talent, she subsisted on supporting roles, like the Mongolian slave in The Thief of Bagdad, or else was typecast as the exotic foreigner. Fed up with the constraints of Hollywood, Wong left for Europe in 1928 to pursue more meaningful roles. “I was tired of the parts I had to play,” she said at the time. “Why is it that on the screen the Chinese are nearly always the villain of the piece, and so cruel a villain–murderous, treacherous, a snake in the grass? We are not like that.”

Still, Wong kept track of American roles throughout the 1930s. When movie adaptation plans were made for The Good Earth, Pearl S. Buck’s novel about a farmer in rural China, Wong hoped to land the leading role of the farmer’s wife. Instead, all of the lead roles went to white actors who played the parts of Asians in yellowface. Luise Rainer, who got the part of the farmer’s wife, O-Lan, won an Academy Award for Best Actress.

Other highlights of Asian American cinema:

1961–Mickey Rooney, complete with prosthetic eyepieces and big buckteeth, plays a huffy Japanese landlord in Breakfast at Tiffany’s. This obscenely racist yellowface bit of “acting,” which continues to this day on shows like MadTV stings for Asians like Amos and Andy does for blacks.

1984–American teen comedy Sixteen Candles features horny foreign exchange student Long Duk Dong. Sole purpose in film: to be the butt of White Man’s jokes. He might as well have been named Long Jap Chink.

1990s–Roles improve, but some Asian American filmgoers have nagging feeling that characters must go extra mile to prove “I am an American!” by pitting themselves against their crazy old-world parents and their antiquated customs (Joy Luck Club). Or, in other cases, the Asian American woman must be saved from the clutches of evil Asian men by a sanctimonious white man (Joy Luck Club.)

2000–Movies from Asia make inroads into American theaters. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is even nominated for Best Picture. These are cool movies in their own right, but should not be confused with Asian American movies that deal with American issues. Incidentally, Crouching Tiger star Zhang Ziyi’s next role is a mail-order bride summoned by a trailer park loser played by Adam Sandler.

Now we as Asian Americans might pretend these movies didn’t affect us growing up in the United States. We might like to pretend movies and television are just fanciful fictions with no bearing on how we conduct our lives, how we see ourselves, or how non-Asians see us. On the contrary–we Americans take most of our cultural cues from the world of entertainment. And, for Asian Americans, decades of Asian caricatures and stereotypes have taken their toll.

Professor Darrell Hamamoto at the University of California–Davis conducted an experiment in his Asian American studies class. Essentially, he asked his students, “When you think of a sexual fantasy, what is the race of the person you fantasize about?” Invariably, the fantasy was not Asian, most certainly not an Asian American male. Years of demeaning roles had invaded our subconscious. Although the question was sexual in nature, the self-hatred could have applied to myriad human desires.

Which brings us to 2003 and Better Luck Tomorrow. In a widely circulated Internet letter, BLT actor Parry Shen lamented the cycle of Asian American typecasting in the twentieth century. “The world is exposed to the cliche9d images of Asians that currently occupy the screen, these images subconsciously encapsulate for them what Asian people are. The martial-artists practitioners. The nerdy students. The exotic sexual prizes. The guy that delivers the food to your door. And it becomes a self-fueling process because audiences continue to pay admission to see them. Unfortunately, these are the only roles that are available for Asian actors to portray.”

Eighty years after Anna May Wong first appeared on screen, things could be changing. Acting and directing opportunities could increase for Asian Americans after BLT, provided it does well at the box office. If it does, it will be due in no small part to the grassroots advertising, organizing, and excitement created by Asian Americans. It’s not hard to see why strong support has been building for BLT. For in this movie, a greater truth will have been revealed: We, as Asian Americans, are all too ready to see ourselves on the big screen, to revel in fictional characters in all their depravity, humor, sexuality, anger, and faults. In other words, as full human beings.”

 

From sparks to full blaze

Reporting Civil Rights traces the evolution of a movement and its coverage.

John Herbers was expecting something different when he turned to the Florida Highway patrolmen observing a civil rights protest. Protection, perhaps, from the white locals who were threatening to beat him up. They told me I had to get out of town, put me in a police car, and drove me away,” said Herbers, who was covering Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 1964 visit for the New York Times. “They weren’t there to help me do my job, and that was the same in community after community.”

Herbers and other journalists on assignment in the South often found themselves plunged into an unfamiliar country where the rule of law no longer seemed to apply. Neither news reporting nor social protest would be the same after this intersection of media and movement, which is chronicled in the new two-volume anthology Reporting Civil Rights: American Journalism 1941-1973.

The first volume, culled mostly from small black papers close to the early flashpoints, documents a slowly festering anger ignored by the mainstream press. But by the 1960s, explosive events like race riots, the Montgomery bus boycott, and King’s Selma march had grabbed national attention. The writers who covered the movement present a wide array of viewpoints–from the immediacy of daily reports from Little Rock, Selma, and Birmingham to essays and magazine pieces by famous names like John Hersey, James Baldwin, Robert Penn Warren, Joan Didion, and even a remarkably sober piece on integration in Louisville by Hunter S. Thompson.

