The appeal of al-Qaeda

Vacuous editorials are always frustrating, and David Brook’s column in today’s New York Times is particularly bewildering.

The heart of Brook’s argument is that “Whether you believe in God or not, the Bible and commentaries on the Bible can be read as instructions about what human beings are like and how they are likely to behave. Moreover, this biblical wisdom is deeper and more accurate than the wisdom offered by the secular social sciences …”

While I find Brook’s argument to be unfounded and bizarre, he is, of course, entitled to his own views on religion and social science. Where I pick a quarrel is in his assertion that “thoroughly secularized listeners lack the mental equipment to even begin to understand” statements made by al-Qaeda. Secularism is not at the root of why certain segments of the American population — secular or otherwise — fail to understand the motivation of those who join al-Qaeda and why the movement has been so effectively terrifying. Religiosity does not necessarily make anyone understand the allure of a violent Islamist movement. Judging from the caliber of scholarship and the intellectual rigor he demonstrates in his article, I doubt that Mr. Brooks understands what drives individuals to join al-Qaeda.

By limiting his understanding of al-Qaeda as a purely religious organization, Mr. Books fails to understand the historical, economic, political, and cultural context that has given rise to Islamist movements and their extremist segments. Mr. Brooks fails to recognize that we must adopt a complex and kaleidoscopic view of the factors that contributed to the rise in Islamist movements and the allure of al-Qaeda.

There are many factors that contribute to anti-American sentiment and the resurgence in Islamist movements that began in the 1960s and 1970s that continue today.  These factors include: the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the failure of “modern secular nationalism,” the Egyptian-Israeli war and Arab oil embargo in 1973, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Wahhabi oil connection, the concrete consequences of modernization in the Muslim world such as rapid population growth, an increase in urban population, mass literacy, a large young segment of the population, and high poverty and unemployment rates. Gilles Kepel, in Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, offers an excellent explanation of the subject, and I would challenge Mr. Brooks and those who share his views to understand the social, political, and historical context for al-Qaeda and to grapple with why some individuals find joining al-Qaeda to be such an attractive option. Limiting such a movement to the sphere of religion is to fail to understand its context, appeal and motivation.  

Mimi Hanaoka