In the first years of the movement, getting the media’s attention was a struggle in itself. Discrimination and racism were dismissed as local problems by major news outlets. Sit-ins were considered pranks; no one knew about lynchings unless someone called the wire. Many Southern papers differentiated between blacks and whites in print. White women, for instance, were given the “Mrs.” Courtesy title, and black women were not.

Change came slowly. In the essay “Mrs. Means Married Woman,” Hodding Carter explains his decision to change his small Greenville, Mississippi, paper’s policy after a black reader’s entreaty in 1951. “Behind her request was the persistent, long-unanswered demand that we–not just we of Mississippi, or of the South, but the Western white people who are an amalgam of so many anciently blended bloods–recognize that what the darker peoples of the world require and must get from us is a recognition of their right to human dignity and self-respect,” Carter wrote. “I do not think that the incident was really small or that the decision that came from it was inconsequential.”

It took conflict and organized protest to bring the issues to mainstream America’s attention. “The movement was all about press,” says Stanford University professor Clayborne Carson, an editor of the anthology. “Southern blacks knew the only way they could call attention to the problem was to get the word out to the whole country.” The nonviolent protests in Birmingham and the riots that accompanied civil rights marches across the South riveted the nation. Civil rights activists organized to get press attention, from the early lunch counter sit-ins to the massive marches that brought national television into the struggle.

For journalists who witnessed the tumultuous events, reporting on civil rights reached beyond the story. If reporters took authority figures at their word in the years immediately after World War II, the civil rights movement forced a radical reassessment of their relationship to authority. “If McCarthy said he had a list, well, then, he had a list,” remembers anthology co-editor Bill Kovach, chairman of the Committee of Concerned Journalists. “As reporters began to see people being jailed, beaten, murdered under the cover of law and authority, that changed the fundamental opinion of what law and government was all about.””

A former resident of a Muslim neighborhood in Suksar Village visits his destroyed home. He now lives in a refugee camp. Navaz Kotwal

Genocide Is Not a Spectator Sport

Exploring the roots of ethnic violence in Gujarat.

I force myself to write a small fraction of all that I heard and saw, because it is important that we all know. Or maybe also because I need to share my own burdens. What can you say about a woman eight months pregnant who begged to be spared. Her assailants instead slit open her stomach, pulled out her foetus and slaughtered it before her eyes. What can you say about a family of nineteen being killed by flooding their house with water and then electrocuting them with high-tension electricity? —Harsh Mander, director of ActionAid India

Former resident stands in front of his destroyed home
A former resident of a Muslim neighborhood in Suksar Village visits his destroyed home. He now lives in a refugee camp. Navaz Kotwal

At 7:43 a.m. on February 27, 2002, the Sabarmati Express was attacked while stopped at Godhra station in the Indian state of Gujarat. While precise events remain unclear, the mix of Hindu devotee passengers returning from Ayodhya, the contested site of a sixteenth-century mosque destroyed by Hindu nationalists, with the Muslim population living around Godhra, was lethal. Two cars were drenched with petrol while a Muslim mob threw stones, acid bulbs, and burning rags at the train. Fifty-eight passengers were roasted alive. Twenty-six were women and sixteen were children.

Many have described what followed as a meticulously executed pogrom against the Muslim community. Within hours of the Godhra outrage, shops were looted, houses were burnt, and whole cities came to a standstill. Officials numbered the dead at 800, while independent reports put the figure at well over 2,000. Women were stripped and raped, parents were murdered in front of their children. Hundreds of mosques were destroyed and homes ransacked. Some 100,000 Muslims became refugees in their own country.

A year later, the question remains: What happened in Gujarat? Was it “simply” communal riots? Or was it systematic genocide of a minority population on par with the atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo? How did this state — Gandhi’s laboratory for nonviolence, source of the wealthiest diaspora of enterprising expatriates — become a petri dish of hate and fear? And why did the vast majority of India’s billion residents remain silent as Gujarat was soaked in Muslim blood? Simple answers remain frustratingly elusive, but it’s clear that the trail of clues leads through the rise of Hindu nationalism, its large-scale acceptance by the average citizen, and the increasing political apathy of the middle class.

The final count of the dead, dismembered, and homeless is only half the story. Initially, the media depicted rioting on both sides. But soon reports trickled in that these were methodical attacks organized by radical Hindu nationalists. Many were members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which heads both the Gujarat state government and the coalition that controls the national parliament. Trucks would arrive full of slogan-shouting young men clad in khaki shorts and saffron sashes and armed with explosives, daggers, and tridents. Their leaders communicated on mobile phones with an unknown “command center,” checking targets against voter rolls and printouts listing Muslim-owned properties. Muslims’ homes and businesses were identified, looted, filled with gas cylinders, and set on fire. Women and children were singled out for the most perverse forms of torture. Mosques and other religious shrines were razed with bulldozers or burned to the ground.

The violence raged well into March and spread to almost all parts of the state. Over 10,000 Hindus were also made homeless either by retaliatory attacks or from being mistaken as Muslim. Twenty-six cities were placed under curfew. Yet Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi kept issuing “all is well” statements while the State Reserve Police sat idle, waiting for orders. There is evidence of police guiding people straight into the hands of rioting mobs. Police sources admit that former parliamentarian Ehsan Jaffrey made frantic calls to the police control room hours before being brutally killed, along with his family, when a mob entered his home. Four constables stood as silent witnesses to the incident. The rest reached the scene two hours after the attack, and the fire brigade only three hours later. The police commissioner cited obstructions along the way as an excuse for the delay.

Those that escaped the murderous mobs faced yet more misery. At the height of violence, the government estimated 98,000 Muslims had been driven from their homes, yet refugee camps received little government support. The humanitarian aid agencies that proliferated during the 2001 earthquake were suddenly scarce. The camps, now officially closed, were run exclusively by bands of Muslim volunteers and a few NGO workers. At present, some estimate that 10,000 Muslims remain without regular shelter. Many are still unable to return to school, access public utilities, or supply themselves with enough food. Pamphlets calling for an economic boycott of Muslims have exacerbated the difficulties of finding work or rebuilding businesses. And to call out for one’s parents as “abba” or “ammi” in Urdu on the streets of Gujarat remains unwise.

 Burnt-our car in Suksar Village
More devastation in Suksar Village. Navaz Kotwal

The Rise of Nationalism

The BJP-led national government’s response was stunning in its denial. It took many weeks for the national party to respond. And when it finally did, members called upon India’s Muslim population — at 150 million, the largest Muslim minority in the world — to earn the “goodwill” of the majority community. Moderate prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee shocked observers when he said, “Wherever Muslims are, they do not want to live peacefully.” In Gujarat, the tragedy gave Hindu nationalist fervor an unprecedented boost. Once a low-key bureaucrat, Chief Minister Narendra Modi took full advantage, campaigning for his second term on a platform of Hindutva, or hardline Hindu nationalism. He won December’s election in a landslide.

The Hindu right focused on an immediate cycle of cause and effect: Muslims killed Hindus in Godhra, and the Hindus retaliated. Some even extended the timeline to prior riots, the ongoing controversy over building a Hindu temple on the former site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, or even the Muslim invasions in 1100 CE. Opposition parties, the national press, and liberal intellectuals were labeled “pseudo-secularists” and “anti-nationals.”

The recent rise of Hindutva, in Gujarat and in India at large, is important to understanding how such a tragedy could have happened. A philosophy of Hindu revivalism, Hindutva seeks to make India a Hindu, rather than a secular, state. Its defining tenets can be traced to a seventy-seven page pamphlet called We or Our Nationhood Defined. Written in 1939 by Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, who once headed the RSS (the fundamentalist ideological arm of the BJP), it states, “The non-Hindu people in Hindustan must cease to be foreigners or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment — not even citizen’s rights.” The subtext of the Hindutva war cry is a call for Hindus to assert their religious, economic, and political rights in the face of hundreds of years of subjugation — by the Mughal empire, the British, and then the so-called “pseudo-secularists” of the Congress party. Specious associations of Muslims with the creation of Pakistan, the Sikh nationalist movement, and missionary Christianity feed into the pernicious view that Hinduism is a religion under siege.

For the BJP and its political siblings, the RSS and the VHP (Global Hindu Convention), the killings were a celebration of their very existence. Founded on a Hindu supremacist platform advocating strong anti-Muslim and antiminority sentiment, and tracing its roots to Gandhi’s assassins, the movement has been brewing hatred for decades. Their ideologues echo Golwalkar: “The future of India is set. Hindutva is here to stay. It is up to the Muslims whether they will be included in the new nationalistic spirit of Bharat. It is up to the government and the Muslim leadership whether they wish to increase Hindu furor or work with the Hindu leadership to show that Muslims and the government will consider Hindu sentiments.”

To comprehend the spread of Hindutva, one must first grasp the leadership vacuum that has long been brewing. India claims to be the world’s largest multiparty democracy, yet a corrupt and self-interested political elite shuffle between the ruling party and the opposition in the Indian parliament. Because permission to govern is won based on volume of electoral votes and gerrymandered districts rather than the strength of public opinion, politicians have an easier time targeting specific populations for electoral gains. Voters are made empty promises, bribed with blankets at wintertime, or forced at gunpoint to vote for politicians they hardly know. And then they are conveniently forgotten. Once in power, ministers and members of parliament trade favors to amass wealth, often for generations to come. The BJP government is propped up by a ragtag alliance of political parties called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). On the opposition benches sit the Congress and the Janata Party, which ruled India for many decades on supposedly secular political agendas until the BJP’s ascension in the mid-1990s.

Within a week of the first riots, the opposition went on a strike to adjourn the parliament, called for a formal censure of the state government, and demanded commissions of inquiry into the massacres. These same instruments of political action — strikes, boycotts, and public inquiry — were implemented during the freedom struggle against the British. But repeated application of these devices in every political conflict has, in Professor Pratap Mehta’s words, “downgraded the currency of protest.” He writes, “What ought to appear like an extraordinary event in the course of our legislative proceedings becomes simply another familiar gesture.”

Women shopping in Ayodhya
Women shop for devotional trinkets in Ayodhya, a place of both Hindu and Muslim worship until 1992. Nicole Leistikow

India Buys In

To lump a billion people, practicing many religions and speaking even more languages, into a predictable and responsible political organism was a challenge on the part of the nation builders — first the British, then the Nehru-led socialists. They began to accentuate every imaginable attribute that could divide people — caste, religion, region, language, income. The government offered customized carrots to each identity-based vote bank: state boundaries drawn to serve linguistic majorities, caste-based quotas in jobs, food packets to the hungry.

The people acquiesced to the command-and-control socialist political system, rewarding politicians with landslide vote margins and a license to misrule. More importantly, the people relinquished the work of social adaptation to the sarkari babus — government bureaucrats, politicians, religious heads, and criminals. Political ideology, religious practice, and cultural norms came to be determined from somewhere above. Freedom was lost again. Thus the way was paved for Hindu nationalists to raise their divisive allegations: the opposition parties want only to appease minorities, to sell out the country, to leave Hinduism vulnerable to Muslim militants and — worse — Pakistan.

India’s deregulation of key industries in the 1990s led to a jump in middle-class affluence, which in turn led to increased consumption. However, the majority of citizens remain poor, with a per capita income of $496 per year. Caught in this transition between postcolonial socialism and a still nascent capitalism were millions of disenfranchised villagers, unemployed urban youth, and bored government officials. Their frustrations and fears were a treasure trove of emotions that could easily be harnessed by political ideology. When provoked by the threat of annihilation of identity, empowered by swords and tridents, and seduced by a feeling of nationalist dogma, this hidden ambivalence spilled over — as numbed apathy at the very least, and bloodcurdling anger at the very worst.

Beneath the veneer of silence and detachment from the blood and gore of Gujarat lies an eerie rationalization of nationalist revival. On Internet bulletin boards, in letters to the editor, or over cups of tea, educated young men (and some women) rationalized the massacres with talk of cause-effect relationships, clash of civilizations, or Newtonian physics — sentiments that resonate with the BJP’s agenda of anti-Muslim propaganda and Hindu revival. In activist Manish Jain’s words, “Their mental make-up and actions are governed by a strange mix of blind hypocritical patriotism, competitive rivalry, consumerist greed, and de-contextualized bits of information.” Who then, he asks, is the struggle between? “Not between ‘Us’ and ‘Them,’ but between ‘us’ and ‘us.'”

For those that believe in the blissful dream of a Hindu state, writer Arundhati Roy has some hard questions. “Once the Muslims have been ‘shown their place,’ will milk and Coca-Cola flow across the land? Once the Ram temple is built, will there be a shirt on every back and a roti in every belly? Will people be beheaded, dismembered, and urinated upon? Will fetuses be ripped from their mothers’ wombs and slaughtered?”

People on street near roadblock
Life goes on around a roadblock controlling access to the site of the former Babri Masjid. Nicole Leistikow

India Opts Out

Many people were shocked and numbed by what was happening in Gujarat. Writers and activists wrote passionately about the unbelievable cruelty and violence. But little happened. Now, a year later, political and social “experts” have moved in to dissect the phenomenon. A witch hunt has begun. They want to find out who started this fire or demolished that building. They continue to accuse BJP political party leaders like Prime Minister Vajpayee and Narendra Modi, some spineless opposition leaders, corrupt bureaucrats, and prominent intellectuals who voice themselves vociferously on both sides of intolerance.

The preferred dosage of intervention is one of technical policy fixes — dismiss the state government, seek a formal apology from the prime minister, call in the Indian army battalions, and impose a stricter code of conduct for press reportage, which in some cases circulated untrue and propagandistic explanations of the carnage. These are real issues, but shouldn’t be Band-Aids placed mindlessly over deep-seated, hidden value conflicts. One of the biggest adaptive challenges lies in the inability of the society at large to consider, in Jain’s words, “the broader processes and systems that shape and harden communal identities and pit neighbors and friends against one another.”

Attempting to pinpoint these identity-forming factors shifts the onus of leadership away from central authority figures, unravels the paradoxes of the competing interests of invisible groups, and probes deep into the contradictions in values so rampant in Indian society. The BJP has marched into power through democratic electoral processes after decades of being a fringe element. Who has given the BJP and the Hindu nationalists the authority to indulge in the brainwashing of millions? It is middle-class India, which forges ahead in its relentless quest for progress, seeking education, jobs, and material accomplishments and believing that political advocacy and influencing public opinion is inconsequential. Yet many hidden contradictions boil within the walls of their own houses — marital rape, child labor, unbridled opportunism, unsustainable environmental practices, and a sense of racial inferiority handed down from the ages.

Many middle-class Indians feel that the deaths in Gujarat are the sad but unavoidable collateral damage of the battle to regain the soul of a nation long suppressed. Ghettoization of Indian society into socially distant bubbles protects those with money from the suffering of the “invisible others”: poor people, minorities, and villagers. How would the middle classes behave if a plane carrying India’s richest man, Azim Premzi, Oscar-nominated actor and director Amir Khan, and cricket star Mohammed Azharuddin — Muslims all — was hijacked by a mob of Hindu fanatics? Their reaction would certainly not be as muted as it was for the Muslim shopkeepers, clerks, and laborers who were killed in Gujarat.

How did we come to be this way? Somewhere down the road, our society failed to perceive the dissonance between the harsh realities facing us and the illusions that our authorities made us believe in: that nationalist identity could somehow promote economic growth; that a nation could somehow leapfrog into global superpowerdom when millions of its children still do not go to school; that somehow all our pains could be linked to the presence of a few pockets of Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians. The pressure cooker of self-examination in which we held ourselves during the struggle against the British has become an open frying pan, steaming out fumes of self-aggrandizement and false nationalism. It took hundreds of years of struggle with others and within ourselves to bring together many ethnicities and create a system of political self-expression. We labeled it “secularism” and “democracy.” Now, secularism connotes the appeasement of minorities, and democracy is the synonym for stuffing ballot boxes with false votes every five years or so.

God, that word which denotes an explicable, multidimensional entity, has been reduced to a menacing idol of Ram with a bow and arrow, reeking of an inferiority complex. We, the people of India, who were supposed to have kept our tryst with destiny, have left destiny to the experts. Someone from above will arbitrate not just the spare change in our wallets, the hymns of our prayers, but also the very content of our character.

UPDATE, 3/8/13: Edited and moved story from our old site to the current one.

 

Crying wolf

Television journalist decries bias in media coverage after 9/11.

I was standing with microphone in hand, staring into a camera on a brisk evening in Modesto, California awaiting my cue for a live-shot, when in my earpiece I heard the anchor read bits of a story that began with five Arab men” and “FBI.” Twenty seconds later, the anchor stated that the nationalities of these men were unconfirmed, their whereabouts within the United States were uncertain, the names attached could be false, and that they werecnot wanted in connection to any terrorist activities. I assumed that I must have missed out on other elements of the story and went back to focusing on my piece. When I watched the same story in its entirety during the late newscast that night (the most-watched 10 p.m. newscast in the country), I was a bit shocked to find that there was no more information.
  
Though it has been almost a year and a half since the attacks on the United States, hyper-patriotic tendencies still flutter through flag-waving newsrooms. On December 29, 2002, the FBI released an incredibly ambiguous plea for public assistance as it sought the whereabouts of five men for whom it had neither certain names, dates of birth, or countries of origin. The government alleged that these five men–whose pictures they had obtained through an illegal passport trafficker–were in the United States. Not only did the media cooperate by trumpeting such scant facts on the government’s behalf (and sometimes mangling them along the way), it also fell silent in sharing responsibility for the dissemination of an errant message.

As a media person in the “age of terror,” I knew the arguments. It was television performing its obligations to public safety, right? We the media, were helping get the bad guys off the streets, right? We had the ability to post pictures of wanted men on the screen, to awake a citizenry that otherwise might not be “vigilant” enough in these times of extra caution.

Driving to the newsroom the next day, I kept hearing the same story on the largest news radio station in the San Francisco Bay Area, again, with little to no facts. Without pictures, I couldn’t fathom the utility of carrying a radio broadcast stating that there were “five Arab men … suspects …” at large, countries of origin/birth dates/names unconfirmed.

When I compared the wire copy on which the previous night’s script had been based with the source (the FBI’s press release, along with a phone call to the FBI press office in Washington, D.C.), I was dismayed. The FBI had made sure to specify that these individuals were not “suspects,” nor was there any mention of their nations of origin, while the media carrying the message had so casually inserted “Arab” and “suspect” into its copy. All it would have taken was a phone call or a click of the mouse.

Racial bias in the media

The wire story took a costly liberty. The need for speed led the wire copy I saw to read, “FBI searching for 5 illegal Arab immigrants.” Similar or identical headlines ran in the Anchorage Daily News, the Houston Chronicle, and the Bergen Record. As the story spread, the language intensified, culminating with this from Fox News: “FBI Searching for Five Suspected Arab Terrorists.”
  
They report, I decide? Isn’t that the Fox slogan? More generally, was the media being “fair and balanced”? It wasn’t just about one television network or one small paper in Alaska. The blame lies with all of us in the media. We were caught up in what I can only surmise was a patriotic zeal that allowed us to justify the injection of inaccurate and potentially dangerous adjectives, and further, to veil a lack of facts.

I began asking everyone I could find about the rationale of putting loaded information out there without a single confirmed fact behind it, other than the five mug shots. What if we had to run just the pictures of the FBI’s ten most wanted domestic suspects–without any information on their whereabouts, any evidence of criminal activity, no confidence in their names, ages, or places of origin. Would we? Most responded with a resounding “No.” Why then, had everyone been so quick to broadcast this information?

I wrote to the wire service, FOX News, and the local news radio station in San Francisco asking how they could glean such a different news story from the FBI press release. Only a gentleman from the radio station wrote back, saying “[The reporter] did not write this story from an FBI news release. It came from AP.” I didn’t know whether to be comforted or alarmed.

Within two days, news reports surfaced from Lahore, Pakistan, that one of the five men was a jeweler, who recognized himself while reading an article with the FBI pictures. Though he admitted to having used fabricated travel documents before, he claimed never to have been in the United States. Meanwhile, the FBI, the American media, and public continued to search for him on U.S. soil. Eleven days after the initial press release, the FBI withdrew the pictures from their site and announced their decision not to publish fourteen more pictures of men wanted for questioning. The primary reason for their about face, besides the egg on that face, was that the credibility of the informant–the same one who turned over the original five–was less than they had initially suspected, They had, in essence, been lied to.

It wasn’t just the FBI that had fallen for a lie. The town clarions had blown loudly and proudly only days before, running pictures just below the fold, or in the first block of newscasts. As always, the retractions/corrections pages in the aftermath haven’t taken responsibility for poor judgment or made any admission of guilt. Instead, consumers are treated to news stories on the layers of complexity in vetting information at an agency as large and powerful as the FBI. There aren’t diminishing marginal return studies that can pinpoint when the joke got old and when the townspeople stopped running to check on the boy who cried wolf, but we might as well start counting.

STORY INDEX

CONTRIBUTORS >

Written by
Hari Sreenivasan, Inthefray.com Contributor

TOPICS > FBI SEARCH >

FBI press release
URL: http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/122902press.htm
The original December 29, 2002 press release

“FBI searching for 5 illegal Arab immigrants”
URL: http://www.adn.com/24hour/front/story/695165p-5148190c.html
By John Solomon | Associated Press | Anchorage Daily News | December 30, 2002

“FBI Searching for Five Suspected Arab Terrorists”
URL: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,74118,00.html
Fox News | December 30, 2002

 

A is for ambivalent

BEST OF IMAGINE 2003 (tie). The rise, fall, and pending resurrection of an Asian American magazine.

I remember reaching for the first issue of aMagazine when I saw it on a drugstore newsstand more than a decade ago. Here, I thought to myself, was a magazine unlike the others that I was reading–Sports Illustrated and Newsweek, at the time. Here was a magazine that purported to speak to and for Asian Americans. Here was a magazine that, well, was supposed to be for people like me.

In the years that followed, I became an on-again, off-again reader, never subscribing but also never failing to flip through its pages when I spied copies on newsstands. I don’t recall ever being thoroughly impressed by it. To me, at least, the magazine smacked of shallow materialism and appeared too preoccupied with pop culture; I thought it was nothing more than a glossy lifestyle publication stuffed with puff profiles of Asian American celebrities. But I always appreciated its existence and visibility. At the very least, aMagazine put a new Asian American face on newsstands throughout the country six times a year, not an unremarkable accomplishment when major news magazines rarely featured Asian Americans on their covers.

So it was with ambivalence that I greeted the news of the magazine’s demise last year. aMagazine had merged with Click2Asia, a website geared toward young, Internet-savvy Asian Americans flush with cash, and when the site shut down last February, it brought down the magazine as well. aMagazine issued its own public farewell. In a terse but heartfelt statement, the staff thanked its contributors, advertisers, and subscribers. I wasn’t sure whether to feel glee or gloom.

In spite of (or because of) my initial impressions of aMagazine, I spent a few days at the New York Public Library reading back issues. At first these sessions confirmed my suspicions about the publication’s editorial direction. Most of the articles left a saccharine aftertaste, but I came to realize that, as far as Asian Americana goes, aMagazine was the best thing out there.

Not just another pretty face

aMagazine arose out of a Harvard campus publication for Asian Americans in the late 1980s. Editor Jeff Yang would become a central figure at aMagazine as co-founder, editor, and publisher. The magazine’s original aim was to fill a void not addressed by either the mainstream press (which appeared not to care about issues pertaining to Asian Americans) or the various ethnic presses (which did not cater to an English-speaking audience).

In true plucky upstart fashion, the founders set up shop in a Brooklyn basement in 1989. A trail of offices maps its ascent: Chinatown, then Soho, then Midtown. Cheap paper and a crude layout gave way to glossy elegance, then a profusion of colors and graphics. The semiannual became a quarterly, and by early 1995, aMagazine had gone bimonthly. By 1999, it enjoyed a circulation of about 180,000 and advertising sales of around $1.1 million. By any reasonable standard, the publication could be considered a success.

A quick review of the archives shows that aMagazine emulated Vanity Fair‘s formula: reel readers in with a celebrity on the cover, then run news-driven or investigative articles within. aMagazine certainly wasn’t going to sell copies by showcasing Paul Igasaki, the vice chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or Norman Mineta, the Bush administration’s transportation secretary. (To be fair, it’s not like my mug shot could ever induce anyone to cough up $3.50 either.) So sultry actress Tamlyn Tomita, heartthrob chef Ming Tsai, and tennis standout Michael Chang would have to do the hawking. Of course, whenever the stateside celebrity supply threatened to run out, the overseas reinforcements could always be shipped in: Chinese actress Gong Li or Hong Kong leading man Chow Yun-Fat.

Yang, to his credit, understood the compromise. In 1996, he acknowledged the difficulty of achieving a balance between covering social issues that were important to Asian Americans and wooing advertisers. Furthermore, he recognized the opportunity his magazine had to shine a spotlight on people of political or cultural significance who otherwise may have gone unnoticed by the national press. “There aren’t enough positive, or at least interesting Asian American role models out there,” he told the New York Times. “We want to pull the shroud off of people who have achieved, not just people who have made lots of money but who are lifelong activists or artists.”

To this end, aMagazine brought exposure to such people as emerging playwright Naomi Iizuka, novelist Lois Ann Yamanaka, and politician John C. Liu, the first Asian American elected to the City Council in New York. It also opened its pages to Karen Narasaki, the executive director of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, and Christine Chen, the eventual director of the Organization of Chinese Americans, who wrote about Congressional legislation mandating an English-only rule in classrooms and the national effort to increase voter participation among Asian Pacific Americans, respectively.

Always a bad sign: an awards show

Still, that precarious balance seemed to shift away from thoughtful articles about politics and culture as the magazine increasingly emphasized lifestyle. In its later years, aMagazine ran articles on food, travel, and health on a regular basis. An advice columnist and horoscopes popped up, and fashion and style dominated the publication more and more. The magazine soon resembled a catalogue; one issue touted cashmere pillows, linen pajamas, and flannel slippers. And nothing could encapsulate aMagazine‘s preoccupation with glamour and celebrity more than the Ammy Awards, an annual gala event started in 2000 to celebrate Asian America’s presence in Hollywood. The awards allowed the magazine’s readers to nominate candidates for such categories as “Best Hollywood Picture” and “Best Performance by an Asian/Asian American Female Actor in a Cinematic Production;” winners were selected by a panel composed of Asian Americans in the entertainment industry.

Yet, amid all this bling-bling and celebrity worship, I found some inspiring, truly insightful journalism. These articles investigated important issues and painted a richer, more engaging portrait of Asian America. One such article was written by Phil Tajitsu Nash, founding executive director of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium. His clear-sighted profile in the February/March 1996 issue of Dinesh D’Souza, the conservative pundit who first gained notoriety with 1987’s Illiberal Education, highlighted the peculiar role of Asian Americans in society. “Being neither black nor white in a society with a bipolar view of race, he personifies the dilemma facing all Asian Americans,” wrote Nash. “They, like South Africa’s infamous ‘colored’ class, must submit to and support a racially unjust status quo as the price of conditional acceptance as ‘model minorities.'”

In addition, writer Terry Hong offered an intriguing exposition of the ideas of Frank Chin, the controversial literary figure and co-editor of Aiiieeeee!: An Anthology of Asian American Writers, in the February/March 1995 issue. Chin claimed that literature written by mainstream Asian American authors such as Maxine Hong Kingston, Amy Tan, and David Henry Hwang are rooted in myth. “These false books are great literary flaws that only work in the Western language, that only appeal to those who believe in the Western stereotype of the Chinese,” Chin told Hong. “It’s white racist text. I mean it .  . . . Their version of Chinese America wants to be white, to think white, to marry whites, and therefore become culturally and racially extinct.” What is so remarkable about Hong’s piece is that it allows Chin to undermine the very sort of figure that aMagazine lived to venerate.

Karl Taro Greenfeld, now editor of Time Asia, wrote an article that also deserves mention. In the August/September 1995 edition, he profiled the emergence of Asian American actresses in the adult video industry. In particular, he examined the lives of porn stars Asia Carrera and Annabel Chong. I was surprised to see that aMagazine didn’t flinch from covering such a salacious topic. (Could you imagine Carrera or Chong sashaying across the red carpet to accept her Ammy Award?) It was a glimpse into the shadows of the Asian American community that presented a more wide-ranging view of Asian American identity.

Another distinguished article, published in February/March 2000, investigated the plight of Wen Ho Lee, the Taiwanese-American nuclear scientist at Los Alamos who was jailed after being accused of passing along state secrets to China. Hindsight reveals that aMagazine‘s piece ran just as Lee’s fortunes began to subtly shift, though few knew it at the time. To bring attention to this civil rights case when it did showed editorial courage and a keen sense of timing.

Out of the ashes?

I couldn’t help but detect the distinct odor of irony when I noticed that both the last issue of aMagazine and the February 18, 2002 issue of Newsweek displayed ice skater Michelle Kwan on their covers. Then I recalled that baseball superstar Ichiro Suzuki had not only recently appeared on the front of aMagazine, but also on several issues of Sports Illustrated. If figures such as Kwan and Ichiro graced the covers of prominent mainstream magazines, did Asian Americans need aMagazine anymore?

After reviewing the history of aMagazine, the answer is yes. Many intriguing political, social, and cultural issues were mined–and still could be. Call me greedy, but it’s not enough just to put Asian American faces on magazine covers. Ask yourself if Newsweek or Time would ever explore controversies in Asian American literature or probe the difficulties associated with possessing an Asian American identity in the political or intellectual arenas? Or just glance at Newsweek‘s puff profile of Kwan last year: “Look for a 21-year-old L.A. babe who’s an A-list celebrity, whose boyfriend is an NHL defenseman and who abruptly canned both her longtime choreographer and her coach last year–in short, a Kwan ready to kick ice.” The piece was thorough, but nary a word about the infamous–infamous, at least, in the Asian American community–headline on MSNBC’s website after the California-born Kwan lost the gold medal to Tara Lipinski at Nagano in 1998: “American beats out Kwan.” Now, I don’t think this issue should have dominated the Newsweek piece, but I would have liked to hear Kwan’s thoughts about it (or see if she would have been willing to talk about it at all). Shedding light on the gaffe could have prevented the same error in the Seattle Times, which ran this secondary headline after Kwan lost at Salt Lake City to Sarah Hughes: “American outshines Kwan.” Whoopsy daisy.

Well, aMagazine might be on its way back. A holding company called GC3 and Associates currently owns Click2Asia and aMagazine, according to Pierre Wuu, associate partner of GC3 and CEO of Click2Asia. GC3 recently relaunched Click2Asia as an online dating site for Asians and is reviewing plans to revive aMagazine.

Unlike its first launch, however, aMagazine will have to take a look in the rearview mirror. Publications such as Yolk, which reads like a dumbed-down version of Maxim, and Giant Robot, which covers Asian pop culture cool, have gained formidable followings. An upstart magazine called Hyphen, based in San Francisco, will release its first issue this March. In contrast to Yolk and Giant Robot, Hyphen will adopt a more generalist approach, mixing serious investigative reporting with light cultural fare. More like aMagazine, in other words.

If aMagazine indeed relaunches, if Hyphen overcomes the inevitable obstacles of starting up, and if Yolk and Giant Robot continue to roll along, the competition will be exciting. The editors of each will all have to keep close tabs on the others. They may also have to vie for the same advertising dollars, and they will certainly be vying for content. The struggle may not be pretty, but collectively, the magazines would cover the Asian American community broadly and allow Asian American writers to make themselves heard on issues long ignored by America’s mainstream media.

Let the battle begin.

STORY INDEX

CONTRIBUTORS >

The writer
William S. Lin, Inthefray.com Contributor

The artist
Marvin Allegro, Inthefray.com Contributor

MARKETPLACE >
A portion of each sale goes to Inthefray.com

Aiiieeeee!: An Anthology of Asian American Writers
Edited by Frank Chin, et al | New American Library | 1974 Amazon.com

Illiberal Education
Dinesh D’Souza | Free Press | 1987 Amazon.com

ORGANIZATIONS >

National Asian American Telecommunications Association
URL: http://www.naatanet.org/
Official website

PEOPLE >

Carerra, Asia
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Carrera,+Asia

Chen, Christine
Announcement and profile
URL: http://www.ocanatl.org/news/pr05222001.html
Organization of Chinese Americans

Chong, Annabel
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Chong,+Annabel

Chow, Yun-Fat
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Chow,+Yun-Fat

Gong, Li
Filmography
URL: http://us.imdb.com/Name?Gong,+Li

Iizuka, Naomi
Profile and catalogue
URL: http://www.newdramatists.org/naomi_iizuka.htm
New Dramatists

Lee, Wen Ho
Official website
URL: http://www.wenholee.org

Liu, John C.
Official website
URL: http://www.liunewyork.com

Naraski, Karen
Profile
URL: http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/pnarabio.html
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium

Yamanaka, Lois Ann
Profile
URL: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0880669.html

PUBLICATIONS >

aMagazine
URL: http://www.aonline.com

Vanity Fair
URL: http://www.vanityfair.com

Yolk
URL: http://www.yolk.com

Giant Robot
URL: http://www.giantrobot.com

Hyphen
URL: http://hyphenmagazine.com

Click2Asia
URL: http://www.click2asia.com

 

The Twelve Principles of Attitudinal Healing

1. The essence of our being is love.

1. The essence of our being is love.

2. Health is inner peace, and healing is letting go of fear.

3. Giving and receiving are the same.

4. We can let go of the past and of the future.

5. Now is the only time there is, and each instant is for giving.

6. We can learn to love ourselves and others by forgiving rather than judging.

7. We can become love finders rather than fault finders.

8. We can choose and direct ourselves to be peaceful inside regardless of what is happening outside.

9. We are students and teachers to each other.

10. We can focus on the whole of life rather than the fragments.

11. Since love is eternal, death need not be viewed as fearful.

12. We can always perceive ourselves and others as either extending love or giving a call for help.

Go back to Let the Rhythm Soothe You.